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Summary
The pharmaceutical market has become increas-ingly competitive since the early 1980s, in partbecause of the dramatic growth of the generic
drug industry.  In 1996, 43 percent of the prescription
drugs sold in the United States (as measured in total
countable units, such as tablets and capsules) were
generic.  Twelve years earlier, the figure was just 19
percent.  Generic drugs cost less than their brand-
name, or "innovator," counterparts.  Thus, they have
played an important role in holding down national
spending on prescription drugs from what it would
otherwise have been.  Considering only sales through
pharmacies, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
estimates that by substituting generic for brand-name
drugs, purchasers saved roughly $8 billion to $10 bil-
lion in 1994 (at retail prices).  
Three factors are behind the dramatic rise in
sales of generic drugs that has made those savings
possible.  First, the Drug Price Competition and Pat-
ent Term Restoration Act of 1984—commonly known
as the Hatch-Waxman Act—made it easier and less
costly for manufacturers to enter the market for ge-
neric, nonantibiotic drugs.  Second, by 1980, most
states had passed drug-product substitution laws that
allowed pharmacists to dispense a generic drug even
when the prescription called for a brand-name drug.
And third, some government health programs, such as
Medicaid, and many private health insurance plans
have actively promoted such generic substitution.
Greater sales of generic drugs reduce the returns
that pharmaceutical companies earn from developing
brand-name drugs.  The Hatch-Waxman Act aimed to
limit that effect by extending the length of time that a
new drug is under patent—and thus protected from
generic competitors.  Those extensions compensate for
the fact that part of the time a drug is under patent it is
being reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) rather than being sold.  The act tried to balance
two competing objectives:  encouraging competition
from generic drugs while maintaining the incentive to
invest in developing innovative drugs.  It fell some-
what short of achieving that balance, however, in part
because the act shortened the average time between the
expiration of a brand-name drug's patent and the ar-
rival of generic copies on the market (so-called generic
entry) from more than three years to less than three
months.  More important, it also greatly increased the
number of drugs that experience generic competition
and, thus, contributed to an increase in the supply of
generic drugs.  In the end, the cost to producers of
brand-name drugs from faster generic entry has
roughly offset the benefit they receive from extended
patent terms.  Meanwhile, the greater competition
from generic drugs has somewhat eroded their ex-
pected returns from research and development.  
CBO estimates that those factors have lowered
the average returns from marketing a new drug by
roughly 12 percent (or $27 million in 1990 dollars).
In this study, "returns from marketing a new drug"
refers to the present discounted value of the total
stream of future profits expected from an average
brand-name drug.  Previous studies estimate that those
profits had an average present discounted value of
$210 million to $230 million (in 1990 dollars) for
drugs introduced in the early 1980s. Those returns are
x  HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS July 1998
valued at the date of market introduction, after sub-
tracting production costs but not the costs of research
and development.  Also, because the drugs in those
studies were not eligible for the patent-term extensions
provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act, those estimates
do not account for the benefits of the extensions now
available under the act.  Thus, those figures can be
considered a minimum estimate of the returns from
marketing.  Only part of the estimated decline in re-
turns can be attributed to the Hatch-Waxman Act; the
other factors that have boosted sales of generic drugs
have played a role as well.
This study relies on a variety of data to produce
its estimates, including a data set that represents about
70 percent of prescription drug sales through retail
pharmacies in the United States.  The various sets of
data all have strengths and weaknesses, which are dis-
cussed along with the estimates they generate.  In gen-
eral, the empirical estimates in this study are rough
rather than precise measures.  They help characterize
the increase in competition in the pharmaceutical mar-
ket and its effects on the profits of drug manufacturers
and the prices paid for prescription drugs.
The Effects of Managed Care
on the Pharmaceutical Market
At the same time that the Hatch-Waxman Act has
helped increase the supply of generic drugs, changes in
the demand for pharmaceuticals have affected the fre-
quency with which generic and brand-name drugs are
prescribed and the prices paid for them.  Those
changes in demand were brought on by newer forms of
health care delivery and financing.  In particular, be-
cause of competitive pressure in the health insurance
market, more private-sector health plans have adopted
managed care techniques in an effort to hold down
overall health spending.  The net effect of those tech-
niques on spending for prescription drugs, however, is
unclear.
On the one hand, many health plans (including
traditional fee-for-service plans) hold down drug costs
by "managing" their outpatient prescription drug
benefits—either themselves or through organizations
called pharmaceutical benefit management companies
(PBMs).  Those plans and PBMs use computer net-
works at pharmacies and electronic card systems for
enrollees that allow pharmacists, before filling an
enrollee's prescription, to consult a list (or formulary)
of the plan's suggested drugs.  Formularies typically
encourage substituting brand-name drugs with generic
versions, or sometimes with other, less expensive
brand-name drugs.  Savings result not only because of
that substitution but also because many manufacturers
of brand-name drugs offer discounts to health plans or
PBMs in exchange for being included on their formu-
lary.  In addition, because they represent a large pool
of customers, PBMs can negotiate with pharmacies
over the retail prices charged for prescriptions.  Since
the late 1980s, those various techniques have been
putting downward pressure on the prices that PBMs
and health plans pay for prescription drugs sold
through pharmacies.
On the other hand, health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMOs) and some other managed care plans fre-
quently charge lower copayments for health care ser-
vices—including physician visits and prescription
drugs—than traditional fee-for-service plans do.
Those lower copayments may lead to greater use of
prescription drugs by beneficiaries.  The treatment
practices of HMOs may also favor more intensive use
of prescription drugs, perhaps as an alternative to
costlier forms of treatment.  As a result, the increasing
prevalence of managed care plans may have helped
boost the quantity of prescription drugs sold in the
United States.
For brand-name drugs still under patent (which
do not yet have generic competitors), managed care
techniques may have only a small effect on profits,
assuming that greater use offsets the downward pres-
sure on prices.  For brand-name drugs whose patents
have expired, however, profits are probably lower than
they would have been without the generic substitution
promoted in part by managed care plans and PBMs;
that substitution has cut dramatically into the market
share of those drugs.  (CBO's calculation of the
change in returns accounts for the full increase in ge-
neric market share since 1984, part of which is attrib-
utable to the rise in managed care techniques, but it
does not measure managed care's effect on profitabil-
ity through other variables, such as increases in pre-
scription drug use and changes in pricing.)
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Pricing and Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Market
Competition in the pharmaceutical market takes three
forms:  among brand-name drugs that are therapeuti-
cally similar, between brand-name drugs and generic
substitutes, and among generic versions of the same
drug.  Manufacturers of brand-name drugs compete
for market share primarily through advertising and the
quality of their products (including efficacy and side
effects), as well as through pricing.  Manufacturers of
generic drugs increase their market share mainly by
lowering prices.  (In general, companies produce either
generic or brand-name drugs, not both, although some
generic manufacturers are subsidiaries of brand-name
manufacturers.)
Competition Among Brand-Name
Drugs
Patents do not grant complete monopoly power in the
pharmaceutical industry.  The reason is that compa-
nies can frequently discover and patent several differ-
ent drugs that use the same basic mechanism to treat
an illness.  The first drug using the new mechanism to
treat that illness—the breakthrough drug—usually has
between one and six years on the market before a ther-
apeutically similar patented drug (sometimes called a
"me-too" drug) is introduced.  Economic theory and
various studies suggest that the presence of several
therapeutically similar drugs limits manufacturers'
ability to raise prices as much as would otherwise be
the case.  In addition, brand-name manufacturers are
more likely to agree to give purchasers a discount if
those purchasers have the option of switching to a ge-
neric or me-too competitor.
The factors that limit the number of similar but
slightly differentiated brand-name drugs on the market
are unclear.  In some cases, perhaps, only a limited
number of slightly different chemicals that target a
given enzyme can be developed into drugs.  Or, as one
economist has suggested, the high cost of developing a
drug may limit the number of similar brand-name
drugs that are eventually brought to market.  Compa-
nies will undertake such investment only if they be-
lieve the market is not already saturated or their drug
has some quality advantage that could enable it to
compete effectively and earn an adequate return.  For
that reason, competition among patented brand-name
drugs probably results in companies' earning roughly a
normal rate of return on their investment in research
and development (R&D), on average.
Overall, the pharmaceutical market is not highly
concentrated, but when that market is divided into nar-
rowly defined therapeutic classes, it becomes quite
concentrated.  The top manufacturers of brand-name
drugs, ranked by pharmaceutical sales, each account
for no more than 7 percent of the entire market for
prescription drugs (which totaled $60.7 billion in 1995
at manufacturer prices).  Within each therapeutic
class, however, higher levels of concentration appear.
In 35 of the 66 therapeutic classes that CBO examined
in this study, the top three innovator drugs together
constituted at least 80 percent of retail pharmacy sales
in their class.
Studies of the average prices paid by pharmacies
and hospitals have shown that manufacturers of
brand-name drugs do compete with each other through
pricing.  The markups they charge over the marginal
cost of producing a drug are consistent with economic
models of price competition in which entry by manu-
facturers is limited (such as by patents).  Offering dis-
counts to some buyers may also be an important di-
mension of price competition for brand-name drugs.
But its extent is difficult to measure because of lack of
data.
Discounts on Brand-Name Drugs
Different buyers pay different prices for brand-name
prescription drugs.  In theory, when companies are
permitted to charge different types of purchasers dif-
ferent prices, those purchasers least sensitive to price
will pay the most.  In today's market for outpatient
drugs, purchasers that have no insurance coverage for
drugs, or third-party payers that do not use a formu-
lary to manage their outpatient drug benefits, pay the
highest prices for brand-name drugs.
Manufacturers offer discounts on brand-name
drugs based not only on the volume purchased but also
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on the buyer's ability to affect the drug's market share
by using a formulary to systematically favor one
brand-name drug over another for a large number of
patients.  Pharmacies themselves do not generally pro-
mote substitution between brand-name drugs, so they
do not generally receive large discounts or rebates
from manufacturers.  Rather, it is the PBMs and in-
surers who manage benefits for drugs sold through
pharmacies that promote brand-name substitution and
receive discounts.
Such price discrimination, or discounting, may
be an important mechanism for facilitating price com-
petition in the pharmaceutical market.  It rewards in-
stitutional purchasers that organize their patient base
through formularies so as to encourage the use of less
costly drugs.  Prohibiting discounts, as some policy-
makers have called for, could decrease price competi-
tion.
Drug companies usually do not make their dis-
counts public, but CBO was able to obtain limited
information on the prices paid by different types of
purchasers for prescription drugs.  The prices that
pharmacies pay can be seen as a proxy for the final
price paid by customers who do not have a managed
drug benefit or PBM to negotiate rebates from manu-
facturers.  Based on the average invoice prices for top-
selling drugs sold primarily to retail pharmacies, hos-
pitals and clinics pay 9 percent less than retail phar-
macies, on average, and HMOs pay 18 percent less.
Federal facilities, such as veterans' hospitals, get an
even more substantial discount—over 40 percent, on
average, compared with the price paid by retail phar-
macies.  (Those comparisons are based only on in-
voice prices, so they do not account for rebates and
other types of discounts that do not appear on in-
voices.)
Statistical analysis shows that manufacturers'
discounts on brand-name drugs tend to be higher when
more generic and me-too drugs are available.  That
analysis is based on the difference between the average
price paid by pharmacies and the lowest price paid by
any private purchaser in the United States (the best-
price discount), as reported under the Medicaid drug
rebate program.   CBO found that the best-price dis-
count for a brand-name drug was 10 to 14 percentage
points greater when a generic version was available
from four or more manufacturers.   That analysis also
showed that as the number of brand-name manufactur-
ers in a therapeutic class increases from one to five,
the best-price discount grows by 10 percentage points.
Those statistical results imply that discounts are at
least partly a response to competitive market condi-
tions and may be a sign of greater price competition in
some segments of the pharmaceutical market.
Competition Between Brand-Name 
and Generic Drugs
The Hatch-Waxman Act eliminated the duplicative
tests that had been required for a generic drug to ob-
tain approval from the FDA.  (That change applied
only to nonantibiotic drugs, since antibiotics already
had an abbreviated approval process.)  Before 1984,
manufacturers of generic drugs were required to inde-
pendently prove the safety and efficacy of their prod-
ucts.  They were prohibited from using the unpub-
lished test results of the original innovator drug, which
were considered trade secrets of its manufacturer.1
The Hatch-Waxman Act streamlined the process for
approving generic drugs by requiring only that manu-
facturers demonstrate "bioequivalence" to an already-
approved innovator drug.  (Bioequivalence means that
the active ingredient is absorbed at the same rate and
to the same extent for the generic drug as for the inno-
vator drug.)  The tests necessary to prove bioequiva-
lence are much less costly than those required to prove
safety and efficacy.
By accelerating the approval process for a ge-
neric drug and also allowing its producer to begin clin-
ical tests before the patent on the innovator drug had
expired, the Hatch-Waxman Act reduced the average
delay between patent expiration and generic entry
from more than three years to less than three months
for top-selling drugs.  Even more important, the act
increased the proportion of brand-name drugs that
face generic competition once their patents expire.  In
1983, only 35 percent of the top-selling drugs with
expired patents (excluding antibiotics and drugs ap-
proved before 1962) had generic versions available.
Today, nearly all do.
1. This study uses the terms "brand-name" and "innovator" inter-
changeably.
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After a drug's patent expires, generic copies
quickly gain a large share of its market.  CBO exam-
ined 21 brand-name prescription drugs in its retail
pharmacy data set that first saw generic competition
between 1991 and 1993.  Within their first full calen-
dar year after patent expiration, those drugs lost an
average of 44 percent of their market (as measured by
the quantity of prescriptions sold through pharmacies)
to generic drugs.  And the generic versions cost an
average of 25 percent less than the original brand-
name drugs at retail prices.  That rapid growth in ge-
neric market share after patent expiration is a substan-
tial change from the situation before the 1984 Hatch-
Waxman Act.  In 1983, for example, generic market
share averaged just 13 percent for nonantibiotic drugs.
Various studies have found that generic entry has
little effect on the prices of brand-name drugs, which
continue to increase faster than inflation.  CBO's anal-
ysis of the average prices that manufacturers charge
for drugs distributed to retail pharmacies is consistent
with that result.  However, CBO's analysis of dis-
counting shows that certain purchasers other than re-
tail pharmacies receive steeper discounts on brand-
name drugs once generic alternatives are available.
Taken together, those results imply that the impact of
generic entry on brand-name prices may vary consid-
erably among different types of purchasers.
Even if brand-name prices frequently do not re-
spond to generic competition, such competition can
effectively save money because price-sensitive buyers
may switch to lower-priced generic drugs.  CBO esti-
mates that in 1994, purchasers saved a total of $8 bil-
lion to $10 billion on prescriptions at retail pharmacies
by substituting generic drugs for their brand-name
counterparts.  (That estimate assumes that all of the
generic prescriptions dispensed in 1994 would have
been filled with a higher-priced brand-name drug if a
generic drug was not available.)
Competition Among Generic Drugs
By making generic entry easier and less costly, the
Hatch-Waxman Act helped increase the number of
generic manufacturers producing the same drug.  As
the number of manufacturers rises, the average pre-
scription price of a generic drug falls.  CBO's analysis
shows that when one to 10 firms are manufacturing
and distributing generic forms of a particular drug, the
generic retail price of that drug averages about 60 per-
cent of the brand-name price.  When more than 10
manufacturers have entered the market, the average
generic prescription price falls to less than half of the
brand-name price.
The Effects of the Hatch-
Waxman Act on the Returns
from Innovation
The patent provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act have
not completely protected drug companies' profits from
the dramatic rise in generic competition since 1984.
Manufacturers of brand-name drugs invest an average
of about $200 million (in 1990 dollars) to bring a new
drug to market, when the cost of capital and the cost
of failures (investment in drugs that never make it to
market) are included.  Patent protection enables manu-
facturers to earn an adequate return on that invest-
ment.  By itself, generic entry increases the rate at
which sales erode after patent expiration, thus reduc-
ing the returns from marketing a new drug.  Two stud-
ies have estimated that drugs introduced in the early
1980s earned returns that exceeded their capitalized
costs of development by $22 million to $36 million, on
average.  (Those figures represent the present dis-
counted value in 1990 dollars.)  CBO concludes that
since 1984, the expected returns from marketing a new
drug have declined by about 12 percent, or $27 million
in 1990 dollars.  That decline has probably not made
drug development unprofitable on average, but it may
have made some specific projects unprofitable.
Changes to the Length of Patents 
for Brand-Name Drugs
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, drugs that contain a
new chemical entity never before approved by the
FDA can qualify for an extension of their patent term.
Those extensions, granted after the drug is approved,
equal half of the time the drug spent in clinical testing
(usually a total of six to eight years) plus all of the
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time it spent having the FDA review its new drug ap-
plication (usually about two years).  Two key limita-
tions apply.  First, the extension cannot be longer than
five years, and second, it cannot grant a total period of
patent protection that exceeds 14 years after the drug
is approved.
The 14-year limit is the main reason that Hatch-
Waxman extensions now average about three years in
length.  Fifty-one drugs approved between 1992 and
1995 received an extension.  Excluding the eight drugs
that were subject to a transitional two-year cap (which
applied to products already in testing when the act
took effect), half of the drugs had their extensions lim-
ited by the 14-year cap.
Not all of the new drugs that are approved obtain
an extension.  Out of 101 drugs approved between
1992 and 1995, 38 did not apply for a Hatch-Waxman
extension.  Nineteen of those drugs had no patent to
extend, and 15 others already had 14 years of patent
protection left after obtaining FDA approval.
Besides patent-term extensions, the Hatch-
Waxman Act contains other provisions that postpone
generic competition.  One key provision is the require-
ment that manufacturers wait five years after an inno-
vator drug is approved before filing an application to
sell a generic copy.  That requirement benefits drugs
that have no patent, or that have very little time left
under patent, when they are approved.  That exclusiv-
ity provision, together with the patent-term extensions,
postpones generic entry by an average of 2.8 years for
all drugs approved that contain a new chemical entity.
Another exclusivity provision delays generic entry for
three years when a new application is approved that
requires clinical tests (such as for a new dosage form
or over-the-counter version of an already-approved
drug).
Ten years after the Hatch-Waxman Act, another
piece of federal legislation—the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act of 1994 (URAA)—further changed
the patent terms of prescription drugs.  That act al-
tered the length of a patent for all types of inventions
to 20 years from the date the application is filed rather
than 17 years from the date the patent is granted.
That change should have little effect on the average
amount of time between market introduction and pat-
ent expiration for brand-name drugs patented after
June 8, 1995 (most of which have yet to be introduced
on the market).  However, many products that were
already under patent by that date have benefited from
the URAA, since their manufacturers can choose be-
tween the 17-year and 20-year patent terms and still
be eligible for a Hatch-Waxman extension.
The Change in Returns from Innovation
As noted earlier, the Hatch-Waxman Act greatly in-
creased the probability that a generic copy would be-
come available once the patent on a brand-name drug
expired.  It also contributed to a dramatic rise in ge-
neric market share.  In addition, the act reduced the
delay between patent expiration and generic entry, but
that acceleration was roughly offset by patent-term
extensions and exclusivity provisions that postpone
generic entry.
CBO estimates that the increase in the size of the
generic market since 1984—part of which is attribut-
able to the act—has reduced the expected level of re-
turns from marketing a brand-name drug by an aver-
age of $27 million in 1990 dollars. That amount is
roughly 12 percent of the total discounted returns from
selling a brand-name drug, which previous studies
have estimated at $210 million to $230 million in 1990
dollars for drugs introduced in the early 1980s.
(Those figures represent the present discounted value
of the total stream of profits from those drugs dis-
counted to the date of market introduction, deducting
manufacturing costs but not R&D costs.)  That 12
percent decline does not change significantly under
reasonable variations in CBO's underlying assump-
tions.
Other factors besides the Hatch-Waxman Act
have played a role in increasing the frequency of ge-
neric competition and the average size of generic mar-
ket share.  For example, changes in state laws have
given pharmacists more leeway to substitute generic
drugs for brand-name ones.  And for reasons of cost,
many purchasers have put increasing emphasis on ge-
neric substitution.
Total returns from selling a brand-name pre-
scription drug vary significantly among different
drugs.  As noted above, the average cost of developing
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such drugs, including failures, is around $200 million
in 1990 dollars.  But on average only three in 10 drugs
earn that much in discounted returns (after deducting
manufacturing, advertising, distribution, and other
non-R&D-related costs).  For most drugs, the returns
from marketing do not exceed the average capitalized
costs of development.  As a result, for a company's
average returns to exceed its average development
costs, the company must discover and market a highly
profitable drug from time to time.
For all drugs, on average, the increase in generic
sales since 1984 has probably not reduced expected
returns below the average capitalized costs of R&D.
On the margin, however, it is possible that a few drugs
that were barely profitable to develop before may no
longer be so now.
CBO's calculation of the change in average re-
turns since 1984 considers only increased generic en-
try and longer patent terms.  It does not include many
other changes that could either increase or decrease
those returns—such as any rise in the volume of pre-
scription drugs sold that might result as HMOs substi-
tute drugs for more expensive forms of treatment and
frequently charge lower copayments for prescription
drugs and physicians' services.  In addition, managed
care plans and PBMs are putting downward pressure
on the prices of brand-name drugs, which would tend
to reduce the returns from selling them.
On the other side, returns could increase because
drug companies' development projects may be improv-
ing as breakthroughs in the basic science of genetics
are converted into ideas for new drugs.  Moreover,
foreign markets for prescription drugs should keep
growing as the drug-approval process becomes
streamlined in Europe, and many other countries con-
tinue to strengthen patent-protection rights.
Between 1983 and 1995, investment in R&D as
a percentage of pharmaceutical sales by brand-name
drug companies increased from 14.7 percent to 19.4
percent.  Over the same period, U.S. pharmaceutical
sales by those companies rose from $17 billion to $57
billion (in current dollars).  Overall, then, the changes
that have occurred since 1984 appear to be favoring
investment in drug development.
Effects of Changing the Hatch-
Waxman Act
Some representatives of the pharmaceutical industry
have called for amending the Hatch-Waxman Act to
lengthen patent-term extensions.  However, doing that
would not encourage innovation as much as accelerat-
ing the FDA approval process by the same amount
would.  The reason is that lengthening patent terms
increases profits today for drugs whose patents are
about to expire, but it does not have as great an im-
pact on the incentive to invest in R&D—that is, on the
expected average value of the profits from marketing a
drug.  CBO calculates that increasing the average pat-
ent term by one year would raise the expected value of
those profits by about $12 million in 1990 dollars.
Accelerating the FDA review period by one year
would boost returns by much more—about $22 mil-
lion in 1990 dollars.  Thus, policies that speed up the
FDA approval process without sacrificing the safety
and efficacy of drugs are much more beneficial to both
the pharmaceutical industry and consumers than is
lengthening the patent-protection period.
 
Chapter One
Introduction
Competition in the pharmaceutical market haschanged significantly.  During the past decade,many health insurance companies have con-
tracted out the management of their prescription drug
benefits to specialized pharmaceutical benefit manage-
ment companies (PBMs), and enrollment in managed
care health plans has increased.  In the previous de-
cade, many states repealed antisubstitution laws that
had prohibited pharmacists from dispensing generic
drugs in place of brand-name ones, and changes in
federal law sped up the approval process for generic
drugs.  All of those factors have contributed to a dra-
matic rise in sales of generic prescription drugs.  Ge-
neric drugs contain the same active ingredient as a
brand-name drug and enter the market after the patent
on the brand-name drug has expired.  Higher sales of
generic drugs in turn have led to lower average prices
for prescription drugs in general and a decline in re-
turns from marketing new drugs.
The prices of brand-name prescription drugs are
also facing downward pressure as many more pur-
chasers try to negotiate discounts from manufacturers.
In particular, PBMs and health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMOs) compile lists of suggested drugs (known
as formularies) for their enrollees that encourage the
use of generic drugs and less expensive brand-name
drugs.  The lure of being included on a large health
plan's formulary allows those plans to leverage dis-
counts on some brand-name drugs.  According to the
statistical analysis in this study, the discounts and re-
bates that some purchasers receive on brand-name
drugs tend to be larger when more therapeutically sim-
ilar brand-name drugs are available from different
manufacturers and when generic copies are available.
Such discounting may be an important source of price
competition among brand-name drugs.  However, as-
sessing the amount of drugs sold at a significant dis-
count is difficult, because sufficient data do not exist.
Market competition and federal policies have
affected not only drug prices but also the incentives
for companies to research and develop new drugs (in
other words, to innovate).  This study assesses the ex-
tent to which longer patents for innovative drugs—the
result of 1984 legislation—have offset the effects of
increased generic competition on the returns from mar-
keting new drugs.  The Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (commonly
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act) established provi-
sions for extending patent terms for innovative drugs.
At the same time, it reduced the testing requirements
for approval of generic drugs, allowing them to enter
the market—and thus cut into the sales of brand-name
drugs—more quickly.
Many other changes have occurred on both the
demand and supply side of the pharmaceutical market
that affect the returns from innovation.  This study
examines many of those changes, but it does not at-
tempt to explicitly measure their impact.  On the sup-
ply side, recent breakthroughs in genetics and biomed-
ical research have increased the technological opportu-
nities for developing new drugs.  On the demand side,
the increase in HMO enrollment and the spread of
managed care techniques to all forms of health insur-
ance have made many purchasers more sensitive to
drug prices and helped hold down those prices.  At the
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same time, under some forms of managed care, the
demand for prescription drugs may grow.  Because of
those diverging trends of lower prices and higher de-
mand, it is difficult to assess the net impact of the rise
in managed care on profits in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry.
The Basis for Competition 
Among Drug Companies
Prescription drugs can be divided into two categories:
innovator drugs and generic drugs.  (See Box 1 for a
glossary of various terms for prescription drugs.)  In-
novator drugs (which this study also refers to as
brand-name drugs) generally have a patent on their
chemical formulation or on their process of manufac-
ture.1  They have been approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), after extensive clinical testing,
under an original "new drug application" (NDA).  Pat-
ented brand-name drugs that are therapeutically simi-
lar may exist, but each has a different chemical formu-
lation. While they are still under patent protection,
innovator drugs are called single-source drugs, be-
cause only the company that holds the patent produces
them.  After the patent has expired, generic copies of
the exact chemical formulation usually become avail-
able.  Then such drugs are referred to as multiple-
source drugs.
Generic drugs obtain FDA approval under a
shorter process than innovator drugs.  They are re-
quired only to demonstrate "bioequivalence" to an in-
novator drug—in other words, to show that the active
ingredient is released and absorbed at the same rate for
the generic drug as for the corresponding innovator
drug.  Because they are copies rather than original
formulations, generic drugs are not patentable.
Manufacturers of prescription drugs can be di-
vided along similar lines:  companies that primarily
produce innovator drugs, and companies that focus on
Box 1.
Types of Prescription Drugs
innovator drug:  a drug that receives a patent on
its chemical formulation or manufacturing pro-
cess, obtains approval from the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) after extensive testing,
and is sold under a brand name.
brand-name drug:  as used in this study, an in-
novator drug.
generic drug:  a copy of an innovator drug, con-
taining the same active ingredients, that the FDA
judges to be comparable in terms of such factors
as strength, quality, and therapeutic effectiveness.
Generic copies may be sold after the patent on a
brand-name drug has expired.  Generic drugs are
generally sold under their chemical name rather
than under a brand name.
breakthrough drug:  the first brand-name drug
to use a particular therapeutic mechanism—that
is, to use a particular method of treating a given
disease.
me-too drug:  a brand-name drug that uses the
same therapeutic mechanism as a breakthrough
drug and therefore competes with it directly.
single-source drug:  a brand-name drug that is
still under patent and thus is usually available
from only one manufacturer.
multiple-source drug:  a drug available in both
brand-name and generic versions from a variety
of manufacturers.
generic drugs.  The two types of manufacturers com-
pete very differently in the market.  Producers of inno-
vator drugs invest heavily in research and development
(R&D), hoping to recoup that investment in profits
from future sales while a drug is under patent and they
have a monopoly on its manufacture.  Producers of
generic drugs do not need to duplicate the research
effort of the innovator firm or invest nearly as much in
getting FDA approval for their drugs.  However, since
those producers have neither patents nor a costly ap-
proval process to deter potential competitors, they
quickly face competition from other companies pro-
1. In a very small number of cases, generic drugs go by a brand name
rather than the drug's chemical name.  Those types of drugs are an
exception and represent less than 2 percent of total retail pharmacy sales
(based on tabulations of the Congressional Budget Office's data set on
retail pharmacy sales).  In this study, "brand-name drug" means an
innovator drug.
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ducing identical drugs.  That intense competition
forces generic manufacturers to charge much lower
prices than the innovator firm—which, even after its
patent expires, typically enjoys a market advantage
based on its reputation for producing a high-quality
product.
Although companies invest in research and devel-
opment because they expect high returns from the fu-
ture sales of their discoveries, those returns are consid-
erably skewed.  Some drugs have billion-dollar sales,
whereas others bring in less than $25 million a year.
For drug manufacturers to be successful, the present
value of their future profits from the sale of new prod-
ucts (discounted to the date the products were intro-
duced) must exceed the capitalized cost of their origi-
nal R&D investment (capitalized to the date of market
introduction), including investment in drugs that never
make it to the market.  Patents increase the rewards
for innovation by giving companies a temporary mo-
nopoly over marketing their discoveries.  Although
that monopoly status rewards the company with high
profits, consumers pay a higher price and get less out-
put than would be the case under competition.  But
that temporary monopoly status is often necessary to
provide sufficient incentives for drug companies to
invent the new products that benefit consumers.  With-
out patents, many new drugs could be easily and
quickly duplicated by other manufacturers, preventing
the innovator firm from obtaining enough reward to
justify its investment.
Patents do not grant total monopoly power to
companies in the pharmaceutical industry.  In many
cases, several chemicals can be developed that use the
same basic mechanisms to treat a disease.  Since a
patent applies to a specific chemical or production
process, different firms can end up patenting similar,
competing drugs based on the same innovative princi-
ple.  In addition, drug therapies often compete with
nondrug therapies.  Rather than having a pure monop-
oly, frequently drug companies produce slightly differ-
ent products—leading to a form of imperfect competi-
tion that allows an innovator firm to earn higher prof-
its than it could in a perfectly competitive market but
less than it would with a pure monopoly.
Changes Made by the Hatch-
Waxman Act
In passing the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, the Congress
attempted to balance the interests of the generic drug
industry against those of manufacturers of innovator
drugs.  That act contained two sets of changes.  First,
it eliminated the duplicative testing requirements nec-
essary to obtain approval for a generic copy of a pre-
viously approved innovator drug.  Specifically:
o It created an abbreviated approval process for
generic copies of innovator drugs.  A similar ab-
breviated process already existed under FDA
regulations for generic copies of antibiotics and
of innovator drugs approved before 1962.
o It allowed manufacturers of generic drugs to file
an abbreviated new drug application and conduct
clinical tests demonstrating bioequivalence with
a brand-name drug before that drug's patent ex-
pires.  As a result, the FDA can approve many of
those applications immediately after patent expi-
ration.  That provision overturned a 1984 deci-
sion by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit that clinical tests conducted by generic man-
ufacturers before patent expiration constitute
patent infringement.2
o It also established a process to handle patent dis-
putes between generic manufacturers and innova-
tor firms.
Those provisions helped to increase the availability of
generic drugs following patent expiration.
Second, the act established patent-term exten-
sions for innovator drugs.  Because such drugs receive
patents from the Patent and Trademark Office before
they receive approval from the FDA, part of their time
under patent is spent in the clinical trials necessary for
2. The case was Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical
Company, Inc.
 (733 F. 2d 858 Federal Circuit 1984).  See also Alan
D. Lourie, "Patent Term Restoration," Journal of the Patent Office
Society, vol. 66, no. 10 (October 1984), pp. 526-550; and Donald O.
Beers, Generic and Innovator Drugs: A Guide to FDA Approval
Requirements, 11th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Aspen Publishers,
1995), pp. 4-75 to 4-77.
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FDA approval.  The patent extensions were intended
to offset part of the patent term used up during the
approval process.3  Under the new procedures:
o Manufacturers of a newly approved innovator
drug that contains an active ingredient never be-
fore approved by the FDA can apply for a
patent-term extension that equals the sum of all
the time spent in the NDA review process plus
half of the time spent in the clinical testing phase.
Two limitations exist.  A patent-term extension
cannot exceed five years, nor can it allow the
period between product approval and patent ex-
piration to exceed 14 years. The average length
of patent-term extensions granted under this pro-
vision is three years.
o If an innovator drug is not protected by a patent,
it may still benefit from certain exclusivity provi-
sions that delay the approval or filing of an ab-
breviated new drug application in some cases. 
By extending patents on brand-name drugs while mak-
ing it easier for generic drugs to enter the market after
patents expire, the Hatch-Waxman Act aimed to bene-
fit consumers by increasing the supply of generic
drugs while preserving drug companies' incentive to
invest in research and development.4
Since the act took effect, pharmaceutical sales in
the United States have risen dramatically.  Between
1985 and 1995, sales of all prescription drugs by man-
ufacturers grew faster than total health care spending.
Valued at manufacturer prices, those sales increased
from $21.6 billion to $60.7 billion—or from 5.7 per-
cent to 6.9 percent of total health care expenditures in
the United States.5  Over the same period, spending on
drug research and development rose even faster, grow-
ing from 15.1 percent to 19.4 percent of brand-name
drug sales.6  Although increased competition from ge-
neric drugs by itself reduces the returns from innova-
tion, the rise in R&D spending indicates that, all fac-
tors taken together, a strong environment still exists
for investing in drug development.
Data Used in This Analysis
This study contains a variety of empirical estimates
that help to characterize competition in the pharma-
ceutical market and its impact on consumers and the
returns from marketing new drugs.  To produce those
estimates, the study draws on several data sets.  The
largest is a set of data on retail sales by pharmacies; it
represents about 70 percent of all sales of prescription
drugs through pharmacies at retail prices and covers
66 therapeutic classes of drugs.  Most of the estimates
in Chapter 3—which include market shares and prices
of brand-name and generic drugs and an attempt to
approximate the savings obtained from generic substi-
tution—rely on that data set.  The statistical analysis
of discounting in the pharmaceutical industry dis-
cussed in Chapter 3 also relies on that data set, as well
as on price information made available through
Medicaid's drug rebate program.
The calculation in Chapter 4 of changes in the
returns from marketing innovator drugs relies on an-
other set of data:  figures on the U.S. sales of 67 drugs
(introduced between 1980 and 1984) during their first
eight to 12 years on the market.  That calculation also
uses the retail pharmacy data set to estimate the mar-
ket share of generic drugs immediately after the patent
expiration of a brand-name drug.
Each of those data sets has its own strengths and
weaknesses, which are discussed along with the empir-
ical results.  A summary of the estimates made in this
study, together with the methods and data sets that
were used, appears in Appendix A.
3. See 35 U.S.C. 156(c), 98 Stat. 1598.
4. See, for example, the opening statement by Senator Orrin Hatch before
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, June 28, 1984.
5. Data on total sales of prescription drugs, net of discounts and rebates
and valued at the prices obtained by manufacturers, were provided by
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America on April
28, 1997.  If prescription drug sales had been valued at retail prices—
the prices used for measuring national health expenditures—they would
represent a higher percentage of such expenditures.  Health care
expenditures in the United States totaled $376.4 billion in 1985 and
$878.8 billion in 1995; see Katherine R. Levit and others, "National
Health Expenditures, 1995," Health Care Financing Review, vol. 18,
no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 179.
6. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 1997
Industry Profile
 (Washington, D.C.: PhRMA, March 1997), p. 57.
Chapter Two
The Effect of Managed Care
on the Pharmaceutical Market
At the same time that the provisions of theHatch-Waxman Act have affected the supplyof generic drugs, changes in the demand for
drugs—brought on by newer forms of health care de-
livery and financing—have influenced both the fre-
quency with which generic and brand-name drugs are
prescribed and the prices paid for them.   Under com-
petitive pressures, more health plans have adopted
managed care techniques that help hold down overall
health spending.  The net effect of those techniques on
prescription drug spending, however, is unclear.
The wider use of formularies has put downward
pressure on the prices paid for brand-name drugs and
has increased generic substitution.   But use of pre-
scription drugs may be higher in health maintenance
organizations and some other types of managed care
plans, because they tend to have more extensive cover-
age of physicians' services and sometimes of prescrip-
tion drugs.  In addition, managed care plans may
sometimes favor the use of prescription drugs over
other, more expensive, forms of medical treatment.  As
a result, the downward pressure on prices from the
spread of managed care techniques may be offset by
the more frequent use of prescription drugs.
The Rise of Managed Care
The shift of many people in the United States from
conventional to managed care plans has been associ-
ated with an increasingly competitive market for
health insurance, in which plans compete largely on
the basis of price to maintain their market share.
Managed care plans enjoy an advantage because they
can generally charge lower prices than conventional
insurance plans by negotiating better rates from doc-
tors, hospitals, and other health care providers and by
reducing the use of high-cost services.  Because of that
cost advantage, a large number of people have moved
to managed care plans.  According to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, the proportion of full-time workers
with health insurance who were enrolled in such plans
increased from around 26 percent in 1988 to 61 per-
cent by 1995.1  As a result, the cost of health care ben-
efits for the private sector has grown more slowly in
recent years (although it may now be on the rise again,
with some health plans anticipating significant in-
creases in 1999).2  
In conventional health insurance plans—also
known as indemnity, or fee-for-service, plans—en-
rollees can receive care from any physician or hospital
they choose.  Generally, they must pay for some initial
1. Those figures are for employees of medium to large firms; see
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "BLS Reports on
Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Private Establishments,
1995" (press release, July 25, 1997, available at http://stats.bls.gov/
special.requests/ocwc/oclt/ebs/ebnr0003.txt).
2. See Congressional Budget Office, Trends in Health Care Spending by
the Private Sector, CBO Paper (April 1997); and Mercer/Foster
Higgins, National Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans (New
York: Mercer/Foster Higgins, 1997).
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amount of health care spending themselves (the de-
ductible) and pay an additional amount (a copayment)
of any costs beyond that.  Conventional plans pay
health care providers on a fee-for-service basis.
In managed care plans, by contrast, beneficiaries
are encouraged to use a limited network of health care
providers.  The extent of that limitation, or the condi-
tions under which a patient may choose a doctor or
hospital outside the plan's network, can be used to
broadly categorize the various types of managed care
plans.3
o Health Maintenance Organizations.  Enrollees
in an HMO must generally receive all of their
care from the HMO's physicians and from hospi-
tals with which the HMO contracts; otherwise,
the expense is not covered.  The services they
receive from those physicians are typically cov-
ered in full, apart from a flat dollar copayment
for an office visit.  (Copayments may also be
required for such items as prescription drugs.)
The plan's health care providers often bear some
financial risk for the costs of the services they
furnish or order on behalf of their patients.
o Preferred Provider Organizations.  Enrollees in
a PPO can receive services from any provider
they choose, but typically they incur significantly
lower deductibles and copayments if they use
physicians and hospitals that are part of the
PPO's network.  The PPO pays providers in the
network on a fee-for-service basis.  Unlike in
conventional insurance plans, however, those
fees are subject to negotiation between providers
and the plan.
o Point-of-Service Plans.  POS plans are also
known as HMO/PPO hybrids or open-ended
HMOs.  As in a PPO, enrollees can choose to
receive services from providers who are not
members of the plan's network as well as from
those who are members.  When enrollees use net-
work providers, a POS plan functions much like
an HMO.  When they use other providers, by
contrast, those providers are typically paid on a
fee-for-service basis and enrollees are responsi-
ble for deductibles and copayments.
Many managed care plans transfer financial risk
to physicians and other health care providers through
the various financial arrangements they use to reim-
burse those providers.  For example, some managed
care plans use a form of capitation to reimburse physi-
cians.  In such cases, the physician (or group of physi-
cians) is paid a fixed monthly amount per enrollee and
is responsible for providing all primary care services
—and in some instances, for paying for all medical
services, including the use of specialists.  When pro-
viders are at financial risk for the services they furnish
or order for patients, they have a powerful incentive to
provide less costly care.  The net effect of that incen-
tive on prescription drug use is not certain.  But it
could encourage providers to prescribe drugs in more
cases rather than immediately selecting relatively ex-
pensive, procedure-oriented approaches.
An important trend in the spread of managed
care techniques is that most types of health care plans
—including conventional fee-for-service plans—have
increasingly been "managing" their outpatient pre-
scription drug benefits, frequently through pharmaceu-
tical benefit management companies.  Since 60 percent
of prescription drugs are sold through pharmacies and
other retail outlets, PBMs have become an important
intermediary that helps limit costs for those drugs.
How PBMs Help Hold Down 
Drug Expenditures
Pharmaceutical benefit management companies exert
downward pressure on the prices paid to both manu-
facturers and pharmacies.  In return for channeling
their patient base to particular pharmacies, they ar-
range to pay lower retail prices for drugs at those
pharmacies.  Similarly, PBMs are able to negotiate
rebates from manufacturers of brand-name drugs
based on their ability to steer their members toward a
3. The definitions below come from Congressional Budget Office, Trends
in Health Care Spending by the Private Sector.  That paper relied in
part on a survey on employer benefits by KPMG Peat Marwick to
develop those definitions; see KPMG Peat Marwick, Health Benefits
in 1995 (August 1995), p. 10.  Many health insurance providers refer
to their different insurance arrangements as products ("indemnity
product," "point-of-service product," and the like).  More than one
product may be available from a particular provider to a company or
individual enrollee.  To be consistent with the earlier CBO paper, this
study uses the term "plan" to refer to those products.
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particular drug by using a formulary.4  Those cost-
saving methods are not limited to PBMs; some health
insurers have set up similar operations to manage their
own drug benefits.  HMOs that have on-site pharma-
cies also apply formularies to promote the use of spe-
cific drugs and to negotiate rebates from drug manu-
facturers.
How Formularies and PBMs Operate
Typically, in a retail setting, formularies work as fol-
lows:  a customer gives a prescription to a pharmacist
to be filled and presents a membership card in a health
insurance plan or PBM.  The pharmacist then uses a
computer network to check the plan's or PBM's list of
preferred drugs as a guide in filling the prescription.
Such lists frequently specify substituting a generic
drug for a brand-name drug (something that has only
been legal in most states since the late 1970s; see Box
2).  In some cases, formularies also suggest substitut-
ing a less expensive brand-name drug for the one on
the prescription.  Promoting substitution between
brand-name drugs is more difficult, however, since it
requires the doctor's permission.
Using the same computer network, a PBM can
track all prescription drug purchases by its members
from pharmacies—providing it with a wealth of mar-
ket data.  PCS Health Systems, the largest PBM in the
United States, in 1987 established the first electronic
links with pharmacies that allowed two-way transmis-
sion of information and claims data.5  PBMs never
physically handle prescription drugs.  Rather, they act
as middlemen in a variety of transactions with health
plans, pharmacies, and drug companies and thus insert
themselves into the payment system (see Figure 1).
PBMs have found their niche as health insurance
plans have expanded outpatient drug benefits.  In
1972, just 20 percent of total retail drug spending was
Box 2.
The Role of Changes in State Drug-Product
Substitution Laws
The growth of generic substitution that has been
fostered by the use of formularies would not have
been possible without changes in state law.
Through the early 1970s, it was illegal in many
states for a pharmacist to dispense a generic drug
when a prescription specified a brand-name one.
By 1980, however, all but three states had drug-
product substitution laws in effect that gave phar-
macists more discretion.  (By 1984, all states had
such laws.)1  Under those new laws, a pharmacist
could dispense a generic drug even when a
brand-name drug was specified, as long as the
physician had not indicated otherwise on the pre-
scription.  By 1989, the dispensing of generic
drugs on "brand-written" prescriptions rather
than generically written prescriptions had be-
come the chief source of generic drug sales
through pharmacies.2
1. Alison Masson and Robert L. Steiner, Generic Substitution
and Prescription Drug Prices: Economic Effects of State
Drug Product Selection Laws
 (Federal Trade Commission,
1985), pp. 232-233, Table A4-1.
2. Richard E. Caves, Michael D. Whinston, and Mark A.
Hurwitz, "Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the
U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry," Brookings Papers on Eco-
nomic Activity: Microeconomics
 (1991), pp. 1-66.
 paid for by third parties (such as private-sector health
plans or Medicaid).  By 1995, that figure had tripled
to 60 percent.6  What share of those drug benefits is
being managed by PBMs or health plans themselves is
unclear, but it appears to be significant.  According to
IMS America, a company that supplies sales data on
the pharmaceutical industry, 58.5 percent of retail
pharmacies' revenues from drug sales in 1996 came
from prescriptions that were at least partly paid for by
4. See, for example, "PCS Rebates from Pfizer on Seven Products Totaled
over $10 Million in First 21 Months of 1994-1998 Contract," The Pink
Sheet, F-D-C Reports, June 10, 1996, p. 16.
5. Wilbur B. Pittinger, Senior Vice President for Health Management
Services, "Placing PBMs in Context" (keynote address given at the
roundtable conference of the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug
Development, "PBMs: Reshaping the Pharmaceutical Distribution
Network," October 24, 1996, available at http://www.pcshs.com/
news/speeches/102496.html).
6. James S. Genuardi, Jean M. Stiller, and Gordon R. Trapnell, "Changing
Prescription Drug Sector: New Expenditure Methodologies," Health
Care Financing Review
 (Spring 1996), p. 192; and Katherine R. Levit
and others, “National Health Expenditures, 1995,” Health Care
Financing Review, vol. 18, no. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 185.
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Patient Premiums
Fee
Share of 
Manufacturer
Rebates
Negotiated
Rebates
Place on
Formulary
Negotiated
Price Discounts
Balance Due for
Drugs Purchased
by Members
Filled
Prescription Copayment
Health Plan
Pharmacy PBM
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers
Figure 1.
How PBMs Fit Into the Payment System 
for Prescription Drugs
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based in part on General
Accounting Office, Pharmacy Benefit Managers: Early
Results on Ventures with Drug Manufacturers, GAO/
HEHS-96-45 (November 1995).
NOTE: PBMs = pharmaceutical benefit management companies.
third-party managed care drug coverage.7   (That fig-
ure does not include cases in which patients paid for
the entire prescription because they had not yet met
their plan's deductible or the prescription price was
less than their copayment, although in such cases the
drug benefit may also be managed.)  IMS America's
definition of managed care third-party payment re-
quires that customers presented an electronic card to
the pharmacist indicating their membership in a health
plan.8
Manufacturer Rebates and 
Pharmacy Prices
Much of the savings that PBMs achieve appear to
come from the lower prices paid to pharmacies rather
than from the rebates offered by drug manufacturers.
The General Accounting Office studied three large
health plans for federal employees that used both
PBMs and mail-order pharmacies.  The study found
that 50 percent to 70 percent of the drop in the plans'
spending on prescription drugs resulted from lower
retail prescription prices (lower than what the plans
would have paid at the pharmacy's usual and custom-
ary charge).  Two percent to 21 percent of the savings
resulted from manufacturer rebates that the PBMs
shared with the health insurance plans.9
Generic Substitution
Another important way that PBMs lower drug costs is
by promoting generic substitution, not just through
formularies but also through their pricing contracts
with pharmacies.  In general, dispensing a generic
drug is already slightly more profitable for a pharma-
cist than dispensing a brand-name drug.10  PBMs' con-
tracts sometimes provide financial incentives that
make generic substitution even more profitable for
pharmacists.
PBMs can also encourage generic substitution at
the consumer level.  In a conventional health plan, pre-
7. IMS America, "IMS Reports Major Regional Differences in Managed
Care Growth" (press release, April 14, 1997, available at http://
www.ims-america.com/communications/pr_regional.html).
8. Personal communication by Paul Wilson, Vice President of Statistical
Services, IMS America, on March 1, 1998.  If a customer had health
insurance but applied for reimbursement later rather than presenting a
card at the pharmacy, the transaction was considered a cash payment.
Cash payments totaled 29.3 percent of pharmacies’ drug revenues.
Medicaid payments made up the remainder. 
9. General Accounting Office, Pharmacy Benefit Managers: FEHBP
Plans Satisfied with Savings and Services, but Retail Pharmacies
Have Concerns, GAO/HEHS-97-47 (February 1997).  In addition,
Blue Cross found that in partnership with PCS Health Systems, it saved
more on prescription drug expenditures through pharmacy discounts
than through rebates from manufacturers (presentation by Alan
Spielman, Vice President for Business Services, Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Association, at the National Health Policy Forum "Purchasing
as a Cost-Containment Tool: A Look at Pharmacy Benefit Manage-
ment," Washington, D.C., May 12, 1995).  
10. For most multiple-source drugs, the markup over the wholesale cost is
higher (on an absolute dollar basis) for generic drugs than for brand-
name drugs.  In addition, because their wholesale cost is lower, the cost
of having money tied up in stocks of generic drugs is lower.  According
to a recent study, for a prescription of 100 pills, the average retail
markup on a generic prescription was about $13, compared with $10
on a brand-name prescription; see Henry Grabowski and John Vernon,
"Longer Patents for Increased Generic Competition in the U.S.: The
Hatch-Waxman Act After One Decade," PharmacoEconomics (1996),
p. 116, Table IV.   
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scription drug coverage reduces the gap between the
prices of brand-name and generic drugs as seen by the
consumer.  For example, if an innovator drug costs
$40, its generic equivalent costs $20, and a health plan
has a 20 percent copayment, then the consumer's price
comparison is between $8 for the brand-name drug
and $4 for the generic drug (after any deductible has
been met).  Because that price difference is small, the
consumer may believe that the brand-name drug is
worth an extra $4 and may prefer to have it dispensed.
Many PBMs and health plans that manage their own
drug benefits try to widen that price gap by charging a
higher copayment for nonformulary drugs, such as
brand-name drugs chosen over generic substitutes.11
Some researchers have found that even a small
difference in the copayment can encourage generic
substitution.  One study determined that HMOs with a
copayment difference of at least $2 between brand-
name and generic drugs had as high a rate of generic
substitution as HMOs that explicitly required such
substitution.12
Industry Changes
Some analysts question whether the savings that
PBMs produce will be adversely affected by recent
changes in the industry.  Several of the largest PBMs
have been acquired by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
PCS was bought by Eli Lilly in 1994 for $4 billion;
Medco (both a PBM and a mail-order pharmacy) was
acquired by Merck in 1993 for $6.6 billion; and Di-
versified Pharmaceutical Services was purchased by
SmithKline Beecham in 1994 for $2.3 billion.13  With
acquisition, will those PBMs continue to represent the
interests of insurance plans and patients effectively?
Or will they have an incentive to favor their parent
company's drugs over others?14  The FDA has begun
to regulate the advertising and marketing practices of
PBMs owned by pharmaceutical manufacturers.15
The Federal Trade Commission is also looking into
those issues.
Another change in the industry involves the
growing proportion of drugs distributed through mail-
order pharmacies.  Many insurance plans now include
an option to purchase drugs by mail.  According to
IMS America, between 1991 and 1996 the share of
prescription drugs channeled through mail-order phar-
macies grew from 6 percent to 10 percent of manufac-
turers' total sales revenues.16  Mail-order pharmacies
are able to obtain substantial discounts on brand-name
drugs from manufacturers in part because, in a mail-
order setting, pharmacists have more time (about two
days) to contact doctors and obtain permission to
switch a prescription to a less expensive brand-name
drug.17  In addition, mail-order pharmacies appear to
be more effective in promoting generic substitution
than retail pharmacies.18  Also, drugs ordered through
a mail-order setting are frequently for chronic condi-
tions, so the savings from switching the prescription
11. See General Accounting Office, Pharmacy Benefit Managers: Early
Results on Ventures with Drug Manufacturers, GAO/HEHS-96-45
(November 1995), p. 7.  That report refers to formularies that charge
a higher copayment for nonformulary drugs as "incentive based"
formularies.  Other insurers, including many HMOs, have a very small
copayment difference between brand-name and generic drugs and
therefore rely more on their doctors and pharmacists (rather than price)
to promote generic substitution; see Levit and others,  "National Health
Expenditures, 1995," p. 185.
12. Jonathan P. Weiner and others, "Impact of Managed Care on Pre-
scription Drug Use," Health Affairs (Spring 1991), p. 145.
13. See Milt Freudenheim, "Pharmaceutical Giant Is Buying Operator of
Drug-Benefit Plans," New York Times, July 12, 1994, p. A1.  For a
ranking of PBMs by size in 1994, see Milt Freudenheim, "A Shift of
Power in Pharmaceuticals," New York Times, May 9, 1994, p. D1.
14. See General Accounting Office, Pharmacy Benefit Managers: Early
Results on Ventures with Drug Manufacturers.
15. See Bruce Ingersoll, "FDA to Watch Drug Switching, Sales Practices,"
Wall Street Journal, January 16, 1998, p. B1. 
16. For the 1991 figures, see "Mail Order Grew 37 Percent to $2.9 Billion
in 1991 IMS Survey: Growth May Slow Soon," The Pink Sheet, F-D-C
Reports, March 16, 1992, p. 11.  For the 1996 figures, see Phar-
maceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 1997 Industry
Profile
 (Washington, D.C.: PhRMA, March 1997), p. 31.
17. For a discussion of how Medco obtains discounts from manufacturers,
see Brian O'Reilly, "Medco Containment Services," Fortune, February
24, 1992, p. 10.  See also Thomas M. Burton, "Eli Lilly's Lack of
Success with PCS May Soon Lead to a Major Write-Off," Wall Street
Journal, June 5, 1997, p. A3.
18. In 1992, Medco dispensed a generic drug on 72 percent of prescriptions
for a multiple-source drug; statement of Judith L. Wagner, Office of
Technology Assessment, before the Senate Special Committee on
Aging, November 16, 1993.
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are greater since the drug will be taken for a long pe-
riod of time.
In addition, links have developed between PBMs
and mail-order pharmacies.  In 1996, PCS Health Sys-
tems, the largest PBM, opened a mail-order pharmacy;
and the largest mail-order pharmacy, Medco, also has
a PBM business.
In sum, the increasing management of outpatient
drug benefits has put downward pressure on prescrip-
tion drug costs by lowering the average prices that
both manufacturers and pharmacists receive for those
drugs.  The promotion of generic substitution has also
been a key factor in holding down the average price of
prescription drugs (and is something that is more eas-
ily accomplished in a pharmacy setting than favoring
one brand-name drug over another).
How Managed Care Affects 
the Demand for Prescription
Drugs
To encourage people to enroll in managed care plans
and accept a limited network of providers, such plans
typically charge lower copayments for physician visits
and other medical services (when the limited network
is used) than traditional fee-for-service plans do.
Those lower copayments tend to increase the use of
physicians' services, which in turn increases the de-
mand for prescription drugs.19  HMOs generally also
have more extensive prescription drug coverage than
most fee-for-service plans.  According to a 1993 sur-
vey by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, HMOs typi-
cally charged $3 to $5 for a prescription drug pur-
chase, with no deductible, compared with a 20 percent
copayment and a deductible (covering all medical ser-
vices) in most fee-for-service plans.20  Those lower
prescription costs to the patient may increase the pro-
portion of prescriptions that are actually filled.  In-
deed, some drug manufacturers believe that HMOs
have contributed to the increase in the volume of pre-
scription drug sales.21
A study by researchers at RAND suggests that a
lower copayment structure for both physician visits
and prescription drugs boosts the use of such drugs.
The study randomly enrolled people in various fee-for-
service plans that differed primarily in their coinsur-
ance rates and deductibles.  After adjusting for differ-
ences in population characteristics, the authors con-
cluded that annual prescription drug spending per per-
son was one-quarter less in plans with a 25 percent
coinsurance rate, no deductible, and a $1,000 cap on
out-of-pocket expenditures than in plans in which all
medical services were free.  When the coinsurance rate
was increased to 95 percent, drug spending per person
was 43 percent lower than when all services were
free.22  Those results suggest that the smaller copay-
ments and absence of deductibles for prescription
drugs and physicians' services that are typical of many
managed care plans lead to greater use of prescription
drugs.23
Moreover, a later study found that more pre-
scriptions were bought per person in several HMOs
than in a fee-for-service plan that offered comprehen-
sive prescription drug coverage.24  The fee-for-service
plan, like the HMOs, required only a small copayment
for prescription drugs and no deductible.  In the three
cases in which age adjustment was possible, the
19. See Congressional Budget Office, Updated Estimates of Medicare's
Catastrophic Drug Insurance Program
 (October 1989), p. 47, for a
discussion of the relationship between physicians' services and
prescription drug expenditures.
20. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits
in Medium and Large Private Establishments, 1993,
 Bulletin 2456
(November 1994), p. 44 and Tables 64, 66, 85, and 86.  The full
results from the bureau's 1995 survey have not yet been published.
21. See Levit and others, "National Health Expenditures, 1995"; and IMS
America, "IMS Says Managed Care Drove Unprecedented Growth in
Pharmaceuticals in 1996" (press release, April 14, 1997, available at
http://www.ims-america.com/communications/pr_growth.html).
22. Arleen Leibowitz, Willard G. Manning, and Joseph P. Newhouse, "The
Demand for Prescription Drugs as a Function of Cost-Sharing," Social
Science Medicine, vol. 21, no. 10 (1985), pp. 1063-1069, Table 4.
See also Willard G. Manning and others, "Health Insurance and the
Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment,"
American Economic Review
 (June 1987), pp. 251-277.
23. The results of the RAND study do not indicate whether physician
coverage or drug coverage has a greater effect on the quantity of
prescriptions sold.
24. Weiner and others, "Impact of Managed Care on Prescription Drug
Use," pp. 141-153.  The HMO plans in the study did not employ their
own doctors, but instead contracted with doctors that also had their own
private practice.
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HMOs nevertheless had 5 percent to 20 percent more
prescriptions dispensed per beneficiary than the fee-
for-service plan.  That result suggests that the treat-
ment practices of HMOs may favor more intensive use
of prescription drugs than the procedures of fee-for-
service plans do, perhaps as an alternative to costlier
forms of treatment.  (However, the study did not men-
tion the copayment structure for physicians' services in
the HMOs and fee-for-service plan.  If the HMOs had
lower copayments for physicians' services, that could
partly explain their higher volume of prescription drug
use.)
The same study also found that the HMOs used
newly approved drugs as much as the fee-for-service
plan.  They showed no tendency toward a slower dif-
fusion of new innovative drugs.  The percentage of
prescriptions that were dispensed for a newly ap-
proved brand-name drug was the same for the two
types of plans.  Since the overall quantity dispensed
was higher in the HMOs, that implies a slightly higher
use of all drugs, including new brand-name ones.  
Conclusions
Although some managed care techniques put down-
ward pressure on drug spending by lowering the prices
paid for brand-name drugs and promoting generic sub-
stitution, other techniques, such as lower copayments
for health care services, tend to increase prescription
drug use and total drug spending.  It is not clear how
the increased use of those techniques has affected the
net returns from marketing a new drug.  PBMs appear
to have greater success at negotiating discounts from
retail pharmacies than from drug manufacturers (in
the form of rebates).  Thus, the management of outpa-
tient drug benefits may not have hurt drug companies'
returns very much.  And the movement of beneficiaries
into managed care plans may have had a positive ef-
fect on prescription drug use.  If managed care has
helped increase the use of prescription drugs, which
are often less costly than other forms of treatment,
then the somewhat lower prices may be at least par-
tially offset by a rise in the quantity of prescription
drugs sold.
Those opposing trends (lower prices but higher
demand) make it difficult to determine whether total
spending on brand-name prescription drugs has in-
creased or decreased because of the rise of managed
care techniques—and as important, whether the total
profits of those drugs' manufacturers have risen or
fallen as a result.
For brand-name drugs still under patent, the ef-
fect of managed care on spending could be negligible
if the discounts that purchasers obtain are offset by a
higher quantity sold.  However, since managed care
techniques promote generic substitution, their effect on
spending and profits is probably negative for brand-
name drugs whose patents have expired.
 
Chapter Three
Pricing and Competition in
the Pharmaceutical Market
The federal government has competing policyobjectives with respect to the pricing of pre-scription drugs.  On the one hand, it wants to
ensure that companies have enough incentive to invest
in researching and developing innovative drugs.  On
the other hand, it wants to discourage them from
charging excessively high prices.  In general, the gov-
ernment achieves the first goal through a patent sys-
tem that grants market exclusivity for a limited period
of time, allowing companies to recoup their investment
in R&D.  For the second goal, it relies on competition
between similar drugs to hold prices down.
This chapter examines price competition among
manufacturers in the pharmaceutical market, including
the impact of the dramatic growth in the generic drug
industry since 1984.  Such competition comes in three
main forms:  between brand-name drugs in the same
therapeutic class, between brand-name drugs and their
generic counterparts, and between different generic
versions of the same drug.  The pharmaceutical indus-
try is also affected by other types of competition, such
as the substitution that sometimes occurs between pre-
scription drugs and other forms of medical treatment.
However, the conditions under which prescription
drugs can be substituted for other medical procedures
are outside the scope of this study.
The patent system provides a period of protection
during which manufacturers of innovator drugs can
charge relatively high prices, earning profits that en-
able them to compensate for the costs of a drug's dis-
covery and development.  Although patents prevent
other manufacturers from producing the same drug,
they do not prevent  manufacturers with a similar but
slightly different drug from also obtaining a patent and
entering the market.  Limited empirical evidence sug-
gests that the availability of several similar brand-
name drugs tends to slow the rate of price growth,
even before generic copies become available.
The dramatic rise in generic sales since 1984 has
held down average prices for drugs that are no longer
protected by a patent.  However, those lower prices
tend not to result from reductions in the price of the
original brand-name drug when it begins facing com-
petition from generic drugs.  Rather, average prices
fall primarily because consumers switch from the
higher-priced innovator drug to the lower-priced
generics.  To be on the receiving end of that switch,
generic manufacturers compete with each other in-
tensely in the area of price, partly because they sell
identical products.
The increased use of generic drugs has kept total
spending on prescription drugs below what it might
otherwise have been.  Considering only drugs sold
through retail pharmacies, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimates that the purchase of generic
drugs reduced the cost of prescriptions (at retail
prices) by roughly $8 billion to $10 billion in 1994.
That estimate assumes that all generic prescriptions
dispensed would have been filled with a higher-priced
brand-name drug if the generic was not available.
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Figure 2.
Channels of Distribution for Prescription Drugs
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Micky Smith,
Pharmaceutical Marketing Strategy and Cases (New
York:  Pharmaceutical Products Press, 1991), Chapter
3; Boston Consulting Group, The Changing Environ-
ment for U.S. Pharmaceuticals (Boston: Boston Con-
sulting Group, April 1993); and Pharmaceutical Re-
search and Manufacturers of America, 1997 Industry
Profile (Washington, D.C.: PhRMA, March 1997), p. 31.
NOTES: Figures in parentheses represent shares of the prescrip-
tion drug market in 1996, calculated as a percentage of
total U.S. sales at manufacturer prices.
HMOs = health maintenance organizations.
a. Some chain-store pharmacies buy directly from the manufacturer.
b. Some mail-order pharmacies go through a wholesaler.
Much of the analysis in this chapter relies on a
set of data that represents 70 percent of prescription
drug sales at retail pharmacies in the United States in
1993 and 1994.  Roughly half of all prescription drugs
are channeled through retail pharmacies (see Figure
2).  Thus, the data set represents about 35 percent of
all drug sales in the United States in those years.  The
data include total dollars spent on each dosage form
(tablet, capsule, liquid, and so forth) of 454 brand-
name drugs, as well as total spending on generic ver-
sions of the brand-name drugs whose patents have ex-
pired.  (For more information about the data, see Ap-
pendix A.)
The unit used to measure quantity in the retail
pharmacy data is the prescription.  That unit can lead
to measurement errors, however, since different pre-
scriptions for the same drug come in different sizes.
(For example, one prescription may be filled with 30
pills and another with 100 pills.)  A statistical bias
would occur if more pills were dispensed per prescrip-
tion, on average, for a generic drug than for its brand-
name counterpart.  That bias would lead to underesti-
mating the price difference between brand-name and
generic drugs.  But the bias could run in either direc-
tion.  Without a better measure of quantity, part of the
analysis in this chapter relies on the number of pre-
scriptions to estimate sales volume and to calculate
average unit prices.  Implicitly, those estimates as-
sume that, in general, prescriptions for a brand-name
drug and for its generic equivalent have roughly the
same average number of dosage units (such as tab-
lets).  All estimates that rely on average prescription
prices are based only on tablet and capsule formula-
tions, which constitute 87 percent of sales in the retail
pharmacy data set.  Those dosage forms yield more
reliable average prescription prices.
Competition Among Brand- 
Name Drugs
In 1994, 83 percent of retail pharmacies' total reve-
nues from selling prescription drugs came from inno-
vator drugs (see Table 1).  Those brand-name drugs
also accounted for 64 percent of all prescriptions dis-
pensed.  Single-source innovator drugs—which, by
definition, do not yet face generic competition—made
up half of retail pharmacies' revenues from the sale of
prescription drugs.  Because innovator drugs consti-
tute such a large share of pharmacy sales, the extent to
which their manufacturers compete on the basis of
price has important implications for consumers.
In general, the higher prices charged for brand-
name drugs allow firms to recoup their investment in a
drug's discovery and development.  Studies have found
that, on average, discovering and developing a drug
takes 11 to 12 years and costs about $200 million per
successful product (in 1990 dollars).1  That $200 mil-
1. That figure represents the after-tax cost of R&D and was calculated as
follows:  for drugs developed between 1970 and 1982, manufacturers'
out-of-pocket costs were about $100 million per drug, after averaging
in the costs of clinical failures.  Accounting for the opportunity cost of
capital (or the time value of money) nearly triples those costs.  But
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Table 1.
Market Share and Average Retail Prescription Price, by Type of Drug, 1994
Market Share Average
Retail Prescription
Price (Dollars)
Percentage of Retail
Pharmacy Salesa
Percentage of
Prescriptions Dispensed
Innovator Drugs
Single source 55.5 37.5 53.80
Multiple sourceb 27.2 26.5 37.40
Generic Drugs 17.3 36.0 17.40
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on tabulations of retail pharmacy sales data from Scott-Levin.
a. Calculated at retail prices.
b. If generic versions of an innovator drug were available in any dosage form, then all sales of all dosage forms of the innovator drug were classified
as multiple source.  Hence, an extended-release dosage form that had no generic versions available was classified as a multiple-source drug if
generic versions of the original formulation were available.
lion figure includes the cost of drugs that never make
it to market; it also accounts for the cost of capital—
that is, the cost of waiting for a return until the drug is
introduced.  Actual drug development costs may be
higher today if, for example, the cost of conducting
clinical trials has increased.  Conversely, costs may be
lower if the failure rate of drugs that go into clinical
trials has declined.2
The stream of after-tax profits over the life of a
typical innovator drug follows an up-and-down pat-
tern (see Figure 3).  The first 11 to 12 years show a
negative cash flow while the drug is being developed,
undergoing testing, and awaiting approval.  Over the
next 20 years, as the drug is marketed, it earns back a
since R&D investments are expensed for tax purposes (because a dollar
invested in R&D is a dollar on which corporate profit taxes are not
paid), the after-tax cost comes to about $200 million at a marginal tax
rate of 35 percent.  See Office of Technology Assessment, Pharma-
ceutical R&D: Costs, Risks and Rewards
 (February 1993); and Henry
G. Grabowski and John M. Vernon, "Returns to R&D on New Drug
Introductions in the 1980s," Journal of Health Economics, vol. 13,
no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 383-406.  Both of those studies rely on
Joseph A. DiMasi and others, "Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceuti-
cal Industry," Journal of Health Economics, vol. 10, no. 2 (July
1991), pp. 107-142.
2. For a discussion about how changes in technology have affected the
R&D process, see Geoffrey Carr, "A Survey of the Pharmaceutical
Industry," Economist, February 21, 1998.  As one example, computer
programs are being developed that can help predict whether a clinical
trial is likely to work before it is undertaken.
return on the investment in its research and develop-
ment. According to two studies, that profit stream has
an average present value of $220 million to $230 mil-
lion (in 1990 dollars, after deducting manufacturing,
advertising, distribution, and other non-R&D-related
costs, discounted to the date of market introduction)
—which more than compensates for the $200 million
in average capitalized costs of drug development.3
Those studies estimate that for innovator drugs intro-
duced in the early 1980s, after-tax profits exceeded
development costs by $22 million to $36 million, on
average (in 1990 dollars, where returns are discounted
and costs are capitalized to the date of market intro-
duction).  Since the returns from selling new drugs are
highly skewed—a few drugs earn very large profits,
whereas others may only cover the cost of their own
development—that average encompasses both a few
big winners and some marginally profitable drugs.
The FDA Approval Process
Much of the capitalized cost of drug development can
be attributed to the length of the discovery, develop-
3. See Grabowksi and Vernon, "Returns to R&D"; and Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D.  Those measures account
for the cost of capital, so the returns are beyond the amount necessary
to adequately compensate investors for their investment in drug devel-
opment.
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Figure 3.
Change in the Profit Stream for
a Typical Innovator Drug
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based in part on Henry G.
Grabowski and John M. Vernon, “Returns to R&D on
New Drug Introductions in the 1980s,” Journal of Health
Economics, vol. 13, no. 4 (December 1994).
NOTE: R&D = research and development.
ment, and approval process.  That process includes
five distinct phases, the first of which is screening and
discovery.  Recent advances in biomedical research
appear to have increased productivity in the discovery
phase by yielding new "targets" (such as enzymes)
against which a chemical can be tested for interac-
tions.  A process called high-throughput screening al-
lows hundreds of chemicals to be tested quickly
against a single target.  After finding a drug candidate
that interacts with the target, the manufacturer checks
the drug for toxicity and tests it in animals.  If the
drug still looks promising, the company files an inves-
tigational new drug application with the Food and
Drug Administration in order to begin testing the com-
pound in humans.  (Testing can begin 30 days after
the application is filed.)  Between 1980 and 1992, that
screening and discovery phase (including preclinical
testing) took an average of two to four years.4
The clinical trials that follow are divided into
three phases.  Phase I tests the new compound on
fewer than 100 volunteers (usually healthy people) to
determine safe dosage levels and toxicity.  Phase II
tests the drug on 50 to 200 people who have the dis-
ease the drug is designed to combat in order to deter-
mine both safety and efficacy.  Phase III tests the drug
on thousands of people to see whether the benefits are
statistically significant.5  The FDA usually requires
two controlled clinical trials in humans (Phase III
studies) before approving a new drug.6  Those trials
establish effectiveness, optimal dosage forms, and pos-
sible side effects. They can also detect adverse reac-
tions at that stage. Companies often consult with the
FDA when designing their clinical tests.  After a com-
pany believes it has gathered sufficient evidence in
Phase III testing, it files a new drug application with
the Food and Drug Administration.
Making the drug-approval process as quick and
efficient as possible without sacrificing standards of
safety and efficacy benefits both the public and phar-
maceutical manufacturers.  Those were the goals of
the 1992 Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA).
Meeting those goals is not a simple task, however,
since "inevitably there is a trade-off between speed and
certainty" about a drug's safety and effectiveness.7
The PDUFA imposed fees on pharmaceutical manu-
facturers when they submit a new drug application for
FDA approval.  In 1997, those fees totaled $205,000
for a full NDA requiring clinical data for approval.
Other types of fees paid by firms that filed NDAs in-
clude an annual fee on their manufacturing establish-
ments and an annual fee for the drugs they currently
have on the market.8
4. Joseph A. DiMasi, Mark A. Seibring, and Louis Lasagna, "New Drug
Development in the United States from 1963 to 1992," Clinical Phar-
macology and Therapeutics, vol. 55, no. 6 (June 1994), pp. 609-622.
5. See DiMasi and others, "Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical
Industry"; and Blanchard Randall, Drug Regulation: Historical
Overview and Current Reform Proposals, CRS Report for Congress
95-962 SPR  (Congressional Research Service, September 11, 1995),
pp. 7-8.
6. David A. Kessler and Karyn I. Feiden, "Faster Evaluation of Vital
Drugs," Scientific American (March 1995).
7. Ibid., p. 50.  For an explanation of the need for a large clinical trial to
demonstrate that a drug is as safe as, and more effective than, existing
treatments, see F.M. Scherer, Industry Structure, Strategy, and Pub-
lic Policy
 (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1996), pp.
353-355.
8. Section 736 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, as
amended, 21 U.S.C. 379(h).
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Table 2.
Average Time from Clinical Testing to Final Approval for an Innovator Drug
Average Length (Years)
Year of FDA 
Approval 
Number of Drugs
in Sample
Clinical
Testing Phase
NDA
Approval Phase
Total FDA
Approval Time
1984 8 6.6 3.3 9.9
1985 23 5.0 2.8 7.9
1986 13 6.7 2.5 9.2
1987 14 4.5 3.2 7.7
1988 15 4.9 3.1 8.0
1989 17 5.5 3.1 8.7
1990 17 5.3 2.7 8.0
1991 26 5.2 2.7 7.9
1992 18 4.6 3.2 7.8
1993 14 5.2 3.2 8.4
1994 11 6.6 1.9 8.5
1995 10 6.2 2.5 8.7
Total 186 5.4 2.9 8.2
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Food and Drug Administration and the Patent and Trademark Office.
NOTES: These figures are for drugs that obtained patent extensions under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
FDA = Food and Drug Administration; NDA = new drug application.
The FDA has used those fees to hire more re-
viewers and accelerate the approval process.  The
agency reports that it has eliminated the backlog of
applications that were awaiting approval and has sped
up approval for applications filed since 1992.  Ac-
cording to the FDA, drug applications approved be-
tween 1991 and 1992 (that included a chemical never
before approved) had a median review time of about
22 months.  For applications approved in 1994 and
1995, the median review time was down to about 15
months, falling to 12 months in 1996.9
By law, however, the FDA is required to approve
all new drug applications within 180 days (or a longer
period if agreed on with the applicant).10  In comply-
ing with the PDUFA, the FDA has set a target date of
one year for all such applications.  It reports that at
least 95 percent of the 106 new drug applications filed
in fiscal year 1995 met that goal.11
The total time a drug spends in development,
however, does not appear to have changed much.
Steering a new drug through clinical testing in humans
to final FDA approval took eight to nine years for
drugs approved between 1980 and 1992, according to
one study.12  CBO found similar results for 186 drugs
approved between 1984 and 1995 that obtained patent
extensions under the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Those
drugs spent an average of 5.4 years in the clinical test-
ing phase (see Table 2).  The NDA approval phase
took another 2.9 years, on average, bringing the total
development time after clinical testing began to 8.2
years.  For drugs approved in 1994 and 1995, the
9. See Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research Fact Book, 1997
 (May 1997), avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/cder/about.htm.  Note that less than half of
all new drug applications include a chemical entity never before ap-
proved.
10. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, as amended, 21
U.S.C. 355(c)(1).  
11. See Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, Fourth Annual Performance Report, Prescription Drug
User Fee Act of 1992
 (December 1, 1996), available at http://www.
fda.gov/ope/96pdufa.htm.
12. See DiMasi, Seibring, and Lasagna, "New Drug Development in the
United States from 1963 to 1992."
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NDA approval phase was shorter than that average
but the clinical testing phase was longer.  That sug-
gests that faster NDA review times in recent years
may have been partially offset by longer clinical test-
ing periods.  However, more data are required to as-
sess whether that is indeed the case.
Last year, the Congress passed the Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997,
which made a variety of changes affecting how the
FDA regulates food, medical devices, and prescription
drugs.  Some of those changes could speed up the ap-
proval process for innovator drugs.  Under the act, the
FDA must formulate a plan to reach compliance with
the 180-day limit on NDA approvals and other exist-
ing time limits.13  That plan could further reduce the
average approval time for a new drug application if
the FDA received enough funding to carry it out.  (For
example, the agency would probably need to hire more
staff.)
The 1997 act also attempts to decrease the time
needed for conducting clinical tests by encouraging
cooperation between the FDA and pharmaceutical
companies.  For example, once the FDA has approved
an investigational new drug application, its officials
are required to meet with the applicant (on written re-
quest) to agree on the size and design of the clinical
studies necessary for final FDA approval.14
Faster approval of new drugs increases the re-
turns that those drugs earn.  For example, speeding up
the FDA approval phase by one year would boost the
average profits from marketing a new drug by about
$22 million (at a present discounted value in 1990 dol-
lars).15  That estimate assumes that the approval is
accelerated entirely because the FDA reviews applica-
tions and test results more quickly, so the timing of
outlays in the R&D process does not change.   The
estimated benefits arise because firms begin earning a
profit on their new drug one year earlier.  Such a
change would nearly double the estimated $22 million
to $36 million by which after-tax profits from selling a
brand-name drug exceed drug development costs, on
average.16  As a point of comparison, extending the
patent on a prescription drug by one year would in-
crease the present discounted value of its returns by
substantially less—about $12 million, on average.  An
additional effect of faster approvals would be in-
creased competition in the pharmaceutical market as
new brand-name drugs were introduced more quickly,
providing more competition for existing ones.
"Me-Too" Drugs
Although patents prevent other companies from pro-
ducing exactly the same drug claimed in the patent,
they usually do not prevent the introduction of similar
but slightly differentiated drugs.  In many cases, sev-
eral different chemical entities can be found that use
the same basic mechanism to treat an illness.  Since
patents are frequently obtained on a specific chemical
formulation, not on a therapeutic mechanism, many
patented products are "functionally similar."17  Thus, a
breakthrough drug—the first innovator drug to use a
particular therapeutic mechanism—may have only one
to six years, at most, of pure market exclusivity before
a similar patented drug (sometimes called a "me-too"
drug) is approved by the FDA.  Of 13 therapeutic cat-
egories that CBO examined for this study, the first
me-too drug entered the market within one year in six
cases and within two to six years in another six
cases.18
13. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C.
393.
14. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C.
355(b).
15. According to Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical
R&D, and Grabowski and Vernon, "Returns to R&D," the average
present discounted value of the profit stream from marketing a new
drug over its product life is $210 million to $230 million in 1990
dollars.  Thus, at an interest rate of 10 percent, adding a year to that
product life by speeding up market introduction could raise returns by
$21 million to $23 million.
16. Ibid.  Those number are also at a present discounted value in 1990
dollars.
17. Z. John Lu and William S. Comanor, Strategic Pricing of New
Pharmaceuticals, Working Paper 96-1 (Los Angeles: University of
California School of Public Health, Research Program in Pharmaceu-
tical Economics and Policy, October 9, 1996), p. 1.
18. The 13 therapeutic classes were H2 antagonists, beta-blockers, ace
inhibitors, cholesterol reducers, serotonin reuptake inhibitors (antide-
pressants), 5-HT3 receptor antagonists (antinauseants), cephalosporins
(1st, 2nd, and 3rd generations), growth hormones, calcium channel
blockers, loop diuretics, and benzodiazepines (tranquilizers). Those
classes were defined by a mechanism of action clearly distinguished in
Facts and Comparisons, Drug Facts and Comparisons (St. Louis,
Mo.: Facts and Comparisons, 1995).
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Consider the example of Tagamet, a break-
through drug in antiulcer therapies that was intro-
duced in 1977.  Tagamet was the first drug to relieve
ulcers by blocking the histamine 2 (H2) receptors in
the lining of the stomach from stimulating acid pro-
duction by the parietal cells.  Such treatment is gener-
ally superior to antacids, which only neutralize stom-
ach acid, as well as to anticholinergic drugs, which
block acid production but often have more severe side
effects.19  Six years after Tagamet became available, a
second H2 antagonist, Zantac, was approved; it even-
tually became the largest-selling drug in both the
United States and the world.  By 1989, two additional
H2 antagonists, Pepcid and Axid, were available.
Thus, four slightly different drugs using the same ther-
apeutic mechanism (blocking the H2 receptor) were all
patentable, and the breakthrough drug had only six
years of market exclusivity before being challenged by
a competitor using a similar compound.
The Economics Behind the Pricing of
Innovator Drugs
Although me-too drugs do not offer a novel treatment,
they may have fewer side effects and may treat some
patients more effectively than the original break-
through drug.  In addition, me-too drugs create more
competition in the market by ending the  breakthrough
drug's monopoly on its method of treatment.  That
added competition generally keeps the manufacturer of
the breakthrough drug from raising its price as quickly
as would otherwise be the case.
According to economic theory, both demand and
production costs play a role in determining the price of
a drug.  The line that illustrates demand for a manu-
facturer's output (known as a demand curve) slopes
downward because people will buy more as the price
declines (see Figure 4).  For example, if the manufac-
turer's price decreases from p1 to p2, then the quantity
that the company can sell increases from q1 to q2.  It is
profitable for the manufacturer to lower the price from
p1 to p2 only if the increase in profits from the larger
Figure 4.
Choosing a Profit-Maximizing Price for a Drug
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTE: According to this hypothetical demand curve, when the price
of a drug declines from p1 to p2, the quantity sold increases
from q1 to q2.  Area A represents the loss in profits when the
price falls from p1 to p2, and area B represents the increase
in profits because a greater quantity is sold.  Drug compa-
nies can increase their profits by lowering price so long as
area B is larger than area A.  At price p2, total profits equal
area B plus area C.
quantity sold (represented by shaded area B) more
than compensates for the loss in profits from the lower
price charged on the first q1 units sold (represented by
shaded area A).  In this example, the manufacturer
would continue to lower the price until it could no lon-
ger profit from doing so.20  The profit-maximizing, or
equilibrium, price will exceed the cost of producing
another unit of the drug, and the profits earned from
selling at that price (represented by areas B plus C, if
p2 is the equilibrium price) provide the incentive for
companies to invest in drug development.
When a breakthrough drug is introduced, by defi-
nition it has no close substitutes on the market.  De-
mand for the drug is therefore fairly insensitive to
19. See Ernst Berndt and others, The Roles of Marketing, Product Qual-
ity and Price Competition in the Growth and Composition of the
U.S. Anti-Ulcer Drug Industry, Working Paper No. 4904 (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, October
1994).
20. Economists refer to this as the point at which incremental, or marginal,
revenue from selling another unit of the drug is equal to the cost of
producing another unit.  To keep Figure 4 simple, the cost of produc-
ing another unit is assumed to be the same no matter how much is
produced (therefore, unit production costs are represented by a hori-
zontal line).
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price, since no alternative treatment of equal quality
and effectiveness exists.  (In other words, the drug has
a much steeper demand curve, and a given percentage
change in its price is associated with a smaller per-
centage change in the quantity sold.)
Over time, advertising, "detailing" (visits by rep-
resentatives of the manufacturer to health care profes-
sionals), and articles in medical journals  disseminate
information to doctors about the new treatment.  As
the breakthrough drug becomes more widely known,
demand for it increases.  (Graphically speaking, the
demand curve shifts to the right, meaning that at any
given price, the manufacturer can sell more of the
drug.)  At that point, the quantity of the drug sold in-
creases, and its equilibrium price usually rises.
Later, when me-too drugs enter the market, de-
mand for the breakthrough drug becomes more sensi-
tive to price, since close substitutes are now available.
At that point, an increase in the price of the break-
through drug will prompt some purchasers to switch
to the substitutes.  Advertising and detailing of the
new me-too drugs may also cause some customers to
switch.  Publicity for me-too drugs can also boost de-
mand for the treatment in general.  But although the
overall market for the treatment may grow, such
growth may not offset the sales that the breakthrough
drug loses to its new competitors.  As the market be-
comes split among several drugs, demand for the
breakthrough drug could shrink and become more sen-
sitive to price.  As a result, the price of the break-
through drug could theoretically decline.
Empirical Evidence About the Pricing
of Innovator Drugs
Studies of competition among similar brand-name
drugs show that manufacturers compete through
prices as well as through advertising and product
quality.  Most of the empirical studies that look at
prices of brand-name drugs are based either on list
prices or on average prices paid on invoices to phar-
macies and hospitals.  Neither of those prices repre-
sents an actual transaction price, however.  No pur-
chaser pays the list price, although it serves as an im-
portant signal since it is a published price observed by
all buyers.21  The average invoice price is much closer
to an actual transaction price, but it does not include
rebates or discounts that do not appear on the invoice.
Since neither price captures the full impact of dis-
counting, studies that rely on those prices underesti-
mate to some extent the level of price competition
among brand-name drugs.  Those are the only prices
widely available to researchers, however, so they are
the ones generally used for analyses.
CBO examined the list prices of breakthrough
and me-too drugs over time for five therapeutic
classes.22  In four of the five, the list price of the
breakthrough product continued to increase in real
terms—that is, by more than just the effects of infla-
tion—after the entry of one or more me-too products.23
In only one case (that of fluoroquinolone anti-
infectives) did the breakthrough drug lower its list
price in real terms after the first me-too drug entered
the market.
A study by John Lu and William Comanor also
found that the average list price of brand-name drugs
continues to rise faster than inflation after the intro-
duction of a me-too competitor.24  For 13 drugs that
received an A rating from the FDA (as most innova-
tive), the average inflation-adjusted list price after
eight years on the market was 7 percent above the
launch price.  For 48 B-rated drugs (slightly less inno-
vative), the inflation-adjusted list price was 32 percent
higher, on average, eight years after launch.
That same study also found that although prices
continued to increase, the rate of increase was slower
for those drugs that had more brand-name competitors
21. The list price, called the average wholesale price, or AWP, is pub-
lished annually in Medical Economics Company, Red Book
(Montvale, N.J.: Medical Economics Company).
22. Prices were obtained from the 1980 to 1994 editions of the Red Book.
The five therapeutic classes were H2 antagonists, cholesterol reducers
(specifically HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors), antidepressants (specifi-
cally serotonin reuptake inhibitors), fluoroquinolone anti-infectives,
and alpha-blockers, as listed in Facts and Comparisons, Drug Facts
and Comparisons.
23. In one of those four cases, the entry price of the me-too drug exceeded
that of the breakthrough drug.  In the other three, the breakthrough
drug's price was not reduced even though the me-too drugs with which
it competed were available at a lower price.
24. Lu and Comanor, Strategic Pricing of New Pharmaceuticals.
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on the market.  The introductory price also tended to
be lower when more similar brand-name drugs were
already on the market.  Those findings suggest that the
rate of price increase is slowed by competition be-
tween brand-name drugs.
A breakthrough drug has an advantage over its
me-too competitors in that doctors become experi-
enced with it first and are usually hesitant to try a new
drug unless it is seen to be more effective or have
fewer side effects.  New me-too drugs that offer small
advantages over competitors may be sold at a lower
price initially; then, as they become more widely ac-
cepted, their price rises more quickly.25  That may par-
tially explain why the list prices of C-rated drugs
(least innovative) tend to increase much more rapidly
over time than the list prices of their more innovative
competitors.  Lu and Comanor found that for a sample
of 69 C-rated drugs, the average inflation-adjusted list
price after eight years on the market was 62 percent
above the launch price.  That high price increase oc-
curred although those drugs were launched at roughly
the same price as their closest competitors, on aver-
age.
Price competition among similar innovator drugs
is softened because products are differentiated.  It is
also softened because entry in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry is limited by patent protection and the FDA
approval process.  Still, companies have an incentive
to continue to enter the market with similar brand-
name drugs until profits are driven down to a normal
(competitive) rate of return that adequately compen-
sates for the risk of investing in drug development.
One economist has asserted, based on discussions with
industry executives, that more me-too drugs are not
developed because they would not be profitable given
the high development costs.26  Companies will choose
to develop a brand-name drug similar to others on the
market only if they believe that the market is not al-
ready saturated, or that their drug may have some
quality advantage (such as fewer side effects or
greater efficacy) that could enable it to compete effec-
tively and earn profits that more than cover the devel-
opment costs.  Competition should result in firms'
earning close to a normal rate of return to their R&D
investment, on average.
Using average invoice prices, economist Scott
Stern found that cross-price elasticities (a measure of
buyers' sensitivity to price differences between similar
brand-name drugs) in four therapeutic classes were
consistent with the assertion that brand-name drugs
compete in price.27  His estimates of price sensitivity
were not consistent with the assertion that firms col-
lude to maintain prices as high as what would be
charged if a single company produced all of the prod-
ucts.  Several other studies have also found that the
price differences between patented pharmaceutical
products can largely be accounted for by differences
in quality, such as side effects and therapeutic effec-
tiveness.28
Barriers to Entry and Market 
Concentration
Competition between brand-name drugs may be lim-
ited not only by patent protection but also by the ad-
vantages that large drug companies have in marketing
and in the FDA approval process.  One of the key
ways in which firms compete for market share (other
than through price) is by advertising.  Promotional
spending for a brand-name drug can run as high as 20
percent of total sales.  In 1989, three-quarters of pro-
motional outlays went toward detailing—financing a
large sales force that promoted the firm's entire prod-
uct line directly to health care professionals.29  The
25. Economists have analyzed this phenomenon using an "experience
goods" or "switching costs" model.  See F.M. Scherer and David Ross,
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance
 (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1990), pp. 588-589.
26. Scherer, Industry Structure, Strategy, and Public Policy, p. 351.
27. The four classes were gout therapies, nonbarbiturate sedatives, oral
diabetic therapies, and minor tranquilizers.  See Scott Stern, "Product
Demand in Pharmaceutical Markets" (draft, Stanford University, De-
partment of Economics, November 21, 1994; the draft was updated in
1996 at MIT's Sloan School of Management).
28. See, for example, W. Duncan Reekie, "Price and Quality Competition
in Drug Markets: Evidence from the United States and the Nether-
lands," in Robert B. Helms, ed., Drugs and Health: Economic Issues
and Policy Objectives
 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Insti-
tute, 1981).
29. Richard E. Caves, Michael D. Whinston, and Mark A. Hurwitz, "Pat-
ent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical
Industry," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics
(1991), pp. 11-12; and Mark A. Hurwitz and Richard E. Caves, "Per-
suasion or Information?  Promotion and the Share of Brand-Name and
Generic Pharmaceuticals," Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 31
(October 1988), p. 302.
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Table 3.
Percentage of New Drugs Acquired Rather Than Self-Originated by U.S.-Owned Drug Companies
Investigational
New Drug Applications
Approved New Drug Applications
(For new chemical entities)
Number of
Applications Filed
Percentage of
Drugs Acquireda
Number of
Applications Approved
Percentage of
Drugs Acquireda
1963-1966 326 19 b b
1967-1970 240 20 b b
1971-1974 206 19 b b
1975-1978 160 21 38 29
1979-1982 185 31 47 40
1983-1986 223 26 40 40
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Joseph DiMasi, Natalie Bryant, and Louis Lasagna, "New Drug Development in the United States
from 1963 to 1990," Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics (November 1991), p. 475.
a. Cases in which the company submitting the application had acquired rather than discovered the drug.
b. Not available.
ability to spread those promotional costs across a
large product line is beneficial in that type of market-
ing, giving big firms an advantage.30  They also ap-
pear to enjoy an advantage in the drug-approval pro-
cess:  the General Accounting Office found that NDAs
from the most experienced sponsors were three times
more likely to be approved than those from the least
experienced sponsors.31
Perhaps because of the advantages enjoyed by
large firms, many new drugs are marketed by a com-
pany that did not discover them.32  Of all chemical
entities that began clinical testing between 1979 and
1986, around 29 percent were acquired by another
company rather than self-originated (see Table 3).
And of the new chemical entities that were approved
for marketing during those years, 40 percent were ac-
quired rather than self-originated.
At first glance, the pharmaceutical industry does
not appear to be highly concentrated.  The four largest
manufacturers of innovative drugs each accounted for
only 6 percent to 7 percent of total U.S. pharmaceuti-
cal sales in 1994.  And the top 10 companies together
shared just 56 percent of the market.33
When pharmaceutical sales are divided into nar-
rower submarkets, in which products are grouped only
with their immediate competitors, much higher con-
centration becomes apparent.  CBO's retail pharmacy
data set divides drugs into narrowly defined therapeu-
tic classes.  (For more information about how those
classes are defined, see Box 3.)  The data cover 66
therapeutic classes that together represent about 70
percent of the total retail pharmacy sales revenues in
the United States from 1991 to 1994.  In just over half
of those classes, the top three innovator drugs ac-
counted for 80 percent or more of retail pharmacy
sales in their class (see Figure 5).34  In only nine of the
30. Economists would also say that economies of scope are important.
Economies of scope occur when the production or advertising of more
than one product lowers the average cost of those expenditures for all
products.
31. General Accounting Office, FDA Drug Approval Review Time Has
Decreased in Recent Years, GAO/PEMD-96-1 (October 1995), p. 5.
"Experienced sponsors" submitted nine or more NDAs between 1987
and 1992, whereas "inexperienced sponsors" submitted four or fewer
NDAs and had no affiliation with more experienced sponsors. 
32. Large firms may also have advantages in financial markets, overcom-
ing problems of adverse selection and moral hazard to obtain funding
more easily.  And they can more easily fund a drug's development out
of their profits from sales.  
33. Based on U.S. sales reported by Med Ad News (September 1995),
p. 34.
34. Thirteen of the therapeutic classes contained just one to three innova-
tor drugs.  In five of those 13 classes, the top three innovator drugs had
less than 63 percent of the market because of generic competition.
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classes did the top three innovator drugs make up less
than 50 percent of their pharmacy market.
The level of market concentration varies widely
among therapeutic classes, however, with concentra-
tion reduced by the availability of several different
brand-name drugs and by generic entry.  Generally,
the most concentrated classes in the retail pharmacy
Box 3.
Defining Therapeutic Classes of Drugs
Drugs are generally assigned to a therapeutic
class according to the Uniform Standard of
Classification—a system used by many pharma-
ceutical data companies.1  Under that system,
drugs are grouped by their indication (the type of
illness they treat) and their mechanism of action.
Each class is assigned a five-digit number.  The
first two digits represent very broad indications,
such as anesthetics, anti-infectives, and cardio-
vascular therapies.  As the number gets larger,
the indication becomes more specific—for exam-
ple, ace inhibitors and beta-blockers are five-digit
classes within cardiovascular therapies, and
amoxicillin and penicillin fall within anti-
infectives.
The degree to which drugs in the same ther-
apeutic class can be substituted for one another
varies by class and by drug within each class.  In
some five-digit classes, the drugs share the same
indication but differ in their mechanism of ac-
tion.  For example, all of the drugs in one five-
digit class treat ulcers, but some coat the stomach
whereas others block acid secretion.  In other
five-digit classes, each drug has the same mecha-
nism of action (examples are ace inhibitors, beta-
blockers, and B-lactamase inhibitors).  Prescrip-
tion drugs that share a five-digit therapeutic class
are closer substitutes for one another than drugs
in other classes.
1. Both Scott-Levin and IMS America use that system to clas-
sify drug sales.  The system was developed by IMS America
to provide a logical grouping of pharmaceutical products
that are considered to compete in the same or similar mar-
kets (according to Paul Wilson, Vice President of Statistical
Services at IMS America).
Figure 5.
Market Share of the Top Three Innovator
Drugs in 66 Therapeutic Classes, 1994
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on tabulations of
retail pharmacy sales data from Scott-Levin.
NOTE: Market share is calculated as the total sales (valued at retail
prices) of the top three innovator drugs in a therapeutic
class divided by the total sales of all drugs (both brand-
name and generic) in that class.
data set had four or fewer innovator drugs, none of
which were available in generic form.  In the 18 least
concentrated therapeutic classes, at least one of the
three top-selling innovator drugs had a generic version
available.  And 14 of those 18 least concentrated
classes had nine or more innovator drugs.
Factors That Determine 
Discounts on Brand-Name
Drugs
Different purchasers pay different prices for brand-
name prescription drugs.  Such discounting, which
economists refer to as price discrimination, may be an
important mechanism for aiding price competition in
the pharmaceutical market.35  It rewards institutional
35. For a general discussion of price discrimination, see Jean Tirole, The
Theory of Industrial Organization
 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989),
Chapter 3.  For a discussion of the legal and economic issues sur-
rounding pricing practices in the pharmaceutical industry, see "Sym-
posium on the Brand Name Prescription Drug Antitrust Litigation,"
International Journal of the Economics of Business, vol. 4, no. 3
(November 1997).
24  HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS July 1998
purchasers that organize their patient base through
formularies so as to encourage the use of less costly
drugs, when possible.  Prohibiting or limiting dis-
counts, as some people have called for, could decrease
price competition.
A statistical analysis of pharmaceutical prices
shows that purchasers tend to obtain higher discounts
from manufacturers on brand-name drugs when ge-
neric substitutes are available and when a greater
number of therapeutically similar brand-name drugs
are available.  That finding suggests that manufactur-
ers' discounts are a response to competitive market
conditions.  When a variety of similar drugs are avail-
able, the purchaser has more opportunities to switch,
which can be used as leverage in negotiating dis-
counts.
The Economic Theory Behind 
Discounting
If companies practice price discrimination, those pur-
chasers least sensitive to price pay the most.  In to-
day's market for outpatient prescription drugs, that
means people who have no insurance coverage for
drugs, or third-party payers that do not use a formu-
lary to manage their outpatient drug benefits, pay the
highest prices for brand-name drugs.  Differences in
price result because manufacturers apply typical
profit-maximizing strategies based on the price sensi-
tivity of buyers.  According to economic theory, no
purchaser pays a higher price to make up for the dis-
counts offered to somebody else.  Instead, each pays
the price dictated by his or her price sensitivity.36
Manufacturers offer discounts on brand-name
drugs based both on the volume bought and on the
purchaser's ability to influence market share by sys-
tematically favoring one brand-name drug over an-
other.  For that reason, one would expect retail phar-
macies to pay higher average prices than other pur-
chasers (such as hospitals, long-term care facilities,
and health maintenance organizations) because they
have less ability to promote such brand-name substitu-
tion.  (As noted earlier, substituting one therapeuti-
cally similar brand-name drug for another requires
getting the doctor's consent—something that pharma-
cists in a hurry do not always have time to do.)  If
pharmacies do pay higher prices, that may be evidence
that some managed care techniques, such as the use of
formularies, help other types of purchasers obtain dis-
counts from manufacturers.37  Pharmaceutical benefit
management companies, for example, receive rebates
from manufacturers precisely because they apply a
formulary to a broad patient base, which a retail phar-
macy itself generally cannot do.
Types of Discounts
Manufacturers' discounts on brand-name drugs take a
variety of forms.  Purchasers that buy directly from
manufacturers can simply negotiate a lower purchase
price.  Three-quarters of prescription drugs are bought
indirectly, however, through wholesalers.  But that
does not prevent the  purchaser from obtaining a lower
price.  Manufacturers frequently pay rebates directly
to such purchasers based on the volume of drugs they
use over a period of time.  A demonstrated ability to
switch patients to a particular company's drug, evi-
denced by an increase in the volume used by a pur-
chaser's patient base, may be rewarded with a higher
rebate.  Some contracts between PBMs and drug com-
panies have been designed in that manner.38
Another important form of discounting involves
the wholesaler.  Together, manufacturers and whole-
salers have developed a computerized system whereby
the wholesaler learns of the discounted price negoti-
ated between a manufacturer and a particular pur-
chaser.  The wholesaler delivers the drug at the dis-
counted price, informs the manufacturer of the dis-
counted delivery, and then is reimbursed by the manu-
facturer electronically.39  Such discounts handled
36. See Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, pp. 137-139.
37. For a further discussion of this issue, see Kenneth G. Elzinga and
David E. Mills, "The Distribution and Pricing of Prescription Drugs,"
International Journal of the Economics of Business, vol. 4, no. 3
(November 1997), pp. 289-292.
38. See, for example, "PCS Rebates from Pfizer on Seven Products To-
taled over $10 Million in First 21 Months of 1994-1998 Contract,"
The Pink Sheet, F-D-C Reports, June 10, 1996, p. 16.
39. For a discussion of that system, see F.M. Scherer, "How U.S. Antitrust
Can Go Astray: The Brand Name Prescription Drug Litigation," In-
ternational Journal of the Economics of Business, vol. 4, no. 3 (No-
vember 1997), p. 248.
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Table 4.
Average Price Differences for Various Types of Purchasers in the Pharmaceutical Market (In percent)
Type of Purchaser
Average Invoice Price Paid for 100 Brand-Name
Drugs (As a percentage of the
average invoice price to pharmacies)
Market Share by
Type of Purchaser
in 1994a1993 1994
Retail Pharmacies 100 100 85.6
Hospitals 91 91 4.2
Long-Term Care Facilities 96 95 3.4
Health Maintenance Organizations 80 82 2.7
Federal Facilities 65 58 2.6
Clinics 95 91 1.6
SOURCE: IMS America.
NOTE: These figures are based on the average prices of 100 top-selling brand-name drugs sold primarily through retail pharmacies.  The prices do
not include manufacturer rebates or other discounts not appearing on the invoice.
a. Calculated as a percentage of total sales revenues for the 100 drugs (valued at invoice prices) after excluding sales to mail-order pharmacies.
through a wholesaler are generally known as charge-
backs (although that term is sometimes used to encom-
pass other types of discounts as well).40
Empirical Evidence on Discounting  
Most discounts are negotiated privately between man-
ufacturers and purchasers and do not become public
information.  CBO was able to obtain limited informa-
tion from IMS America about the different prices that
different types of purchasers paid for some prescrip-
tion drugs in 1993 and 1994 (see Table 4).  The prices
paid by pharmacies can be viewed as a proxy for the
final price paid by customers who do not have a man-
aged drug benefit or PBM to negotiate rebates from
manufacturers.  That limited pricing information sug-
gests that customers of retail pharmacies who do not
have such a plan are paying the most for brand-name
drugs.
The price comparison is based on the average
invoice prices paid by various kinds of purchasers for
100 top-selling drugs sold largely through pharmacies.
(Top-selling drugs that were dispensed primarily in an
inpatient setting, such as a hospital, were excluded.)
About 85 percent of the revenues from sales of those
drugs (excluding sales to mail-order pharmacies) came
from retail pharmacies; the other 15 percent came
from sales to other types of purchasers.
Those other purchasers paid less, on average,
than retail pharmacies for the drugs in question.  That
finding is consistent with the notion that purchasers
are rewarded for their ability to influence the prescrip-
tion choice of a large patient base.  For example, hos-
pitals and clinics paid 9 percent less than retail phar-
macies in 1994, and HMOs paid 18 percent less.  Fed-
eral facilities got the biggest discount, over 40 percent,
off the average invoice price paid by retail pharma-
cies.41
40. For example, hospitals and hospital buying groups sometimes refer to
the rebates paid directly to them by manufacturers for drugs bought
through wholesalers as charge-backs, even though the wholesalers
have no knowledge of them.  See Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz, "Pat-
ent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical
Industry," p. 32.
41. Note that the prices paid by federal agencies—such as the Department
of Veterans Affairs, the Defense Department, the Indian Health Ser-
vice, and the Public Health Service, as well as state pharmaceutical
assistance programs—are not affected by the best-price provision in
the Medicaid rebate program, which discourages discounting.  That
exclusion was made permanent by the Veterans Health Care Act of
1992.  For more information, see Congressional Budget Office, How
the Medicaid Rebate on Prescription Drugs Affects Pricing in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, CBO Paper (January 1996); and General
Accounting Office, Drug Prices: Effects of Opening Federal Supply
Schedule for Pharmaceuticals Are Uncertain,
 GAO/HEHS-97-60
(June 1997).
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That comparison is based on invoice prices only,
which do not capture rebates and other types of dis-
counts that do not appear on an invoice.42  The size of
the average price differences between types of pur-
chasers, and perhaps also the relative ranking of the
nonpharmacy purchasers, would change if rebates and
all forms of discounts were included.  But as long as
the excluded rebates and discounts were not larger for
retail pharmacies than for the other types of purchas-
ers, on average, then the conclusion drawn from Table
4—that customers of pharmacies without a managed
drug benefit pay the highest prices for brand-name
drugs—would remain correct.  Unfortunately, more
complete pricing data are not available.
Rebates to PBMs and Medicaid are also not in-
cluded in Table 4.  Such rebates are an important
mechanism for lowering the average prices that manu-
facturers are paid for prescription drugs bought
through retail pharmacies.  Since the invoice prices
paid by pharmacies do not include the rebates that
PBMs and Medicaid receive, Table 4 probably over-
states the difference between the average prices that
manufacturers earn for drugs channeled through retail
pharmacies and the average prices they earn for drugs
channeled through other types of purchasers.
Statistical Analysis of Discounts  
For another perspective on pricing in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, CBO analyzed data on the "best-price
discounts" offered by manufacturers of brand-name
drugs in 1994.  (Manufacturers reported that informa-
tion to the federal Health Care Financing Administra-
tion as part of the Medicaid rebate program.)  The
best-price discount equals the percentage difference
between a manufacturer's best price (the lowest price
it offers any private purchaser in the United States)
and the average price it charges for drugs distributed
to retail pharmacies.  The best price encompasses all
forms of discounting, whereas the average price to
retail pharmacies generally does not include rebates
paid to PBMs or Medicaid (although it does include
all forms of discounts that manufacturers give directly
to pharmacies).43
The best-price discount alone is not a perfect
measure of discounting, because it is not representa-
tive of all discounts.  It would be preferable from an
analytic standpoint to know more about the distribu-
tion of different prices paid for a particular brand-
name drug and the quantity sold at each price.  Such
extensive pricing data are not publicly available, how-
ever.
Manufacturers are very careful about giving
large best-price discounts (more than 15.1 percent of
their average price to pharmacies) because, by law,
they must give that same discount on all drugs distrib-
uted through retail pharmacies that are purchased by
Medicaid beneficiaries.44  Since Medicaid usually con-
stitutes a larger share of a drug's market than any sin-
gle private purchaser—13 percent of retail pharmacy
sales, on average—such a discount can represent a
significant reduction in revenues.  The Medicaid re-
bate program makes it less likely that manufacturers
would offer a large best-price discount (over 15.1 per-
cent) to just one private purchaser.45
CBO's statistical analysis in fact shows that the
Medicaid rebate program, which began in 1991, has
discouraged discounting on brand-name drugs.  For
every increase of 3 percentage points in Medicaid's
market share for a particular brand-name drug, the
best-price discount falls by 1.3 percentage points.
(That result does not apply to prescription drugs used
exclusively in an inpatient setting, which are generally
not included in Medicaid's rebate program.)
42. Invoice prices generally incorporate discounts granted through a
charge-back system with wholesalers.
43. For more detailed information on the calculation of those prices, see
the Medicaid rebate agreement signed by manufacturers  (available at
http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/drug8.htm).  The calculation of the
average price that  manufacturers charge for drugs distributed to retail
pharmacies includes sales and discounts to mail-order pharmacies.
44. Manufacturers pay at least a flat rebate of 15.1 percent of the average
manufacturer price for drugs they distribute through retail pharmacies
that are purchased by Medicaid beneficiaries.  The rebate percentage
is equal to the best-price discount only when that discount exceeds
15.1 percent.
45. See Congressional Budget Office, How the Medicaid Rebate on Pre-
scription Drugs Affects Pricing in the Pharmaceutical Industry, pp.
22-25.
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The statistical analysis examines the size of dis-
counts offered on brand-name drugs after adjusting for
the effects of the number of brand-name and generic
competitors, the therapeutic class of the drug, and its
Medicaid market share.  (For more details of the anal-
ysis, see Appendix B.)  The results show that the best-
price discount on a brand-name drug is 10 to 14 per-
centage points greater when therapeutically similar
brand-name drugs are available from three or more
manufacturers.  As more producers of brand-name
drugs enter a particular therapeutic class, the size of
the best-price discount increases.  Similar increases
occur when generic competitors enter a market.  Those
results confirm the theory that the steep discounts on
brand-name drugs available to some purchasers are a
response to competitive market conditions.46
Competition Between Brand-
Name and Generic Drugs
One of the primary goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act
was to increase the availability of lower-cost generic
drugs.  Since the act became law in 1984, the market
share of generic drugs has indeed been rising steadily
—although not all of that increase stems from the act.
For drugs that come in easily countable units, such as
tablets and capsules, the share of generic units sold
more than doubled between 1984 and 1996—from
18.6 percent of all drug units sold to 42.6 percent (see
Figure 6).47
Those numbers are probably the best publicly
available estimate documenting the rise in generic
Figure 6.
Growth in the Market Share of Generic
Drugs Since 1984
SOURCE: Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of Amer-
ica, 1997 Industry Profile (Washington, D.C.: PhRMA,
March 1997), p. 40, based on data from IMS America.
NOTE: Generic market share is calculated as a percentage of all
prescription drugs sold, not just off-patent drugs.  These
figures are based on countable units, such as tablets or cap-
sules; prescription drugs that come in injectible form are not
included.
market share since 1984.  However, since countable
units do not include injectable drugs and many types
of prescription drugs dispensed in liquid form, they
are not a perfect measure of average generic market
share.  Many injectable drugs are dispensed primarily
in hospitals and other inpatient settings, so the esti-
mate may underrepresent those channels of distribu-
tion.  Countable units appear to yield an estimate of
generic market share similar to that measured by the
number of prescriptions dispensed through retail phar-
macies.48
The Hatch-Waxman Act encouraged the entry of
generic drugs by establishing an abbreviated approval
process for generic versions of all nonantibiotic drugs
(antibiotics already had such a process).  In addition,
the act reversed a 1984 court ruling and allowed ge-
neric manufacturers to begin the tests required for
46. CBO's 1996 paper on the Medicaid rebate program also found that the
largest discounts were significantly higher for multiple-source drugs
than for single-source drugs.  In 1991, the largest discounts offered on
multiple-source innovator drugs averaged 50 percent off the price to
pharmacies, compared with 35 percent off for single-source drugs; see
Congressional Budget Office, How the Medicaid Rebate on Prescrip-
tion Drugs Affects Pricing in the Pharmaceutical Industry.  See also
Fiona Scott Morton, "The Strategic Response by Pharmaceutical
Firms to the Medicaid Most-Favored-Customer Rules," RAND Jour-
nal of Economics, vol. 28, no. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 269-290.
47. Those figures come from IMS America and are published in Pharma-
ceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 1997 Industry Pro-
file, p. 40.  The publication gave the generic market share in 1996 as
41.6 percent.  The corrected 1996 figure came from a personal com-
munication from Paul Wilson, Vice President of Statistical Services,
IMS America, on February 27, 1998.
48. "Approximately 57 percent of all prescriptions paid for by managed
care are still filled with branded products—a virtually identical ratio
to the overall market," implying a generic market share of about 43
percent for the retail pharmacy market; see IMS America, "IMS Says
Managed Care Drove Unprecedented Growth in Pharmaceuticals in
1996" (press release, April 14, 1997, available at http://www.ims-
america.com/communications/pr_growth.html).  
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FDA approval before the patent on the innovator drug
they were copying had expired.  Those changes both
increased the probability that a generic copy would
become available after patent expiration and reduced
the average delay between patent expiration and ge-
neric entry from more than three years to less than
three months.
As generic drugs are substituted for their more
expensive brand-name counterparts, the average price
of a prescription falls.  In CBO's retail pharmacy data
set, the average retail prescription price for a brand-
name drug with generic substitutes was $37 in 1994.
However, including prescriptions that were filled with
a generic drug, the average prescription price for a
multiple-source drug was only $26.  Thus, generic
substitution lowered the average cost for a multiple-
source prescription by $11.  That result is only a
rough estimate, however, since prescriptions may
somewhat misrepresent the relative quantities of
brand-name and generic drugs sold.  For example, if
generic drugs tend to have more pills dispensed per
prescription than their brand-name counterparts, that
estimate would understate the degree to which generic
substitution reduces the average cost of a prescription.
If generic drugs tend to have fewer pills dispensed, the
reverse would be true.
Effect of Generic Entry on Sales  
For many innovator drugs whose patents have recently
expired, generic copies quickly gain a large share of
the market.  CBO's retail pharmacy data set includes
21 innovator drugs whose first generic competitors
entered the market between 1991 and 1993.  During
the first full calendar year in which those 21 drugs
faced generic competition, generics already accounted
for an average of 44 percent of prescriptions dis-
pensed through pharmacies.49  Generics also cost one-
fourth less than the brand-name drugs, on average, at
retail prices.  For seven of those drugs (Anaprox,
Feldene, Lopid, Naprosyn, Pamelor, Tavist, and
Xanax), generics had gained 65 percent or more of the
innovator's market by 1994.  For all but two of the 21
drugs, generic entry occurred within one year of patent
expiration, and in many cases within three months.50
Other studies examining the size of the generic
market after patent expiration have yielded slightly
different results.  Those appear to be attributable to
differences in the sample of drugs studied as well as to
small differences in method.  A study by Grabowski
and Vernon found that 11 drugs whose patents expired
between 1989 and 1992 had an average generic mar-
ket share (measured by quantity sold) of 50 percent in
the first year after generic entry, and eight drugs
whose patents expired in the 1986-1987 period had an
average generic market share of 38 percent.51  The
study also found that the wholesale price of generic
drugs was about half that of brand-name drugs in the
first year after generic entry.
Grabowski and Vernon's average generic market
share for the 1989-1992 period is higher than that
measured by CBO for the 1991-1993 period in part
because CBO included the quantity sold of all dosage
forms of the brand-name drug, even those for which
generic entry had not occurred, when calculating the
percentage of total prescriptions filled with a generic
drug.  That method takes account of the option that
brand-name manufacturers have to introduce a new
dosage form (such as an extended-release capsule) just
as a drug's patent is about to expire, so as to benefit
from a three-year exclusivity period on that dosage
form.  Occasionally, manufacturers can even get a
separate patent on a new dosage form.  Of the 21
brand-name drugs that CBO analyzed, four had an
advanced dosage form (Sinemet CR, Cardizem CD,
Toprol XL, and Procardia XL) that was not yet avail-
able from generic manufacturers.
The Congress's former Office of Technology As-
sessment (OTA) also studied the erosion of brand-
name drug sales after patent expiration.52  In OTA's
study of 35 brand-name drugs that lost patent protec-
49. The 44 percent average is weighted by sales revenues of the innovator
drugs.  The unweighted average is 42.8 percent.
50. The two drugs for which generic entry took more than a year after
patent expiration had retail pharmacy sales of about $130 million in
1991.
51. Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, "Longer Patents for Increased
Generic Competition in the U.S.: The Hatch-Waxman Act After One
Decade," PharmacoEconomics (1996).
52. Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D, Table F-3,
p. 297.
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tion between 1984 and 1987, sales volume for those
drugs was 43 percent lower three years after patent
expiration.  Part of the reason it took that long for
brand-name sales to erode by so much was a longer
delay between patent expiration and generic entry dur-
ing the period that OTA examined.  For more than
half of the 1984-1987 period, generic manufacturers
could not have begun the abbreviated drug-approval
process far enough in advance to enter the market
soon after patent expiration.  Also, that study differed
from CBO's analysis because it focused on the decline
in brand-name sales following patent expiration rather
than explicitly on generic market share.  Actual ge-
neric market share measured in volume may have been
greater than 43 percent if the total quantity of the
drugs demanded rose because generic drugs were
cheaper.  Or generic market share may have been
smaller if competition from similar brand-name drugs
was also eroding innovators' sales.  OTA's estimates
also differed from CBO's in that its measurements
were based on the date of patent expiration rather than
the date of generic entry.
Before 1984 and the Hatch-Waxman Act, com-
petition from generic drugs in terms of price and mar-
ket share was limited primarily to antibiotics.53  In 29
cases other than antibiotics in which top-selling brand-
name drugs had generic copies available, generic mar-
ket share averaged just 12.7 percent of prescriptions
dispensed through retail pharmacies in 1980.54  The
probability of generic entry was also much lower be-
fore 1984.  Excluding antibiotics and drugs approved
before 1962 (for which an abbreviated generic-drug-
approval process existed), only 18 out of 52 top-sell-
ing drugs with expired patents had generic versions
available.55  Clearly, the lengthy FDA approval pro-
cess at that time hampered the generic drug industry.
Effect of Generic Entry on Brand-
Name Prices  
Those consumers who are more sensitive to price, or
who are covered by health plans that encourage ge-
neric substitution, are more likely to buy a generic
drug when it becomes available.  As the more price-
sensitive consumers switch to the generic version, de-
mand for the original brand-name drug declines and
may become less sensitive to price.  If that happens,
the price of the brand-name drug could theoretically
rise more quickly over time than it would have without
generic competition.56
A number of empirical studies have found that
the prices of brand-name drugs continue to rise faster
than inflation after generic entry (see Box 4 for de-
tails).  One study also found that brand-name prices
increase by about 1 percent with each new generic
competitor.  At the same time, CBO's analysis shows
that discounts on brand-name drugs tend to increase
after generic entry, something not fully captured in the
invoice prices on which the other empirical studies are
based.  CBO found that the best-price discount is 10
to 17 percentage points greater when two or more ge-
neric manufacturers produce copies of the brand-name
drug (see Appendix B).  Taken together, the implica-
tion of those results is that prices of brand-name drugs
do rise faster than inflation for many final purchasers
after generic entry, but some purchasers pay less for
those drugs after generic entry.
CBO examined the prices that manufacturers
charged for 34 brand-name drugs distributed to retail
pharmacies that first saw generic competition after
1991.  It found that those brand-name prices contin-
ued to increase faster than inflation after generic entry,
perhaps as much as they would have otherwise.57
53. See Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Consumer Protection,
Drug Product Selection
 (1979), p. 46.
54. See Appendix C for details.
55. Those drugs were all in the top 200 drugs in the United States, rated
by sales.  Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, "Longer Patents for
Lower Imitation Barriers: The 1984 Drug Act," American Economic
Review, vol. 76, no. 2 (May 1986), pp. 195-198.
56. Frank and Salkever have developed a theoretical model that formally
captures this phenomenon, showing that it may be profitable for the
manufacturer of the innovator drug to raise its price after generic en-
try; see Richard G. Frank and David S. Salkever, "Pricing, Patent
Loss and the Market for Pharmaceuticals," Southern Economic Jour-
nal
 (October 1992), pp. 165-179.
57. The analysis was based on the average price that manufacturers
charged for brand-name drugs sold to the retail pharmacy class of
trade, as reported by manufacturers to the Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration as part of the Medicaid rebate program.  Those prices,
which include all discounts and rebates to retail pharmacies, were
matched to the drugs in the retail pharmacy data set to determine
whether a generic substitute existed.  (For more details on the pricing
data, see Appendix A.) 
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That result affects primarily third-party payers that do
not manage their outpatient drug benefits and consum-
ers who have no insurance (but who still purchased
the brand-name drug).  Other types of purchasers,
such as Medicaid and PBMs, get rebates from manu-
facturers that are not captured in the prices charged to
pharmacies.
For 34 drugs that experienced generic competi-
tion for the first time after 1991, the average price in-
Box 4.
Studies of How Generic Entry Affects Brand-Name Prices
Several economists have studied what happens to the
prices of innovator drugs when generic copies enter
the market.  All of the studies agree that the effect on
innovators' prices is very small, although there is
some dispute about the direction of that effect.
(Those studies looked at average invoice prices paid
by hospitals and pharmacies, which do not include
some types of discounts and rebates offered by drug
manufacturers.)  
For 18 innovator drugs whose patents expired
between 1983 and 1987, Grabowski and Vernon
found that prices continued to rise faster than infla-
tion after generic entry.1  Another empirical study, by
Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz, examined 30 brand-
name drugs that went off patent between 1976 and
1987.  The authors attempted to control for the rate of
price increase that would have occurred without ge-
neric entry.  They concluded that although the prices
of many brand-name drugs continued to rise after ge-
neric entry, those prices were still lower than they
would have been otherwise.  The study's results
showed that the brand-name price actually increased
slightly just after patent expiration and then declined
by only 2 percent with the entry of the first generic
manufacturer.2  After five generic manufacturers had
entered the market, the brand-name price was 8.5 per-
cent lower than it would have been without generic
entry, and after 10 generic manufacturers had entered
the market, that price was 15 percent lower.
1. Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, "Brand Loyalty, Entry, and
Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act,"
Journal of Law and Economics
 (October 1992), p. 339.
2. Generic entry occurs much sooner after patent expiration now
than during most of the period studied by the authors, because of
changes made by the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Richard E. Caves,
Michael D. Whinston, and Mark A. Hurwitz, "Patent Expiration,
Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics
(1991), pp. 1-66.
Wiggins and Maness showed that generic entry
has been effective in lowering the brand-name price
for anti-infective drugs.3  And a recent study by
Ellison and colleagues found that in one antibiotic
market (cephalosporins), demand for a brand-name
drug is more sensitive to changes in the price of its
generic substitute(s) than to changes in the price of a
competing brand-name drug.4  (Price competition be-
tween brand-name and generic drugs in the anti-
infective class is thought to be unusually strong, how-
ever.)5
One study by Frank and Salkever of 32 drugs that
went off patent between 1984 and 1987 found that
brand-name prices increased more quickly than if ge-
neric entry had not occurred—by approximately one
extra percentage point for each generic entrant.6
Overall, brand-name prices frequently continue to
rise after generic entry.  Whether they rise more
quickly or more slowly than would be the case with-
out competition from generic drugs, however, is un-
clear based on these studies.  
3. Steven Wiggins and Robert Maness, "Price Competition in
Pharmaceuticals: The Case of Antiinfectives" (draft, Texas A&M
University, Department of Economics, 1995).
4. Sara Fisher Ellison and others, "Characteristics of Demand for
Pharmaceutical Products: An Examination of Four
Cephalosporins," RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 28, no. 3
(Autumn 1997), pp. 426-446.
5. Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs,
Risks and Rewards
 (February 1993); and Grabowski and
Vernon, "Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition," p. 333.
Antibiotics are also known as a class for which physicians are
more likely to write the prescription in generic form (specifying a
chemical name) than with a brand name.
6. Richard G. Frank and David S. Salkever, "Generic Entry and the
Pricing of Pharmaceuticals," Journal of Economics and Man-
agement Strategy, vol. 6 (Spring 1997), pp. 75-90.
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crease between 1991 and 1994 was 22 percent.  By
comparison, average prices for brand-name drugs that
faced no generic competition rose by 24.5 percent over
that period.  And the prices of brand-name drugs that
had already faced generic competition by 1991 grew
by 22.4 percent during the same period.  (Apart from
any effect of generic competition, that price increase
for multiple-source drugs could be lower because
many of the drugs are older ones that have been sur-
passed by newer treatments.)  The differences in the
rate of price increase among those three groups of
brand-name drugs are small and consistent with the
notion that generic competition does not have a large
effect on brand-name prices for many purchasers.
Effect of Generic Competition on Total
Costs for Prescription Drugs
Because generic drugs are priced much lower than
their brand-name counterparts, they are a source of
substantial savings.  According to CBO's data on re-
tail pharmacy sales, the average retail price of a pre-
scription for a generic drug in 1994 was $17.40 (see
Table 1 on page 15).  Multiple-source brand-name
drugs were twice as expensive—averaging $37.40 per
prescription.
CBO estimates that if each generic prescription
had been dispensed at the corresponding brand-name
price, purchasers of prescription drugs through retail
pharmacies would have spent roughly $8 billion to
$10 billion more in 1994.  Those figures were calcu-
lated as follows:  CBO assumed that all of the generic
prescriptions dispensed in 1994 would have been filled
with a higher-priced brand-name drug if the generic
drug was not available.58  Then the price difference
between the innovator and generic formulations of a
given drug was multiplied by the number of generic
prescriptions dispensed for that drug.  Adding together
the results of those calculations for all of the multiple-
source drugs in the retail pharmacy data set yielded an
estimate of $7 billion in direct savings from retail pur-
chases of generic drugs in the data set.59
The sales data cover only 70 percent of the retail
pharmacy market, however, although they may cover
more than 70 percent of generic drug sales through
retail pharmacies since they include nearly all of the
200 top-selling drugs that are dispensed primarily
through pharmacies.  Assuming that the data set en-
compasses 70 percent to 90 percent of total generic
sales, then savings from all retail purchases of generic
drugs through pharmacies would total approximately
$8 billion to $10 billion in 1994.  Of course, retail
pharmacies are not the only sellers of prescription
drugs.  Since other channels (including hospitals, clin-
ics, and mail-order pharmacies) distribute around 40
percent of prescription drugs, the total savings from
generic substitution through all channels were most
likely even greater than that amount.
That calculation entails a variety of assumptions
and caveats.  First, it assumes that the quantity of pre-
scriptions filled for a particular multiple-source drug
does not increase because a lower-priced generic has
become available.  If the number of prescriptions did
increase, the calculation would overstate the savings
from generic entry.  However, limited statistical evi-
dence supports the assumption that the quantity sold
does not change.  A study by Caves, Whinston, and
Hurwitz found that the total amount sold of a drug in
both generic and brand-name forms did not increase
after generic entry.60
Second, the calculation is a rough one because
the price per prescription, from which it is derived,
does not account for possible systematic differences
between the size of brand-name and generic prescrip-
tions.  The calculation would be more accurate—
though much more cumbersome—if the unit of mea-
sure was the cost of an average daily dose.  But even
58. Technically, the calculation assumed that demand is perfectly price
inelastic—that is, the lower price of generic drugs does not induce
more prescriptions to be filled than if the cheaper generic version did
not exist.  To the extent that people fill prescriptions they would have
left unfilled if a cheap generic version was not available, the estimate
somewhat overstates the savings from generic substitution.  And to the
extent that some consumers substitute the generic for a therapeutically
similar (but chemically different) brand-name drug that is still under
patent, savings from generic substitution exist but the calculation esti-
mates them based on the wrong brand-name price.  That may or may
not lead to a small overstatement of the total savings.
59. Those savings were calculated only for tablet and capsule dosage
forms, which constitute 91 percent of the value of generic sales in the
retail pharmacy data set.  Those dosage forms yield a more reliable
average price per prescription, which forms the basis of the calcula-
tion.
60. Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz, "Patent Expiration, Entry, and Com-
petition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry."
32  HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS July 1998
that measure contains problems, because the average
daily dose can vary among people and among the dif-
ferent medical conditions that a drug is used for.
Without the ability to use a better measure, the calcu-
lation relies on prescriptions as the unit of quantity to
obtain a rough estimate of the savings from generic
substitution.
Finally, the calculation does not include any re-
bates that manufacturers pay to PBMs or other pur-
chasers of prescription drugs through retail pharma-
cies.  Excluding those rebates leads to an overestima-
tion of the savings from generic substitution at retail
pharmacies.  That overestimate could be as much as
roughly $500 million, assuming that manufacturers
give rebates on multiple-source brand-name drugs (to
PBMs and other third-party payers that manage their
outpatient drug benefits) to the same extent that they
do on brand-name drugs still under patent.61
Competition Among Generic 
Drugs
The expiration of an innovator drug's patent frequently
prompts more than one generic copy to enter the mar-
ket.  Since most generic competitors sell their copy
under the same chemical name, there is little apparent
difference between their products.  Economic theory
suggests that differences between products dampen
price competition, so when products are roughly iden-
tical, price competition can be intense.  Hence, as
more generic manufacturers enter the market, they
should face increased pressure to lower prices in order
to maintain market share.
Tabulations of average retail prescription prices
in 1994 show that the average price of a generic drug
does decline as the number of manufacturers and dis-
tributors of that drug increases (see Table 5).  For ex-
ample, the average prescription price of a generic drug
with one to five manufacturers ($23.40) is more than
that of a drug with 16 to 20 manufacturers ($19.90).
CBO's retail pharmacy data set covers 112 innovator
drugs that in 1994 were also available in generic
forms sold under their chemical name.  Comparing the
average generic prescription price with the average
innovator price for the same drug also shows prices
falling as the number of generic manufacturers rises.
When one to 10 generic manufacturers are in the mar-
ket, the generic retail prescription price averages 61
percent of the brand-name price.  When 11 to 24 ge-
neric manufacturers are in the market, the generic re-
tail price averages less than half of the brand-name
price.
Other studies have also concluded that prices of
generic drugs decline in response to increased generic
competition.  Economist Richard Caves and col-
leagues found that as the number of generic manufac-
turers increased from one to 10, the average generic
price fell from 60 percent to just 34 percent of the
brand-name price.  With 20 manufacturers, the ge-
neric price was only 20 percent of the brand-name
price.62  Since generic prices tend to fall as the number
of producers rises, generic manufacturers are most
profitable when they are one of the first to enter a
market.
Market Concentration in the Generic
Drug Industry
Overall, the generic drug market is not particularly
concentrated.   Mylan and Geneva, the largest generic
firms in 1994, accounted for 16 percent and 12 per-
cent, respectively, of all generic sales in the retail
pharmacy data set.  Most generic firms had just 1 per-
cent to 5 percent of total generic sales.
61. Discounts and rebates to private purchasers in 1994 totaled $3,456
million (not including Medicaid rebates), according to information
that the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America pro-
vided to CBO on April 28, 1997.  Pharmacies distribute 60 percent of
prescription drugs, but only rebates to third-party payers, not the dis-
counts to pharmacies themselves, should be counted.  Assuming that
40 percent of the discounts and rebates went to PBMs and other pur-
chasers that manage their outpatient drug benefits (a very generous
amount), that leaves $1,382 million.  Since multiple-source brand-
name drugs represent about 33 percent of the value of all brand-name
drugs sold through retail pharmacies, taking 33 percent of that leaves
$455 million.
62. Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz, "Patent Expiration, Entry, and Com-
petition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry," p. 36, Table 9.  Their
study actually counted the number of approved abbreviated new drug
applications, which a generic manufacturer is required to obtain from
the FDA, rather than the number of manufacturers and distributors.
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Table 5.
Price Comparison of Generic and Innovator Drugs, by Number of Manufacturers, 1994
Number of 
Manufacturers 
Selling Generic
Copies of a Given
Innovator Druga
Number of
Innovator Drugs
in Category
Average
Prescription
Price of All
Generic Drugs
in Category
(Dollars)
Average
Prescription
Price of All
Innovator Drugs
in Category
(Dollars)
Average Ratio
of the Generic
Price to the
Innovator Price
for the Same Drugb
1 to 5 34 23.40 37.20 0.61
6 to 10 26 26.40 42.60 0.61
11 to 15 29 20.90 50.20 0.42
16 to 20 19 19.90 45.00 0.46
21 to 24 4 11.50 33.90 0.39
Average n.a. 22.40 43.00 0.53
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on tabulations of retail pharmacy sales data from Scott-Levin.
NOTES: The retail pharmacy data covered 177 multiple-source drugs, but only 112 had both brand-name and generic versions and came in tablet or
capsule form.  Only tablet and capsule formulations were used for calculating average prescription prices.  The average number of generic
manufacturers and distributors for a given drug was 10.  Only manufacturers with sales above $100,000 for at least one dosage form were
counted in the groupings, although all generic sales were used to calculate the average generic price.
n.a. = not applicable.
a. Includes manufacturers and distributors of dosage forms with annual sales above $100,000.
b. An unweighted average of the ratios of generic to brand-name retail pharmacy prices for the drugs in each category.  The ratio for a multiple-
source drug is equal to:  (total generic sales/number of generic prescriptions) ÷ (total brand-name sales/number of brand-name prescriptions).
The markets for individual multiple-source
drugs, by contrast, are much more concentrated.  For
94 of 110 multiple-source drugs in the retail pharmacy
data set, the top two generic firms were responsible
for more than half of generic sales.  And for 57 of
those drugs, the single top generic firm accounted for
more than half of generic sales.
Leading generic firms may lower their price
when new competitors enter the market so as to main-
tain their dominant position.  That would explain how
the average generic price falls as the number of manu-
facturers rises, but sales of many generic drugs remain
dominated by one or two companies.  Still, Grabowski
and Vernon found that in only half of the 18 markets
they examined, the lowest-priced generic manufacturer
had the largest market share.63  Factors other than
price, such as being the first to enter a market, proba-
bly also play a role in determining a generic manufac-
turer's market share.  And one recent study found that
generic manufacturers are more likely to enter markets
where they have some experience with a drug's dosage
form, therapy, or active ingredient.64
Links Between Generic and Brand-
Name Manufacturers
Although the same company rarely produces both a
brand-name drug and its generic copy, some generic
manufacturers are subsidiaries of brand-name firms.
In 1994, eight of the 15 largest generic companies in
63. Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, "Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price
Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act," Journal of
Law and Economics
 (October 1992), p. 345.  CBO's retail pharmacy
 
data are in retail prices, so they cannot be used to compare the prices
charged by different generic manufacturers.  
64. Fiona Scott Morton, Entry Decisions in the Generic Pharmaceutical
Industry, Working Paper No. 6190 (Cambridge, Mass.: National
Bureau of Economic Research, September 1997).
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the retail pharmacy data set were owned by innovator
firms.65  Those generic subsidiaries were responsible
for 46 percent of total generic sales in the data set.
Today, the proportion of generic drugs produced
by subsidiaries of innovator firms is probably some-
what smaller than in 1994 because several brand-
name manufacturers have left the generic drug busi-
ness.  For example, three of the eight larger generic
firms owned by a brand-name company (Rugby, Ham-
ilton, and Warner-Chilcott) have been sold or dis-
banded in recent years.66  Some of those brand-name
companies experimented with producing generic cop-
ies of their own drugs in the early 1990s and found
that it was not very profitable.  For example, generic
manufacturer Hamilton offered copies of the brand-
name drugs Anaprox and Naprosyn produced by its
parent company, Syntex.  During the first calendar
year after patent expiration, the average generic price
quickly dropped, and Syntex lost 70 percent of its
market for those two drugs to generic competition.67
A few of the brand-name companies that tried to get
further into the generic business in the early 1990s,
including Hoechst Marion Roussel and Merck, have
recently sold generic subsidiaries.68
Nevertheless, brand-name companies that have
long held generic subsidiaries remain committed to
their generic business.  Today, at least 13 manufactur-
ers of innovator drugs have a generic subsidiary or
division (see Table 6).  One of the largest generic
firms, Geneva Pharmaceuticals, is a subsidiary of
Novartis (a company formed by the merger of Ciba-
Geigy and Sandoz).
Most generic subsidiaries do not produce copies
of their parent company's drugs.  Out of 112 multiple-
Table 6.
Generic Subsidiaries or Divisions of Brand-
Name Manufacturers
Generic Manufacturer Owned By
Apothecon Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
Arcola Laboratories Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 
Blue Ridge Laboratories Marion Merrell Dow Inc.
Copley Pharmaceutical Inc. Hoechst Marion Roussel
Dista Products Co. Eli Lilly and Co.
Elkins-Sinn Inc. American Home Products
    Corp.
ESI-Lederle American Home Products
    Corp.
Geneva Pharmaceuticals Novartis Corp.
Greenstone Ltd. Pharmacia & Upjohn Inc.
IPR Pharmaceuticals Inc. Zeneca Pharmaceuticals 
Kanetta Pharmacal Sanofi Winthrop Inc.
Lederle Laboratories Lederle Standard Products
Penn Labs Inc. SmithKline Beecham
Schein Pharmaceutical Inc. Bayer Corp.
SOURCES: "Generics Are Gaining Respect," Med Ad News (No-
vember 1993), p. 10; and "The Meltdown: A Special
Report on the Generic Drug Industry," Med Ad News
(November 1997), p. 31.
source drugs in the retail pharmacy data set, only 13
had a generic subsidiary of the brand-name manufac-
turer selling more than 10 percent of the prescriptions
dispensed through retail pharmacies.   In general, the
incentives to lower price in order to gain market share
are the same for all generic manufacturers, whether or
not they are the subsidiary of an innovator firm.  But
an important exception occurs when the generic sub-
sidiary produces a copy of the parent company's inno-
vator drug.  Though infrequent, in such cases the sub-
sidiary may have less incentive to lower price than
other generic producers because it does not want to
take more sales away from the parent company's drug.
And when the generic subsidiary does lower price dra-
matically, the innovator firm suffers.
Conclusions
Changes to the approval process for generic drugs
made by the Hatch-Waxman Act, combined with the
changes in demand for generic drugs discussed in
65. All 15 companies had annual sales of over $100 million for the drugs
in the retail pharmacy data set in 1994.
66. Rugby, which was owned by Hoechst Marion Roussel, was sold to
Watson, a generic drug company.  Hamilton, a subsidiary of Syntex,
was disbanded when Syntex was acquired by Roche in 1995.  And
Warner-Chilcott was sold by Warner-Lambert to Nalé Laboratories.
67. Based on CBO's retail pharmacy data set.  Also see Catherine Yang,
"The Drugmakers vs. the Trustbusters," Business Week, September 5,
1994, p. 67.
68. Milt Freudenheim, "Cleaning Out the Medicine Cabinet," New York
Times, September 11, 1997, p. D1.  Hoechst Marion Roussel sold
Rugby in 1997 but still owns two smaller generic subsidiaries. 
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Chapter 2, have prompted a dramatic rise in generic
competition since 1984.  That increased competition
has helped hold down the average price of a multiple-
source prescription drug by encouraging the substitu-
tion of lower-priced generic drugs for brand-name
ones.  In 1994, such substitution saved final purchas-
ers of prescription drugs through retail pharmacies
roughly $8 billion to $10 billion (at retail prices).
Manufacturers of generic drugs, who sell nearly
identical versions of the same product, compete more
intensely on the basis of price than do manufacturers
of innovator drugs, who compete more on the basis of
quality and other differences between products.  Aver-
age list and invoice prices of brand-name drugs do not
typically fall after generic competitors enter the mar-
ket.  On a selective basis, however, manufacturers of
brand-name drugs do offer discounts and rebates to
some purchasers, and those discounts tend to be larger
when generic versions of the drug are available.  The
data necessary to determine what volume of purchases
is sold at a substantial discount do not exist.  The in-
dustry group Pharmaceutical Research and Manufac-
turers of America estimates that discounts saved pur-
chasers $5.3 billion in 1994, $3.5 billion of which
went to non-Medicaid purchasers.69  (That $3.5 billion
represented over 5 percent of the value of non-
Medicaid prescription drug sales.)
The extent to which brand-name drugs compete
through price is difficult to assess.  Limited empirical
evidence suggests that competition between similar
brand-name drugs causes their prices to rise more
slowly over time than would otherwise be the case.
However, evidence also suggests that the prices of me-
too drugs increase much more rapidly over time than
the price of the breakthrough drug.  Much of that
analysis is based on list prices or average invoice
prices, which do not include many charge-backs and
rebates.
Clearly, some price competition is occurring,
particularly in the segment of the market that can ne-
gotiate discounts when several similar brand-name
drugs are available.  As Chapter 2 noted, that segment
of the market is growing with the emergence of PBMs
and the proliferation of other managed care tech-
niques.  Still, since the size of discounts and the quan-
tity of drugs sold at a discount are not known, it is
difficult to assess the extent of competition brought
about through discounting.
69. The group’s $5.3 billion estimate is based on reporting from its mem-
ber companies.  In 1994, manufacturers paid states $1.8 billion under
the Medicaid rebate program, leaving a net value of $3.5 billion in
discounts to non-Medicaid purchasers.
 
Chapter Four
The Effects of the Hatch-Waxman Act
on the Returns from Innovation
The Hatch-Waxman Act helped increase the sup-ply of generic drugs by lowering the cost of get-ting them approved by the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration.  As a result of that act and structural
changes in the demand for prescription drugs, more
innovator drugs now face generic competition shortly
after their patents expire.  They then quickly lose over
40 percent of their market, on average, to generic
drugs.
By themselves, the increase in generic market
share and the acceleration of generic entry after patent
expiration would have substantially reduced the re-
turns from marketing an innovator drug.  However,
the Hatch-Waxman Act countered part of that effect
by providing patent extensions for such drugs, which
now average about three years.  Those patent exten-
sions offset part of the potential loss.  But they do not
completely protect the returns of brand-name manu-
facturers from the dramatic rise in market share for
generic drugs.
The analysis in this chapter focuses on changes
in patent protection for brand-name drugs as well as
on supply-side factors that have boosted generic mar-
ket share.   As noted in Chapter 2, however, demand-
side factors, such as the rise of managed care tech-
niques, have also played a role.  The Congressional
Budget Office's estimate of changes in the returns
from marketing a new drug takes those demand-side
factors into account only through their contribution to
the dramatic growth of generic market share since
1984.
The Hatch-Waxman Act has increased the likeli-
hood that generic copies will become available once
the patent on a brand-name drug expires.  Before the
act (in 1983), only 35 percent of the top-selling drugs
no longer under patent had generic copies available.1
Today, nearly all do.2  At the same time, the share of
their market that those drugs lose to generic competi-
tors has also expanded dramatically.  In 1980, generic
drugs accounted for only around 13 percent of the to-
tal quantity of prescriptions sold for multiple-source
drugs (excluding antibiotics).3  Fourteen years later,
they constituted 58 percent of the total quantity of
multiple-source prescriptions dispensed (according to
CBO's retail pharmacy data set).  Pinpointing how
much of that increase resulted solely from the Hatch-
Waxman Act, however, is impossible.
For the minority of brand-name drugs that would
have experienced generic competition even without the
1. That figure is based on the top 200 off-patent drugs that year, excluding
antibiotics and drugs that were approved before 1962; see Henry
Grabowski and John Vernon, "Longer Patents for Lower Imitation
Barriers: The 1984 Drug Act," American Economic Review, vol. 76,
no. 2 (May 1986), pp. 195-198.
2. For example, in 1994, 95 percent of the off-patent drugs with sales
revenues of $40 million or more in CBO's retail pharmacy data set had
generic copies available.  In that case, off-patent drugs were ones that
were not protected by a patent or an exclusivity provision.
3. CBO calculated that average based on 29 nonantibiotic multiple-source
drugs that were among the top 100 in U.S. sales, using data from Alison
Masson and Robert Steiner, Generic Substitution and Prescription
Drug Prices: Economic Effects of State Drug Product Selection Laws
(Federal Trade Commission, October 1985), pp. 251-269.  See
Appendix C of this study for details.
38  HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS July 1998
act, the average number of years they are on the mar-
ket before facing generic competition did not change
much.  Before 1984, an average of three years elapsed
between patent expiration and generic entry.  By ac-
celerating the approval process for generic drugs and
explicitly permitting them to undergo clinical tests
while the innovator drug is still under patent, the
Hatch-Waxman Act now enables generic manufactur-
ers to enter a market almost immediately after patent
expiration.  However, that decline of roughly three
years in the average time before generic entry is al-
most exactly offset by the average increase in patent
terms from Hatch-Waxman extensions.
CBO's analysis finds that despite the patent-term
extensions and various exclusivity provisions of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, the increase in generic market
share since 1984 has decreased the total returns from
marketing a new drug by about $27 million, on aver-
age.  (That estimate does not apply to antibiotic drugs,
which were not affected by the act.)  In this study, the
phrase "returns from marketing a new drug" refers to
the expected average present discounted value of the
total profit stream generated by introducing a new
drug onto the market.  Previous studies estimated that
profit stream at an average of $210 million to $230
million (in 1990 dollars) for drugs introduced in the
early 1980s.4  Those returns account for production
costs but not the cost of research and development,
which averaged about $200 million per drug (in 1990
dollars) when capitalized to the date of market intro-
duction.  Expressed as a percentage, the $27 million
decline in returns equals roughly 12 percent of the to-
tal average returns from marketing a new drug.  De-
spite that decline, those expected returns probably
continue to cover the costs of developing a drug, on
average, including the cost of capital.5
Changes to the Length of 
Patents for Brand-Name
Drugs
Over the past 14 years, federal legislation—particu-
larly the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 and the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act of 1994—has altered the pat-
ent  protection available to pharmaceutical products in
the United States (see Table 7).  The average length of
time between when a brand-name drug enters the mar-
ket and when its patent expires rose by more than two
years—from an average of about nine years before
1984 to 11 to 12 years.6   By contrast, the period after
that, between when the innovator drug's patent expires
and when the first generic copy enters the market, de-
clined from about three years to a few months.  After
patent expiration, sales of an innovator drug can de-
cline significantly.  Between 1984 and 1994, the aver-
age market share of generic drugs increased from
around 13 percent to 58 percent of prescriptions dis-
pensed for multiple-source drugs (except antibiotics).7
Determining the extent to which average patent
terms have changed under the Hatch-Waxman Act is
crucial to assessing whether the returns from market-
ing a new drug have largely been preserved despite the
dramatic rise in generic competition.  To that end,
CBO analyzed data from the Patent and Trademark
Office to evaluate the effect of Hatch-Waxman exten-
sions on the average patent term of an innovator drug.
4. See Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs,
Risks and Rewards
 (February 1993); and Henry G. Grabowksi and
John M. Vernon, "Returns to R&D on New Drug Introductions in the
1980s," Journal of Health Economics, vol. 13, no. 4 (December
1994), pp. 383-406.
5. Ibid.  Those two studies found that the present discounted value of the
returns from marketing a drug exceeded the capitalized costs of drug
development by an average of $22 million to $36 million for drugs
introduced in the early 1980s.
6. According to data that CBO obtained from the Patent and Trademark
Office, the average patent term remaining after FDA approval was 11.5
years for the 51 drugs approved between 1992 and 1995 that received
a Hatch-Waxman extension.  For drugs approved between 1978 and
1982, the average patent term remaining was just over nine years,
according to Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D,
p. 83.
7. According to CBO's retail pharmacy data set, generic drugs accounted
for 36 percent of all retail prescriptions dispensed in 1994 and 58
percent of prescriptions dispensed for multiple-source drugs.  Excluding
the few multiple-source antibiotic drugs from the data does not par-
ticularly affect that average.
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Table 7.
Changes in Patent Protection for U.S. Pharmaceuticals
Before the 
Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984
After the Hatch-Waxman Act
and the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act of 1994
Patent Term 17 years from patent grant 20 years from application filing 
(the earliest relevant filing date)a
Average Period of Marketing Under
Patent Protectionb About 9 years About 11.5 years
Usual Period Between Patent 
Expiration and Generic Entryc 3 to 4 years Frequently 1 to 3 months
Average Generic Market Share for
Multiple-Source Drugs (Percent)d 12.7 57.6
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based in part on the sources in the footnotes below.
NOTE: These figures exclude antibiotics, which were not affected by the Hatch-Waxman Act.
a. See 35 U.S.C. 154(c)(1).  For drugs patented before June 8, 1995, companies can choose between the 17-years-from-patent term and the 20-
years-from-filing term (if the drug was not yet into its Hatch-Waxman extension on that date).
b. The average “effective” patent term (the period between approval by the Food and Drug Administration and patent expiration).  These averages
differ from the sales-weighted averages used in calculating the returns from marketing a new drug.  Top-selling drugs tend to have more years of
marketing under patent protection, making the sales-weighted averages larger.  The figure for the pre-Hatch-Waxman period is based on Office
of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs, Risks and Rewards (February 1993); and Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, "Longer
Patents for Lower Imitation Barriers: The 1984 Drug Act," American Economic Review, vol. 76, no. 2 (May 1986).  The figure for the post-Hatch-
Waxman period is based on the average effective patent term for the 51 drugs approved between 1992 and 1995 that received a Hatch-Waxman
extension.
c. The pre-Hatch-Waxman figure is based on CBO’s analysis of generic entry for 11 nonantibiotic drugs approved after 1962.  The post-Hatch-
Waxman figure is based in part on Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, "Longer Patents for Increased Generic Competition in the U.S.: The
Hatch-Waxman Act After One Decade," PharmacoEconomics (1996).
d. The increase resulted from various changes in the structure of demand for brand-name and generic drugs as well as from changes in the Hatch-
Waxman Act.  The pre-Hatch-Waxman figure is based on sales data for 29 multiple-source drugs (excluding antibiotics) in Table A5-1 of Alison
Masson and Robert Steiner, Generic Substitution and Prescription Drug Prices: Economic Effects of State Drug Product Selection Laws
(Federal Trade Commission, October 1985).
Patent Extensions Under the Hatch-
Waxman Act
The Hatch-Waxman Act allows for patent extensions
based on the amount of time a drug spends in the FDA
review process.  Those extensions now average about
three years for new drugs.8  Technically, the length of
a patent extension equals half of the time spent in clin-
ical testing after the patent is granted, plus all of the
time that the FDA spends reviewing the new drug ap-
plication.  (The clinical testing phase starts when the
manufacturer files an investigational new drug appli-
cation, which allows clinical testing in humans to take
place.)  Those extensions are subject to two limits.
8. The average extension for drugs approved before 1992 was less than
that because a transitional two-year cap applied to drugs that were in
clinical testing when the Hatch-Waxman Act became law.  Drugs
whose clinical testing began before September 24, 1984, were limited
to two years of patent extension, and drugs that were already on the
market by that date were not eligible for any patent extensions.
However, drugs approved between January 1, 1982, and September 23,
1984, were eligible for 10 years of market exclusivity before an
abbreviated new drug application could be submitted to the FDA by a
generic manufacturer. 
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Table 8.
Average Length of Hatch-Waxman Extensions for Drugs Approved Between 1992 and 1995
Average Extension (Years)
Year of
FDA Approval
Number of New Drugs
Receiving Extensions For All Drugs
Excluding Drugs
Subject to Two-Year Cap
1992 16 2.4 2.5
1993 14 3.2 3.4
1994 10 2.5 2.7
1995 11 3.6 3.6
Average n.a. 2.9 3.0
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office calculations based on data from the Patent and Trademark Office and the Food and Drug Administra-
tion.
NOTE: FDA = Food and Drug Administration; n.a. = not applicable.
First, they cannot exceed five years.  And second, they
cannot allow the period between product approval and
patent expiration to exceed 14 years.
Only one patent for each newly approved chemi-
cal entity is eligible for a Hatch-Waxman extension.
If a drug has more than one patent, the manufacturer
must choose which will receive the extension.  Exten-
sions are usually applied to the patent on a drug's
chemical compound (a product patent) or occasionally
to a patent on the use of the drug.9  Manufacturers
must apply for an extension no more than 60 days af-
ter the FDA approves a drug for marketing.
For the 51 drugs approved between 1992 and
1995 that have received an extension, the average ex-
tension lasted 2.9 years.  However, eight of those
drugs were subject to a transitional two-year cap be-
cause they were undergoing clinical testing when the
Hatch-Waxman Act became law.  For the 43 drugs
not subject to that cap, the average extension lasted
3.0 years (see Table 8).10  In all, the average patent
term remaining after FDA approval for the 51 drugs
that received extensions was 11.5 years.
Given the length of the clinical testing and NDA
approval phases, those extensions would have aver-
aged more than three years were it not for the 14-year
cap.  A study of the first 65 drugs to receive Hatch-
Waxman extensions found that the total extension
available under the act's formula, before applying the
caps and other restrictions, averaged 4.5 years.11  Al-
most half of those drugs would have been subject to
the 14-year cap had the transitional two-year cap not
applied.  Similarly, about half of the 43 drugs intro-
duced between 1992 and 1995 that received Hatch-
Waxman extensions and were not limited by the tran-
sitional cap had their extensions limited by the 14-year
cap (see Table 9).  Only 10 drugs had their extensions
limited by the five-year cap.
9. A third type of patent, called a process patent, also exists. Since it may
not be difficult to formulate a similar compound using a slightly
different chemical process, those types of patents do not necessarily
prevent generic entry; personal communication by Peter Richardson,
chief patent attorney, Pfizer, May 1997.
10. A study by Henry Grabowski and John Vernon found that for about 70
innovator drug products whose patents expired between 1991 and 1993,
Hatch-Waxman extensions averaged 2.4 years.  Some of those drugs
were subject to the transitional two-year cap.  See Grabowski and
Vernon, "Longer Patents for Increased Generic Competition in the U.S.:
The Hatch-Waxman Act After One Decade," PharmacoEconomics
(1996).
11. The average clinical testing period for those drugs lasted 5.1 years.
After subtracting the time between the beginning of clinical tests and the
issuing of the patent, that period came to 3.8 years, half of which is
counted when calculating the extension.  The average NDA approval
phase for those 65 drugs was 2.6 years, for a total average potential
extension of 4.5 years.  See Alan D. Lourie, "A Review of Recent
Patent Term Data," Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office
Society
 (February 1989), pp. 171-176.
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Not all drugs obtain a Hatch-Waxman extension.
The FDA approved a total of 101 drugs containing
new chemical compounds between 1992 and 1995, but
only half (51) have received a Hatch-Waxman exten-
sion so far.  Another 12 have an application pending
(see Table 10).  Of the remaining 38 drugs, 19 had no
patent to extend.  Fifteen others already had 14 years
left under patent when they were approved by the
FDA.  And four drugs did not apply for an extension,
for reasons that could not be determined.
Nonpatent Exclusivity Periods Under
the Hatch-Waxman Act
In addition to extending patent terms, the act grants
special periods of exclusivity in two circumstances
(not including some of its transitional features).  First,
when the FDA approves a new chemical entity, no
application for a generic copy is accepted for a mini-
mum of five years.  That provision benefits drugs that
have no patent, or have a very short remaining patent
life when they are approved, because it means that
generic manufacturers must wait five years before fil-
ing an abbreviated new drug application.  Since the
approval process for such applications takes more
than 30 months, on average, many of those brand-
name drugs should actually have six to seven years of
exclusivity before they must face generic competi-
Table 9.
Limits on Hatch-Waxman Extensions for Drugs
Approved Between 1992 and 1995 
Type of Limit
Number of
Drugs Affected
14-Year Cap 21
Five-Year Cap 10
Two-Year Cap 8
No Cap 12
Total 51
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the
Patent and Trademark Office.
Table 10.
Reasons That Some Drugs Approved Between
1992 and 1995 Did Not Receive a Hatch-Waxman
Extension
Reason
Number of
New Drugs
No Patent to Extenda 19
Already Had 14 Years of Exclusivity 15
Extension Application Pending 12
Eligible but Did Not Apply   4
Total 50
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office calculations based on data
from the Patent and Trademark Office and from Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug
Administration, "Prescription and OTC Drug Product
Patent and Exclusivity Data," in Approved Drug Prod-
ucts with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (1996).
NOTE: The Food and Drug Administration approved a total of 101
new drugs during this period.
a. These drugs received five years of exclusivity under the Hatch-
Waxman Act or seven years of exclusivity under the Orphan
Drug Act.
tion.12  In most cases, however, that period is probably
too short to fully recover the average costs of drug
development.
Second, the act allows the FDA to grant three
years of market exclusivity for an NDA (including a
supplemental one) if that application requires new
clinical investigations.  Manufacturers can use NDAs
or supplemental NDAs to obtain approval for new
dosage forms of an already-approved drug, for a new
use, or for marketing the drug over the counter.  Those
provisions give manufacturers an incentive to continue
improving brand-name drugs, and the knowledge
about those drugs, after they are on the market.
Manufacturers can also use those provisions to
slow generic competition.  By introducing a new dos-
12. In 1995 and 1996, an average of 33 to 34 months elapsed between the
submission and final approval of abbreviated NDAs; see Department
of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration,
Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committees
 (1997 and
1998).
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age form just before patent expiration, a manufacturer
obtains three years of market exclusivity for the new
product under the Hatch-Waxman Act (although ge-
neric manufacturers can still copy the original form of
the drug).  Likewise, if a drug starts being sold over
the counter, it enjoys three years of exclusivity before
the FDA can accept abbreviated applications for ge-
neric over-the-counter versions.  The over-the-counter
versions of Zantac and Tagamet, for example, have
benefitted from that provision.  Sometimes, a manu-
facturer can obtain a separate patent on a new dosage
form—particularly an extended-release form.  For ex-
ample, the patent for the active ingredient in Procardia
expired in 1991, but the patents for the extended-re-
lease version, Procardia XL, do not expire until 2000
or later.13
The Effect of Those Changes on 
the Average Drug
To assess the change in returns from marketing a new
drug, analysts need to know the average effect of the
Hatch-Waxman Act on all brand-name drugs ap-
proved, not just on those that obtain an extension.
When the benefits of the act's patent extensions and
five-year exclusivity period are averaged over all
drugs approved between 1992 and 1995, the average
effect is to postpone generic entry by 2.8 years.
CBO calculated that effect as follows.  As Table
8 shows, extensions averaged three years for the 43
drugs receiving a Hatch-Waxman extension during
that period that were not subject to the transitional
two-year cap.  Since the transitional cap applies only
to drugs in clinical testing in 1984, it will eventually
disappear.  Therefore, the calculation attributes three
years of patent exclusivity to all 51 drugs that received
a Hatch-Waxman extension.  It also assumes that the
12 drugs with extension applications pending will re-
ceive an average extension of three years.
Of the 19 drugs that had no patent to extend,
nine were excluded from the calculation because they
were "orphan" drugs (those with a potentially small
market because of the medical condition they treat),
which received seven years of exclusivity under the
Orphan Drug Act.  The other 10 unpatented drugs
were entitled under the Hatch-Waxman Act to five
years of exclusivity, during which no generic manu-
facturer could file an abbreviated application with the
FDA.  Since it takes at least one year for a generic
manufacturer to obtain FDA approval, that exclusivity
provision effectively postpones generic entry by at
least six years.  Thus, the calculation attributes six
years of delay in generic entry for those drugs under
the act.
The average was taken over the number of new
drugs approved between 1992 and 1995, after sub-
tracting the nine orphan drugs and the four drugs that
did not apply for an extension but were eligible.
Mathematically, the formula is:
(number of drugs obtaining an extension x 3 years) +
(unpatented drugs x 6 years) 
(all new drugs approved) - (orphan drugs) - (drugs
that were eligible for an extension but did not apply)
=  [(51 + 12) x 3 + (10 x 6)]/(101 - 9 - 4) = 2.8.
That average does not take into account the ex-
clusivity periods for new dosage forms.  As explained
below, CBO accounted for those exclusivity periods in
its calculation of returns from marketing by including
dosage forms that have no generic versions available
in its estimate of average generic market share fol-
lowing patent expiration.
The Effect of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act
Ten years after the Hatch-Waxman Act, another piece
of legislation, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of
1994 (URAA), affected patent terms for brand-name
drugs.  That act changed the length of U.S. patents on
all types of inventions to 20 years from the date of
application rather than 17 years from the date the pat-
ent is granted.  That change has had only a very small
effect on the average "effective" patent term—the time
between FDA approval and patent expiration—for
drugs patented after June 8, 1995 (most of which have
13. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, "Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations," January 31, 1998 (available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/
da/patex.17.htm).
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yet to be introduced on the market).  Drugs already
patented by June 8, 1995, may benefit from the change
as their manufacturers can choose between the 17-year
and 20-year terms and still obtain a Hatch-Waxman
extension.14
So-called patent pendency periods (the time be-
tween applying for a patent and receiving it) vary con-
siderably among drugs.  Of the 100 top-selling drugs
in 1996, 45 were granted patent-term extensions under
the Hatch-Waxman Act.  CBO found that the patent
pendency period for those 45 drugs averaged 3.3
years.15  That implies that the new 20-years-from-fil-
ing term should have a slightly negative effect for
drugs patented after June 8, 1995.  The URAA's effect
on patent terms interacts with the rules in the Hatch-
Waxman Act used to calculate extensions.  On net,
CBO estimates, those 45 drugs would have lost an
average of almost four months of patent life if the 20-
years-from-filing term was applied universally.16
Companies can file a provisional patent applica-
tion that establishes priority for their invention but
does not start the patent-term clock.  They must then
file a full application within one year.17  If companies
take advantage of that provisional application, the
negative effect of the 20-years-from-filing term could
be slightly offset.  Firms may also change their behav-
ior in other ways that could speed up the time between
patent application and patent grant.  For those rea-
sons, CBO assumed in calculating the change in re-
turns from marketing that the URAA had no net im-
pact on effective patent terms.
Some patents that were about to expire under the
17-year term had their expiration dates postponed un-
der the 20-year term established by the URAA.  For
those patents, a transitional feature in the act allows
generic manufacturers to enter a market after the 17-
year term expires if the generic manufacturer had al-
ready undertaken a substantial investment.18  How-
ever, because of complications in the way the URAA
interacts with the Hatch-Waxman Act, that transi-
tional feature does not apply to pharmaceutical prod-
ucts.19  Some Members tried during the 104th Con-
gress to pass legislation allowing earlier generic entry
in the pharmaceutical market in cases in which sub-
stantial investment had already been made, but that
effort was unsuccessful.
Changes to the Approval 
Process for Generic Drugs
The Hatch-Waxman Act made two key changes that
allow generic manufacturers to obtain FDA approval
more quickly once the patent on an innovator drug has
expired.  First, it established an abbreviated approval
process for generic copies of innovator drugs that were
approved after 1962.  Second, it allowed generic man-
ufacturers to conduct the tests required for FDA ap-
proval before the innovator drug's patent expired.
Those changes shortened the average time between
patent expiration and generic entry for top-selling
drugs from three or four years to less than three
months.  That acceleration of generic entry helps con-
sumers by making lower-cost drugs available more
quickly.  It also roughly offsets the average 2.8-year
delay in generic entry provided by the patent-term ex-
tensions and exclusivity provisions in the Hatch-
Waxman Act.
Before the act took effect, the FDA had two
types of application processes for approving generic
copies of innovator drugs.  When copying an innova-
14. According to a 1996 ruling by the U.S. Circuit Court, products patented
before June 8, 1995, that were already into their Hatch-Waxman
extension period on that date are not eligible for the new 20-year patent
term under the URAA.  
15. Based on data on patent pendency periods provided by Pfizer and data
on regulatory review periods and patent-term extensions from the Patent
and Trademark Office.
16. Henry Grabowski and John Vernon found that the average patent
pendency period for 105 drugs approved between 1990 and 1995 that
received Hatch-Waxman extensions was 3.8 years.  The overall effect
of the URAA, when interacted with the Hatch-Waxman extensions, was
a loss of 0.34 years.  See Grabowski and Vernon, "Effective Patent Life
in Pharmaceuticals," International Journal of Technology Manage-
ment
 (forthcoming).
17. Title V, section 532(b)(1) of the URAA pertains to provisional
applications and the right of priority (see 35 U.S.C. 119(e)(1), 108 Stat.
4985).  Section 532(a)(1) defines the new 20-year patent term (see 35
U.S.C. 154(a)(2), 108 Stat. 4984).
18. The generic manufacturer must pay an equitable remuneration to the
patent holder (see 35 U.S.C. 154(c)(2) and (3), 108 Stat. 4985).  
19. It also does not apply to other products reviewed by the FDA that are
eligible for Hatch-Waxman extensions— namely, biological products,
food and color additives, and medical devices.
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tor drug that had been approved before October 1962,
the generic manufacturer had only to demonstrate bio-
equivalence through clinical tests.  When copying an
innovator drug approved after 1962, the generic manu-
facturer also had to demonstrate safety and efficacy.
The tests necessary to demonstrate a drug's bioequiv-
alence are much less costly than those required to
prove its safety and efficacy.20  In some instances, the
FDA accepted a literature review of published reports
in lieu of safety and efficacy tests; such applications
were called "paper NDAs."21  However, in many
cases, sufficient evidence was not available in pub-
lished reports.22  After the first generic copy of a drug
was approved, subsequent applications by generic
manufacturers could more easily substitute a literature
review for safety and efficacy tests.
In the case of antibiotics, the distinction between
pre- and post-1962 drugs did not exist.  An abbrevi-
ated process for approving generic antibiotics, which
required clinical tests to show only bioequivalence,
applied to all antibiotic drugs approved under section
507 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Since an abbreviated approval process for generics
already existed, such antibiotics were not included in
the Hatch-Waxman provisions and were not eligible
for patent-term extensions under the act.  However,
the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
of 1997 made antibiotic drugs eligible for Hatch-
Waxman extensions, thus increasing the returns from
their development.
In essence, the Hatch-Waxman Act extended the
abbreviated process for approving antibiotics (as well
as generic copies of innovator drugs approved before
1962) to all generic drugs.  Generic manufacturers
now file an abbreviated new drug application, which
requires that they perform clinical tests only to demon-
strate that their drug is bioequivalent to a drug with an
approved NDA that is already on the market.  The
FDA relies on the safety and effectiveness determina-
tion for that original drug when approving the generic
copy.
To further speed up the process, the Hatch-
Waxman Act explicitly allows generic manufacturers
to begin those clinical tests before the original drug's
patent expires.  In most cases, that change lets manu-
facturers obtain FDA approval and begin selling cop-
ies of an innovator drug soon after patent expiration.
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic testing occa-
sionally occurred before patent expiration; it was sub-
ject to legal dispute until the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ruled in 1984 that such tests infringed
on the patent of the innovator drug.23  The Hatch-
Waxman Act effectively reversed that decision by stat-
ing that generic manufacturers can begin the FDA ap-
proval process before patent expiration.  By including
the patent expiration date in its application, the generic
firm makes explicit its intention not to market the new
product until after patent expiration.  For its part, the
FDA will not approve a new generic drug until the
innovator's patent has expired (unless the generic ap-
plicant successfully challenges that patent in court).24
Before the Hatch-Waxman Act, an average of
three to four years elapsed between patent expiration
and generic entry.  CBO identified 15 cases before
1984 in which one or more generic manufacturers had
obtained FDA approval to produce a post-1962 drug
by filing a new drug application.  For the 11 cases in
which a patent expiration date was identified, the aver-
age time between patent expiration and generic entry
was 3.1 years.  In six of those cases, the NDA was
applied for before patent expiration.  In the other five
cases (in which the NDA was applied for after patent
expiration), the average time between patent expira-
tion and generic entry was 3.9 years.
20. Grabowski and Vernon, "Longer Patents for Lower Imitation Barriers."
21. See Donald O. Beers, Generic and Innovator Drugs: A Guide to FDA
Approval Requirements, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Aspen
Publishers, 1995), pp. 3-59 to 3-71.
22. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Report on the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
 (June 21,
1984), pp. 16-17.  According to that report, the FDA estimated that
sufficient published evidence was not available for 85 percent of all
post-1962 drugs.
23. The case was Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical
Company, Inc.
 (733 F. 2d 858 Federal Circuit 1984).  See Alan D.
Lourie, "Patent Term Restoration," Journal of the Patent Office
Society, vol. 66, no. 10 (October 1984), pp. 526-550; and Beers,
Generic and Innovator Drugs, pp. 4-75 to 4-77.
24. The process for a generic applicant to challenge an innovator's patent
is discussed in 21 U.S.C. 355(j)(2)(A)(vii), paragraph IV, and section
355(j)(5)(B)(iii) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,
as amended.
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For those 15 drugs, generic entry occurred, on
average, 1.8 years after the filing of an application.
The approval process for those drugs actually took
longer than that because before filing an NDA, the
generic manufacturers had to research the formulation,
contact a chemical manufacturer who could produce
the active ingredient, search the literature for preclini-
cal and clinical data, conduct a bioequivalence study,
and perhaps demonstrate safety and efficacy as well.
Although some of those steps could be taken before
patent expiration, the Roche v. Bolar decision required
that no clinical tests be conducted until afterward.
As an indication of how much more quickly ge-
neric entry occurs since the Hatch-Waxman Act, CBO
examined 17 brand-name drugs that lost their patent
protection between 1990 and 1993, most of which had
annual U.S. sales of $50 million or more.  For most of
those drugs, generic entry occurred within one or two
months of patent expiration, although there were ex-
ceptions (see Appendix C for more details).25
Effects on the Returns 
from Marketing a Drug
Makers of innovator drugs were slightly worse off af-
ter the Hatch-Waxman Act, largely because many
more of their drugs experienced generic competition
following patent expiration.  The act's provision for
extending patent terms merely compensated for the
loss of the average three-year delay between patent
expiration and generic entry that existed before the act
(in cases where generic entry occurred).
Still, those extensions played an important role in
protecting the returns from drug companies' research
and development.  Without them, the rise in generic
market share since 1984 would have dramatically low-
ered the expected returns from marketing a drug and
might have caused the pharmaceutical industry to re-
duce its investment in R&D.  In that case, a successful
innovator drug would have been likely to lose over 40
percent of its market to generic competitors just after
reaching its peak year in sales.   If the pre-1984 level
of R&D investment was desirable, then the patent ex-
tensions benefited society by preserving most of the
returns from marketing a new drug.
This study uses as a benchmark the average re-
turns from marketing a new drug in the early 1980s
under the modest levels of generic entry that existed
then.  The analysis estimates how much returns have
declined relative to that benchmark because innovator
drugs (excluding antibiotics) are losing a larger share
of their market to generic competitors after patent ex-
piration.  Whether the benchmark level of returns is
the best one for society is a separate question, which
this study does not address.
When a brand-name drug first comes on the mar-
ket, its sales revenues are low because its benefits are
not yet widely known.  As the drug becomes better
known through published articles, advertising in medi-
cal journals, and detailing, its sales rise and reach their
peak by year nine or 10, on average.  Both before and
after 1984, the average innovator drug had a few years
of sales at its peak level before generic manufacturers
entered the market.
The Hatch-Waxman Act did not greatly change
the average point in a drug's life at which generic entry
occurs, because the act's patent-term extensions and
five-year exclusivity provision together postponed ge-
neric entry by roughly the same amount that the act's
streamlined approval process sped it up.  Two things
that did change after 1984 were the likelihood that
generics would become available and the average mar-
ket share captured by generic drugs.  Thus, on net, one
would expect returns from marketing a new drug to
decline after the Hatch-Waxman Act, because al-
though the timing of generic entry has not changed
much, the probability of generic entry and the size of
the generic market once entry occurs have grown.
Calculating the Change in Returns
CBO estimated the effect of increased generic compe-
tition on the stream of profits generated from the sale
of 67 innovator drugs that were introduced in the25. The date of generic entry came from Table 1 of Grabowski and Vernon,
"Longer Patents for Increased Generic Competition in the U.S." 
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United States in the early 1980s.26  The data include
U.S. sales revenues from 1980 to 1991, covering the
first eight to 12 years that those drugs were on the
market.  The average patent term for the drugs,
weighted by sales revenues, was 11 years.
CBO's calculation assumes that the profit stream
for an average brand-name drug (excluding antibiot-
ics) would have been the same for the first 11 years
with or without the Hatch-Waxman Act.  (For more
details about the assumptions behind the calculation,
see Appendix C.)  The total profit stream over the
drug's product life is depicted in Figure 7 by the area
under the solid curve between year 0 (market introduc-
tion) and year 20 (when the drug has become nearly
obsolete).  The present discounted value of that profit
stream, discounted to the date of market introduction,
represents the returns from marketing the drug.  The
negative cash flow before drug introduction represents
the investments made in the drug's development.  Cap-
italizing those costs to the date of market introduction
brings their total to about $200 million.
For years 12 to 20, CBO estimated two revenue
paths, one before and one after the Hatch-Waxman
Act.  The only difference between those two revenue
paths is in the amount of sales revenues lost to compe-
tition from generic drugs.  Sales revenues also decline
in later years because of competition from newer, im-
proved brand-name drugs.  CBO assumed that decline
to be the same before and after 1984.  The pre-1984
path assumes that the drug's patent expires at the end
of year 11 but that it takes three years for generics to
enter the market, consistent with the data for that pe-
riod.  Therefore, profits do not begin to decline be-
cause of generic entry until after year 14.  But the de-
cline after year 14 is gradual because generic market
share was small for nonantibiotic drugs before 1984.
In the post-1984 path, the Hatch-Waxman Act
extends patents by 2.8 years.  Generics are assumed to
enter about a month later and begin taking a large
share of the market.  For any specific drug, the size of
the generic market and whether generic entry occurs at
all will vary.  The rate at which profits are eroded de-
Figure 7.
The Average Profit Stream for a Brand-Name
Drug Before and After the Hatch-Waxman Act
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTE: This figure is intended to be illustrative and does not reflect
the actual dollar amounts invested in research and develop-
ment (R&D) or the actual value of profits from drug develop-
ment.
a. That increased generic competition did not result solely from
changes in the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Other developments, such
as the use of formularies by private-sector health plans to in-
crease generic substitution, also affected the degree to which
generic drugs have eroded the profits of off-patent brand-name
drugs.
pends on whether generic entry occurs and, if so, on
the size of the generic market.   For the average drug,
however, profits erode much more rapidly in this case
than before the Hatch-Waxman Act because of greater
generic competition.  In either case, the effect of in-
creased generic entry on the returns from marketing a
26. Data on average annual U.S. sales of those drugs were provided by
Henry Grabowski of Duke University.  The analytical approach is
based in part on Grabowksi and Vernon, "Longer Patents for Lower
Imitation Barriers."
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new drug is less than one might expect because ge-
neric entry occurs at the end of a drug's product life,
when profits are more heavily discounted (in other
words, worth less today because they occur farther in
the future).
CBO used the actual stream of sales revenues
through year 11 for the 67 innovator drugs it exam-
ined as the starting point for its calculation.  For the
pre-1984 profit stream, it applied a rate of sales ero-
sion after generic entry that was based on a sample of
29 top-selling, multiple-source, nonantibiotic drugs in
1980.27  The erosion rate for the post-1984 case was
based on this study's analysis of generic market share
in 1993 and 1994.
The total difference between the two profit
streams has a present discounted value of $27 million
(in 1990 dollars), CBO estimates.  In other words,
despite the patent extensions and exclusivity provi-
sions in the Hatch-Waxman Act, the growth in generic
market share since 1984 has reduced the present dis-
counted value of the returns from marketing a new
drug by about $27 million, on average.  That figure
should be compared with the present discounted value
of the total profit stream from marketing an innovator
drug throughout its product life, discounted to the date
of market introduction, which previous studies have
estimated to average $210 million to $230 million for
drugs introduced in the 1980s.  (Those returns account
for production costs but not the capitalized costs of
drug development.  They include profits from sales
abroad, which make up roughly half of total returns.)
Expressed as a percentage of those returns, the present
discounted value of the returns from marketing a new
drug have declined by roughly 12 percent.  That result
holds true even with modest variations in the assump-
tions (see the sensitivity analysis in Appendix C).
Grabowski and Vernon and the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment estimated that the present dis-
counted value of the returns from marketing a drug
exceeded the capitalized costs of R&D by $22 million
to $36 million.28  That is, investment in R&D earned a
return slightly higher than the cost of capital, on aver-
age.  The drugs in those studies did not obtain patent-
term extensions under the Hatch-Waxman Act because
they were introduced before the act was passed.  But
they did face increased generic competition once their
patents expired.  On average, therefore, the returns
from marketing a new drug would probably still fully
cover the capitalized costs of R&D despite the in-
crease in generic sales since 1984.  On the margin,
however, a few drugs that were barely profitable to
develop would no longer be profitable.
Caveats About CBO's Estimate
CBO's estimated change in returns from marketing a
new drug accounts for the full impact of increased ge-
neric entry since 1984.  But it does not account for
many changes in the pharmaceutical market that could
increase or decrease those returns, such as changes in
R&D costs, in technology, or in the overall demand
for prescription drugs.  Thus, the estimate is only a
partial one, which focuses on the effects of the Hatch-
Waxman Act and increased generic sales.
Moreover, since the calculation is based on the
U.S. sales of drugs during the 1980-1991 period, it
does not include the effects of changes in the pharma-
ceutical market since then (other than increased ge-
neric entry).  Some of those changes would raise the
returns from marketing a new drug; others would
lower them.  The rise in managed care since 1991 and
its impact on the returns from marketing a new drug
are considered only through their effect on increased
generic market share.  The impact of managed care on
the volume of drugs purchased or the prices charged
by manufacturers has not been considered.  In addi-
tion, manufacturers selectively offer discounts and
rebates on innovator drugs, but those rebates and some
of the discounts are not captured by the data on sales
revenues, which are based on average invoice prices.
Other factors not included in the estimate could
increase the returns from marketing a new drug.  For
27. Masson and Steiner, Generic Substitution and Prescription Drug
Prices, Appendix A5.
28. Grabowski and Vernon, "Returns to R&D on New Drug Introductions
in the 1980s," pp. 383-406; and Office of Technology Assessment,
Pharmaceutical R&D.
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example, the over-65 population, which has a high use
of prescription drugs, is growing more rapidly now
than it was 10 years ago.  In addition, some Medicare
beneficiaries are moving into HMOs.  Since traditional
Medicare does not offer an outpatient drug benefit but
many HMOs do, the effect of those moves is to in-
crease prescription drug coverage for the over-65 pop-
ulation.29  As noted in Chapter 2, managed care tech-
niques may also boost the volume of prescription
drugs used by people under 65.
In addition, foreign markets for pharmaceutical
products will probably continue to grow as the drug-
approval process becomes streamlined in Europe and
as various countries strengthen their patent-protection
rights.30  The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, which was negotiated in
1994 at the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, included provisions to encour-
age developing countries to strengthen their intellec-
tual property rights, particularly in the areas of agri-
culture and pharmaceuticals.  That agreement provides
patented pharmaceutical products with a minimum of
five years of exclusivity in a participating developing
country.31
The net effect of changes not accounted for in
CBO's estimate may push the total returns from mar-
keting a new drug in one direction or the other.  Over-
all, however, spending on R&D by brand-name manu-
facturers has increased as a percentage of their sales
revenues—from an average of 14.7 percent in 1983 to
19.4 percent in 1995 (despite the fact that such reve-
nues more than tripled).32  That increase would seem
to indicate that, all factors taken together, the incentive
to invest in developing new drugs has remained intact
since the Hatch-Waxman Act.
No one knows whether that amount of investment
in R&D is over or under the optimal level.33  Some
people might argue that companies are not investing
enough in drug development and that society would be
better off if returns from marketing were increased
further.  Clearly, the avoided surgery and improved
quality of life that result from the use of prescription
drugs create large benefits for many people.  But it is
also possible that too many firms invest in the same
research projects, and less could be spent on pharma-
ceutical R&D without significant costs to society.
Other Considerations
CBO's estimate of the average change in returns from
marketing a new drug is small relative to the returns
earned on highly successful drugs.  The reason is that
returns from marketing new drugs are highly skewed.
The top six drugs in the set of 67 that CBO used in its
calculation earned a return of around $1 billion (dis-
counted to the date of market introduction).  But only
the top 20 earned a return from marketing that ex-
ceeded $200 million, roughly the average cost of drug
development.34  However, since the cost of developing
drugs includes the cost of failures, a drug can be prof-
itable in the sense of covering its own development
costs but still not earn enough to cover average devel-
opment costs (which include the cost of drugs that
never made it to market).  A company must discover a
highly profitable drug from time to time for its average
returns from marketing to exceed the average capital-
ized cost of drug development.
Another factor to consider, which can reduce the
impact of lower returns, is the so-called replacement
effect.  When a manufacturer introduces a new brand-
name drug, that drug may erode the sales of similar
drugs the company already has on the market. CBO's
29. In 1997, 4.5 million out of 38.2 million Medicare beneficiaries were
enrolled in an HMO or risk-based health plan.  CBO projects that the
proportion of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in such plans will
continue to grow.  See Congressional Budget Office, The Economic
and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1999-2008
 (January 1998),
Appendix F.
30. Standard & Poor's, Healthcare: Pharmaceuticals, Industry Surveys
(New York: Standard & Poor's, August 29, 1996), p. 21.
31. See Dorothy Schrader, Intellectual Property Provisions of the GATT
1994 and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, CRS Report for
Congress 94-302A (Congressional Research Service, September 23,
1996), pp. 36-37.
32. Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America, 1997
Industry Profile
 (Washington, D.C.: PhRMA, March 1997), p. 57.
Those figures equal R&D spending in the United States divided by
domestic sales plus exports.
33. See F.M. Scherer, "Pricing, Profits and Technological Progress in the
Pharmaceutical Industry," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 7,
no. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 111.
34. Grabowski and Vernon, "Returns to R&D on New Drug Introductions
in the 1980s," pp. 398-400.
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estimate of the decline in the present discounted value
of the returns from marketing a new drug does not
consider the dynamic effect of such product replace-
ment.  The replacement effect derives from the re-
duced incentive that companies have to innovate when
a new drug will replace a share of the market currently
held by one of their other products.  (For more details
about that effect, see Appendix D.)  The rise in ge-
neric market share, however, reduces the replacement
effect.  A firm has less to lose by replacing an older
product with a new drug when the patent on the older
product is about to expire, since generics will take
away a large share of that product's market anyway.
An example is the allergy drug Allegra, intro-
duced in 1996 by Hoechst Marion Roussel, which also
sells a competing brand-name drug, Seldane.  The two
drugs are very similar antihistamines, but Allegra has
fewer negative side effects.  Because of the replace-
ment effect, Hoechst Marion Roussel had less incen-
tive to introduce Allegra when it would cut into the
profits from the sale of Seldane significantly.  How-
ever, anticipation of generic competition reduced that
replacement effect—Allegra was introduced just three
years before Seldane's patent was to expire.35
Although the growth of generic competition since
1984 has reduced the returns from innovation overall,
the effect of those lower returns on the incentive to
innovate will be offset somewhat by a commensurate
reduction in the replacement effect.  That is, the
slightly reduced value of profits at the end of a drug's
product life will give firms with existing products a
greater incentive to replace them in the market more
quickly—as close to patent expiration as possible.
That dynamic effect exists only when pharma-
ceutical firms continue to invest in developing drugs in
therapeutic areas where they are already market lead-
ers.  Large firms usually conduct R&D in a variety of
therapeutic areas, so the dynamic effect will be greater
for some projects and nonexistent for others.36   The
operation of the replacement effect reduces—but does
not eliminate—the negative impact that the rise in ge-
neric market share has on the incentive to invest in
developing brand-name drugs.
Effects of Proposed Changes 
to the Hatch-Waxman Act
Some representatives of the pharmaceutical industry
would like to modify the Hatch-Waxman Act in vari-
ous ways to increase the average effective patent term
for pharmaceutical products.37  Although lengthening
patents would increase profits today for drugs whose
patents are expiring, it would not have as large an im-
pact on the incentive to invest in R&D—that is, on the
present discounted value of the returns from marketing
a new drug.  Extending the average effective patent
term by one year would increase the present dis-
counted value of those returns by about $12 million.
In contrast, accelerating the FDA review period
by one year would have a much greater effect on the
present discounted value of the returns from marketing
a new drug—a net benefit of about $22 million, on
average.  Thus, reducing FDA approval times—if it
could be done without sacrificing safety concerns—
would be much more effective in helping both the drug
industry and consumers than would lengthening the
patent-protection period.
Some drugs do not benefit from patent-term ex-
tensions because they have no patent to extend, or be-
cause their patent has already expired (perhaps be-
cause the drug lingered in the clinical testing phase).
Lengthening the five-year exclusivity period for a new
drug (that contains a chemical entity never before ap-
proved) would have a sizable impact on the incentive
to develop those drugs, because the benefits would be
35. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Ad-
ministration,  Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations
 (1997).  The section that contains patent expiration dates
and exclusivity periods is available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/da/
patex17.htm.  Seldane's patent expires in April 1999; Allegra was
introduced in July 1996.
36. For a discussion of the diversity of R&D projects within a single firm
and the benefits of such diversification, see Rebecca Henderson and Ian
Cockburn, "Scale, Scope and Spillovers: The Determinants of Research
Productivity in Drug Discovery," RAND Journal of Economics, vol.
27, no. 1 (Spring 1996).
37. See testimony at the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearing on the
Hatch-Waxman Act on March 5, 1996.
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seen relatively early in the drug's product life.  Fur-
thermore, the current exclusivity period is probably
too short to compensate for the average cost of devel-
oping those drugs.  Out of the 101 drugs approved
between 1992 and 1995, 10 would have benefited
from a lengthening of the five-year exclusivity period.
Conclusions
The Hatch-Waxman Act eliminated the duplicative
testing requirements for manufacturers of generic
drugs to obtain FDA approval.  That regulatory relief
has translated into greater availability of generic drugs
and lower average prices to consumers for off-patent
drugs.  By itself, the doubling of generic market share
between 1984 and 1994 would have substantially low-
ered the returns from marketing new innovator drugs.
However, the act also provided patent extensions that
postponed the time when an innovator drug would face
generic competition.
CBO's analysis has found that the patent exten-
sions available under the Hatch-Waxman Act were not
sufficient to fully preserve the returns from marketing
new brand-name drugs.  The present discounted value
of those returns has declined by about 12 percent be-
cause of the rise in generic competition.  However,
that rise has resulted from a variety of demand-side
factors as well as from changes in the act itself.
The Hatch-Waxman Act helped increase the op-
portunity to substitute less expensive generic drugs for
more expensive off-patent brand-name drugs.  That
substitution lowers the average cost of a multiple-
source prescription drug.  The point in the life of an
average drug at which generic entry occurs did not
change much under the act, because the average length
of a patent extension roughly offsets the average delay
between patent expiration and generic entry that ex-
isted before 1984.  Of course, that specific timing var-
ies significantly from one drug to another.   Neverthe-
less, many purchasers are better off since the act, as
most top-selling off-patent brand-name drugs now
have generic versions available.  And with the lower
testing costs required for FDA approval, more generic
manufacturers probably find it profitable to enter a
given market.  Empirical evidence suggests that that
puts downward pressure on the average prescription
price of generic drugs as well.
Many changes in the pharmaceutical market and
in the technology of drug development have affected
the returns from marketing a new drug.  This study
considered only two changes that affect those returns:
the increase in generic market share since 1984 and
the increase in patent terms under the Hatch-Waxman
Act.  Changes that were not considered may, taken
together, either increase or decrease those returns.
Overall, it appears that the incentives for drug compa-
nies to innovate have remained intact since the Hatch-
Waxman Act; even as sales revenues from innovator
drugs have more than tripled, the percentage of those
revenues that manufacturers reinvest in R&D has
risen from 14.7 percent to 19.4 percent between 1983
and 1995.
Appendixes
 
Appendix A
Data Used for the Empirical Estimates
This study draws on several different sets of datathat cover sales revenues, prices, and quantitiesfor prescription drugs sold in the United States
(see Table A-1 for an overview).  The data come from
two private companies that collect and sell information
about the pharmaceutical industry (Scott-Levin and
IMS America), from three government agencies (the
Food and Drug Administration, the Patent and Trade-
mark Office, and the Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration), and from Henry Grabowski, an economist at
Duke University.
Retail Pharmacy Data Set
Many of the estimates in Chapter 3 rely on a set of
retail pharmacy data purchased from Scott-Levin.
That data set covers the number of prescriptions dis-
pensed at retail pharmacies in 1993 and 1994 for all
formulations of all prescription drugs in 66 narrowly
defined therapeutic classes, as well as the revenues
from sales of those drugs, valued at retail prices.
(Those retail prices are the average of the actual retail
transaction prices charged by pharmacies.)  The total
value of sales revenues in the data set equals approxi-
mately 70 percent of the total sales revenues of retail
pharmacies in the United States from prescription
drugs.  The data set is based on Scott-Levin's Source
Prescription Audit, which covers more than 34,000
U.S. retail pharmacies.  Scott-Levin projects the sales
data upward to reflect sales through all pharmacies in
the United States (which numbered 67,939 in 1995).1
Since retail pharmacies distribute roughly half of the
value of prescription drugs, this data set represents
approximately 35 percent of the value of all prescrip-
tion drug sales in the nation.
The data are broken down by each dosage form
of each drug in the 66 therapeutic classes.  For exam-
ple, if a multiple-source drug comes in both 50 milli-
gram and 100 milligram tablets, the data set includes
the sales revenues and number of prescriptions for
each brand-name and generic manufacturer (if there
are any) of both of those dosage forms.  The set con-
tains 454 different prescription drugs (or chemical
entities), 177 of which are multiple source.  Expanding
that by the different dosage forms for each drug—
many of which are produced by several manufactur-
ers—brings the number of individual observations in
the data set to 11,665.  The Congressional Budget Of-
fice (CBO) added the chemical names of the brand-
name drugs (using the reference book Drug Facts and
Comparisons) and coded each observation so the ge-
neric drugs could be matched with their brand-name
counterparts.2
1. National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, Survey of Pharmacy
Law: 1995-1996
 (Park Ridge, Ill.: National Association of Boards of
Pharmacy, 1995), p. 90.
2. Facts and Comparisons, Drug Facts and Comparisons (St. Louis:
Facts and Comparisons, 1995).
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Table A-1.
Data and Methods Behind CBO’s Estimates
Empirical Estimate Data Used Method
Average prescription price and market
share for brand-name and generic
drugs (Chapter 3, Table 1)
Retail pharmacy sales data
purchased from Scott-Levin. 
Includes the number of prescriptions
dispensed through retail pharmacies
for 11,665 dosage forms of 454
drugs.
The total retail pharmacy sales
revenues for a given type of drug
were divided by the number of
prescriptions dispensed for it.  The
drug types are multiple-source and
single-source brand-name drugs and
generic drugs.  Market share is the
percentage of total prescriptions
dispensed for that type of drug.
Market concentration by therapeutic
class (Chapter 3, Figure 5)
Retail pharmacy data set The percentage of sales held by the
top three brand-name drugs was
calculated for 66 therapeutic
classes.
Price differences for various types of
purchasers (Chapter 3, Table 4)
Computed by IMS America based on
invoice prices to most intermediate
purchasers, such as pharmacies
(other than mail-order ones), clinics,
hospitals, and HMOs.  Prices are net
of invoice discounts but do not
include rebates.
For 100 top-selling outpatient drugs,
the average prices paid by
intermediate purchasers are
expressed as a percentage of the
average price paid by pharmacies.
Effect of competition on manufacturers'
discounting of brand-name drugs sold to
intermediate purchasers (Chapter 3)
Average manufacturer price to
pharmacies and lowest price to any
U.S. purchaser as reported to HCFA
under the Medicaid rebate program.
The number of brand-name
manufacturers in the therapeutic
class and the existence of generic
formulations were obtained from the
retail pharmacy data set.
Total Medicaid sales were obtained
from HCFA and total U.S. sales from
IMS America.
Regression analysis (see Appendix
B for more details).  The dependent
variable is the lowest price to any
intermediate purchaser divided by
the average price to pharmacies. 
Explanatory variables include the
number of brand-name
manufacturers in the drug's
therapeutic class, a dummy variable
taking the value of 1 when generic
forms are available, and the drug’s
Medicaid market share.
Percentage change in brand-name 
drug prices between 1991 and 1994
(Chapter 3)
The average manufacturer price 
to pharmacies, reported by
manufacturers to HCFA under the
Medicaid rebate program.  Price is
reported per unit, such as tablet, and
is equal to total sales divided by the
number of units sold in a given
quarter.  Those prices include most
discounts and rebates to pharmacies. 
Whether a given drug had generic
competitors was determined from the
retail pharmacy data set.
Calculated the average percentage
change in price between 1991 and
1994 for 269 brand-name drugs. 
Compared those facing generic
competition with those not facing
generic competition.
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Table A-1.
Continued
Empirical Estimate Data Used Method
Total direct savings from generic
substitution on retail pharmacy
prescriptions (Chapter 3)
Retail pharmacy data set; 177 of 
the 454 drugs in the data set were
multiple source in 1993 and 1994. 
CBO coded the data to link each
brand-name drug with its generic
competitors.
For each multiple-source drug, the
difference between the brand-name
and generic retail price for a
prescription was multiplied by the
number of generic prescriptions of
the drug purchased through
pharmacies in 1994.  That difference
was then summed for all multiple-
source drugs.
Decline in average generic prescription
price as the number of manufacturers
rises (Chapter 3, Table 5)
Retail pharmacy data set The average generic prescription
price was calculated for cohorts of
generic drugs, grouped by the
number of generic manufacturers. 
The average ratio of generic to
brand-name prescription price was
also calculated by cohort.
Average length of patent-term
extensions under the Hatch-Waxman
Act (Chapter 4, Table 8)
Extension length was obtained from
the PTO for the 51 drugs approved
by the FDA between 1992 and 1995
that received an extension.
Averages were calculated for the 51
drugs approved between 1992 and
1995 that received an extension and
for all new drugs approved during
that period.
Effects of increased generic competition
and longer patent terms on the returns
from marketing a new drug (Chapter 4)
Average U.S. manufacturer sales of
67 brand-name drugs over their
product life, obtained from Henry
Grabowski.  Those drugs were
introduced between 1980 and 1984. 
The average is based on actual sales
for the first eight to 12 years that a
drug was on the market; remaining
years were projected.
Calculated the change in the present
discounted value of the profit stream
for the average drug when the rise in
generic market share and the Hatch-
Waxman extensions are considered
together (see Appendix C for more
details). 
Retail pharmacy data set The rate of sales erosion from
generic competition after the Hatch-
Waxman Act is based on analysis of
21 drugs that lost patent protection
between 1991 and 1993 (for the first
year’s rate) and all off-patent drugs
in the data set (for the rate in
subsequent years).
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTE: HMOs = health maintenance organizations; HCFA = Health Care Financing Administration; PTO = Patent and Trademark Office; FDA =
Food and Drug Administration.
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CBO used that data set to estimate the total sav-
ings on prescriptions at retail pharmacies from generic
substitution, to compare retail pharmacy sales of ge-
neric and brand-name drugs, and to analyze generic
competition.  Portions of the data set were also used to
examine market concentration at the level of the thera-
peutic class for brand-name drugs and at the level of a
single multiple-source drug for generics.
One drawback of the data set is that prescrip-
tions are not the best measure of the quantity of sales.
When comparing the prices of two drugs, the best
comparison is one based on the price of an average
daily dose, not the price of a prescription.  Because
prescriptions for a drug are typically dispensed in a
variety of sizes (the quantity of dosage units, such as
pills, varies), comparisons between them are poten-
tially misleading.  The variability in prescription sizes
may be more of a problem for chronic drugs—which
are taken over a long period of time—than for acute
drugs.  In the case of chronic drugs, whether a phar-
macist dispenses a prescription that will last one
month or four months may be arbitrary.  However,
since the data set covers such a large number of pre-
scriptions, it seems reasonable to assume (where rele-
vant) that the average quantity dispensed per prescrip-
tion for one type of drug will be roughly equivalent to
the average quantity dispensed for a close competitor.
Moreover, such an assumption is necessary for carry-
ing out any quantitative analysis because of the lack of
better data.
CBO used prices per prescription to evaluate the
reduction in prescription drug spending from generic
substitution and the relative prices of brand-name and
generic drugs.  Those data were also used to evaluate
the decline in the average prescription price as the
number of generic manufacturers rises.  The measure-
ment error inherent in using a prescription as the unit
of quantity could cause the estimated price difference
between a brand-name drug and its generic counter-
part to be either too high or too low—depending on
whether generic prescriptions are smaller or larger, on
average, than their brand-name counterparts.  Conse-
quently, the estimates of average prescription prices
and of the savings to consumers from generic substitu-
tion should be viewed as rough figures, not exact ones.
All of the estimates based on average prescrip-
tion prices cover only tablet and capsule dosage forms,
which constitute 87 percent of all sales (or 91 percent
of generic sales) in the data set.  The average prescrip-
tion price for those dosage forms appears more reli-
able than the average price when injectable and liquid
dosage forms are included.
Total U.S. Sales at Average 
Invoice Prices
CBO purchased data on the total U.S. sales of 350
prescription drugs from IMS America.  That data set
covers all channels of distribution except mail-order
pharmacies.  The sales revenues are valued at the av-
erage prices charged on invoices to hospitals, pharma-
cies, and other purchasers.  IMS America also calcu-
lated the difference in average invoice prices paid by
different channels of distribution for 100 top-selling
drugs that were largely distributed through retail phar-
macies.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the average invoice
price does not include rebates and some discounts that
manufacturers give purchasers.  As a result, the  aver-
age invoice price slightly overstates the final price
paid.  Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America estimates that discounts and rebates (not in-
cluding Medicaid rebates) amounted to about $3.5
billion in 1994.  Assuming that none of those dis-
counts and rebates were included on an invoice, that
figure would equal 5.5 percent of total pharmaceutical
sales valued at invoice prices.  Although the excluded
discounts and rebates are small overall, they could
substantially alter the price dispersion figures in Chap-
ter 3 if they were disproportionately received by a par-
ticular type of purchaser.
The calculation of the change in returns from
marketing a new drug was based on data provided by
Henry Grabowski for the average annual U.S. sales
revenues of 67 brand-name drugs (valued at invoice
prices).  Those drugs were introduced between 1980
and 1984.  The sales data cover the 1980-1991 period
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and thus capture the first eight to 12 years that those
drugs were on the market.  For drugs with only eight
to 10 years of actual data, CBO relied on sales projec-
tions by Grabowski and John Vernon to determine av-
erage annual sales revenues through year 11 for all 67
drugs.
Pricing Data from the 
Medicaid Rebate Program
CBO obtained data from the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) on the average price that
manufacturers charge wholesalers for drugs that are
then distributed through retail pharmacies, as well as
on the lowest price charged to any private purchaser
(known as the best price).  Manufacturers are required
by the Medicaid rebate program to report those prices
to HCFA for all brand-name drugs that Medicaid ben-
eficiaries buy at retail pharmacies.  CBO also obtained
data on total Medicaid sales by prescription drug (val-
ued at the price at which states reimburse pharmacies
for purchases through Medicaid).  Those data were
used to assess the differences in price increases be-
tween 1991 and 1994 for multiple-source and single-
source brand-name drugs.
Those prices reported to HCFA are among the
best available (although they are not publicly avail-
able) to assess price changes for drugs channeled
through retail pharmacies.  They represent actual
transaction prices, since all discounts and rebates to
wholesalers and retail pharmacies are included.  Both
the average price to pharmacies and the best price are
reported by dosage units, such as price per 50 milli-
gram tablet.  The average price to pharmacies of a
particular dosage form of a drug is calculated by di-
viding the value of its total sales to wholesalers or
chain pharmacies by the number of dosage units sold.3
Data from the Patent and 
Trademark Office and 
the FDA
The Patent and Trademark Office provided data on all
drugs approved through 1995 that have received an
extension under the Hatch-Waxman Act.  The Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) provided overlapping
data on the average length of time those drugs spent in
clinical testing and in having their new drug applica-
tions approved.  Those data were used to calculate the
average length of a Hatch-Waxman extension and the
average time a drug spends in the FDA approval pro-
cess.
3. Details on how the best price and average manufacturer price are
calculated can be found on HCFA's Web site at http://www.hcfa.gov/
medicaid/drug8.htm.
 
Appendix B
Regression Results on Discounting
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) ana-lyzed whether the discounts that  manufacturersoffer on brand-name prescription drugs tend to
be greater when several therapeutically similar brand-
name drugs or generic copies are available.  The anal-
ysis is based on the difference between the average
price that manufacturers charge for a particular brand-
name drug distributed through retail pharmacies (the
average manufacturer price to pharmacies) and the
lowest price they charge to any private purchaser in
the United States for that drug (the best price).  The
percentage difference between those two prices is
called the best-price discount.  CBO's analysis shows
that best-price discounts are indeed greater when more
competing brand-name or generic substitutes for a
drug are available.
That result suggests that discounts are a response
to competitive market forces.  Discounting may in fact
be an important component of price competition in the
pharmaceutical market, but because of limited data,
CBO cannot gauge its prevalence.  This analysis is
based on pricing data that only measure the size of the
largest discounts offered to private purchasers on
brand-name drugs.  The quantity of brand-name drugs
sold at those discounts, or any discount, is unknown.
Therefore, these results are only suggestive.
The Dependent Variable
In CBO's regression analysis of discounting, the de-
pendent variable (that is, the value to be explained) is
the ratio of the best price to the average manufacturer
price for a given brand-name drug sold through retail
pharmacies.  (Frequently, such drugs are sold to
wholesalers rather than directly to pharmacies.)  If a
brand-name drug is always sold at the same price, that
ratio will equal 1; if it is ever sold at a discount, the
ratio will be less than 1.
Manufacturers report best prices and average
prices to pharmacies to the Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration as part of the Medicaid rebate program.1
The average manufacturer price to pharmacies in-
cludes all discounts and rebates given to retail phar-
macies.  That average is calculated by dividing all
sales of a particular dosage form of a brand-name
drug to retail pharmacies (after netting out all applica-
ble discounts and rebates) by the number of units of
that dosage form sold to retail pharmacies (including
mail-order pharmacies).  That price is therefore an
average transaction price.  The best price also includes
all discounts and rebates given to any private pur-
chaser.  Under the Medicaid rebate program, Medicaid
is entitled to receive a discount equal to the best-price
discount or 15.1 percent of the average manufacturer
price to pharmacies, whichever is greater.
1. The amount that manufacturers sell at the best price is not known.
However, Medicaid's best-price provision helps ensure that a significant
quantity is sold at that price.  Offering a very low price on an extremely
small quantity is usually unprofitable for a company because it
increases the rebate on all outpatient sales to Medicaid.  For more
details on the pricing data set and the Medicaid rebate program, see
Congressional Budget Office, How the Medicaid Rebate on Pre-
scription Drugs Affects Pricing in the Pharmaceutical Industry, CBO
Paper (January 1996).
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To isolate the effects of competition on price dis-
persion, and to adjust for other factors that may affect
prices, CBO selected a set of economic and therapeuti-
cally relevant variables for its regression.  It used
multivariate statistical analysis to analyze the effects
of those variables on the ratio of the best price to the
average price to pharmacies (BP/AP) for a particular
brand-name drug.  The explanatory variables for mar-
ket competition—which include the number and types
of substitutes that compete with a particular brand-
name drug—are based on CBO's retail pharmacy data
set, which covers sales through retail pharmacies of all
drugs in 66 narrowly defined therapeutic classes in
1994.  Those 66 therapeutic classes encompassed 70
percent of all retail pharmacy sales in 1994.  The re-
gression was run using pricing data for the fourth
quarter of 1994 and the competitive market variables
constructed from the retail pharmacy data set for cal-
endar year 1994.
The Explanatory Variables
The analysis used six explanatory variables (see Table
B-1 for a description of them, along with their means
and ranges).  The variable explaining brand-name
competition is defined at the level of a drug's five-digit
therapeutic class, as established by the Uniform Stan-
dard of Classification codes (see Box 3 on page 23).
That variable, INVNMBR, the inverse of the number
of manufacturers, is equal to 1 divided by the  number
of manufacturers of brand-name drugs in a five-digit
therapeutic class.  That variable resembles imperfect
competition based on a Cournot model, in which the
equilibrium price is a function of 1/(N+1), N being the
number of manufacturers.  (In that model, firms
choose the profit-maximizing quantity to produce, and
the equilibrium price results.  Note that the Cournot
model does not apply when N = 1).
Another model of imperfect competition that
could apply to the pharmaceutical industry is Bertrand
competition with limited entry and differentiated prod-
ucts.  In that model, firms compete by setting prices,
with prices declining as the number of firms in a thera-
peutic class increases.2  Specifically, the ratio BP/AP
should decline as the market becomes more competi-
tive if the difference in cross-price elasticities between
pharmacies and other types of purchasers grows as
more substitutes are introduced.  Previous theoretical
analyses and one empirical study have shown that the
gap in prices paid by different types of purchasers
widens with increased competition when the difference
in price sensitivity among types of purchasers grows
as more substitutes are introduced.3
Manufacturers are more likely to offer discounts
when there are more similar brand-name drugs in the
same therapeutic class.  A manufacturer has less in-
centive to offer a discount on a breakthrough drug that
has no close substitutes.  With respect to the depend-
ent variable, the best price should be closest to the av-
erage price to pharmacies when there is only one man-
ufacturer of a brand-name drug in a given therapeutic
class.  Larger values of the BP/AP ratio should be as-
sociated with larger values of INVNMBR; thus, the
expected sign of the coefficient on INVNMBR is posi-
tive.
Similarly, the difference between the average
price to pharmacies and the best price should increase
when generic manufacturers are producing copies of
the brand-name drug.  The variables explaining ge-
neric competition are GENDUM (a dummy variable)
and INVNMG (the inverse of the number of generic
2. Four functional forms for competition were tried:  the log of N,
(N+N*N), N, and 1/N. Although the coefficients took the expected
signs in all four cases, only 1/N yielded statistically significant results
for both brand-name and generic competition. This functional form for
competition was also used by Wiggins and Maness to explain price
competition in antibiotic markets.  See Steven Wiggins and Robert
Maness, "Price Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets" (working
paper, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics, June 1994).
The empirical analysis does not distinguish whether Bertrand
competition or Cournot competition is the more appropriate model for
the pharmaceutical industry.
3. Thomas J. Holmes, "The Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination
in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, vol. 79 (March 1989);
Severin Borenstein, "Price Discrimination in Free Entry Markets,"
Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 16, no. 3 (Autumn 1985); and
Severin Borenstein and Nancy L. Rose, "Competition and Price
Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry," Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 102, no. 4 (1994).
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Table B-1.
Variables Used in the Regression Analysis of Discounting
Variable Description Mean Range
Dependent Variable
BP/AP The ratio of the best price (the lowest price to any private purchaser in
the United States) for a brand-name drug relative to the average price
to pharmacies.a  The prices for the top-selling dosage form of each
brand-name drug were used. .77 .10 to 1
Explanatory Variables
INVNMBR The inverse of (or 1 divided by) the number of manufacturers in a
therapeutic class producing an innovator drug. .23 .08 to 1
Number of brand-name manufacturers per class: 6.3 1 to 13
GENDUM Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if generic entry has occurred
and 0 otherwise.  A threshold of $1 million in total generic sales must
exist for this variable to take a value of 1. n.a. 0 to 1
INVNMG The inverse of the number of generic manufacturers and distributors
of a bioequivalent formulation of the brand-name drug.  This term is
interacted with GENDUM so it takes a value of 0 if GENDUM is 0 and
1 divided by the number of generic manufacturers if GENDUM is 1. .20b .04 to 1b
Number of generic manufacturers per brand-name drug: 11.0b 1 to 24b
MDSHARE Medicaid's market share for a brand-name drug, defined as total
Medicaid sales of the drug divided by its total U.S. sales. .14 .0005 to .79
CLSDUM A dummy variable for each therapeutic class defined at the broader
two-digit level under the Uniform Standard of Classification codes.
The data set contained 26 therapeutic classes at the two-digit level, 25
of which received a dummy.  (The class left out was respiratory
drugs.) n.a. 0 to 1
MNDUM A dummy variable given to each manufacturer of a brand-name drug
that had nine or more products in the sample.  There were 14 such
manufacturers. n.a. 0 to 1
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTE:   n.a. = not applicable.
a. This price is reported by manufacturers as the average price charged on sales to the retail pharmacy class of trade (it does not include the
wholesaler's markup).  The price is calculated by dividing total manufacturer sales to the retail pharmacy class of trade by the quantity sold (that
is, the number of dosage units, such as tablets).
b. Mean and range were taken over those observations in which GENDUM equals 1.
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manufacturers).  GENDUM takes a value of 1 if a
generic form of the brand-name drug is available.  The
expected sign of the coefficient on GENDUM is nega-
tive since the best price should tend to be lower rela-
tive to the average price to pharmacies when a generic
drug is available.
The variable INVNMG is interacted with
GENDUM, taking the value of 1 divided by the num-
ber of generic manufacturers and distributors (with
retail sales of $100,000 or more) when GENDUM
equals 1 and taking the value of 0 when GENDUM
equals 0.  Larger values of INVNMG are associated
with fewer generic manufacturers and therefore less
competition.  Thus, larger values of INVNMG are
associated with higher values of BP relative to AP,
and the expected sign on this variable is positive.
When there are four generic manufacturers,
GENDUM and INVNMG together yield
(1)*GENDUM + 0.25*(INVNMG) < 0 as long as the
expected sign on GENDUM dominates.
Medicaid market share was included as an ex-
planatory variable (MDSHARE) because of the provi-
sion in Medicaid's rebate program that requires manu-
facturers to pay a larger rebate to Medicaid if they
offer a price to any private purchaser that is more than
15.1 percent (15.4 percent in 1994) below the average
price to pharmacies.  Since Medicaid constitutes a
large share of the retail pharmacy market—about 13
percent on average—that provision discourages manu-
facturers from offering large discounts.  Medicaid
market share varies widely among different types of
drugs, and the larger Medicaid's share in a particular
drug's market, the less incentive that manufacturer has
to offer a large discount.4  Therefore, the expected sign
on this coefficient is positive, since a larger Medicaid
market share will be associated with less difference
between the best price and the average price to phar-
macies.
To account for differences in the marginal cost of
production between therapeutic classes, as well as
competitive market characteristics not accounted for in
the explanatory variables, the analysis included
therapeutic-class dummies at the two-digit level
(CLSDUM).  And to account for possible differences
in pricing policies between manufacturers, those man-
ufacturers with at least nine brand-name drug observa-
tions in the data set were given a dummy variable
(MNDUM).
The Results
The coefficients on INVNMBR, GENDUM, and
MDSHARE are all significant at the 1 percent level,
and the coefficient on INVNMG is significant at the 5
percent level (see Table B-2).5  All four coefficients
have the expected signs.  Four of the manufacturer
dummies and 12 of the class dummies are also signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level.6
The coefficients on GENDUM and INVNMG
together imply that when two generic manufacturers
have entered a market, the BP/AP ratio is 10 percent-
age points lower, and when three or more generic man-
ufacturers have entered that market, the BP/AP ratio
is 12 to 17 percentage points lower (see Table B-3).
That implies that discounts are larger when a generic
drug is available, and the size of the discounts in-
creases as more generic manufacturers enter the mar-
ket.
The regression results also show that competition
from other brand-name drugs can increase price dis-
persion.  When there are three or more manufacturers
of brand-name drugs in a therapeutic class, the BP/AP
ratio is 10 to 14 percentage points lower than if there
was only one brand-name manufacturer in that class.
Moving from one to two brand-name manufacturers is
a particularly important step, as the BP/AP ratio de-
clines by 8 percentage points.  Each subsequent brand-
name entrant continues to reduce that ratio by a small
amount.  The more brand-name manufacturers in a
class, the greater the difference between the best price
4. See Congressional Budget Office, How the Medicaid Rebate on Pre-
scription Drugs Affects Pricing in the Pharmaceutical Industry.
5. A statistical test (the Goldfeld-Quandt test) showed heteroscedasticity.
The error terms tend to be larger when MDSHARE is small. The
standard errors were corrected for heteroscedasticity before calculating
the statistical significance of the estimated parameters.
6. A chi-square test of the hypothesis that the coefficients of the set of
manufacturer dummies are jointly equal to zero can be rejected with 99
percent probability.  And a similar test of whether the coefficients of the
set of class dummies are jointly equal to zero can be rejected at the
same probability level.  Those results indicate that accounting for
differences among manufacturers and between therapeutic classes is
important in explaining changes in BP/AP.
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Table B-2.
Regression Results on Price Dispersion in 1994
Explanatory Variable OLS Parameter Estimate Standard Errora t Statisticb
Intercept 0.650** 0.0560 11.61
INVNMBR 0.145** 0.0532 2.73
GENDUM -0.172** 0.0351 -4.90
INVNMG 0.154* 0.0778 1.97
MDSHARE 0.358** 0.0942 3.79
clsdum1 0.185 0.0927 1.99
clsdum2 0.171* 0.0782 2.19
clsdum3 0.234** 0.0587 3.98
clsdum4 0.174** 0.0699 2.48
clsdum5 0.108** 0.0527 2.05
clsdum6 0.045 0.1146 0.39
clsdum7 -0.006 0.0773 -0.08
clsdum8 0.151* 0.0627 2.41
clsdum9 0.019 0.0520 0.37
clsdum11c 0.248** 0.0533 4.65
clsdum12 0.225** 0.0860 2.62
clsdum13 0.111* 0.0526 2.11
clsdum14 0.157 0.0991 1.58
clsdum15 -0.126 0.1254 -1.01
clsdum16 -0.157 0.0972 -1.62
clsdum17 0.163* 0.0766 2.12
clsdum18 0.083 0.0960 0.87
clsdum19 0.144** 0.0515 2.79
clsdum20 -0.003 0.0813 -0.04
clsdum21 0.041 0.1170 0.35
clsdum22 0.124 0.0851 1.46
clsdum23 0.127* 0.0627 2.03
clsdum24 0.086 0.1243 0.69
clsdum25 0.213** 0.0526 4.05
clsdum26 0.107 0.0815 1.31
mndum1 -0.180* 0.0691 -2.60
mndum2 0.012 0.0414 0.29
mndum3 0.005 0.0454 0.11
mndum4 -0.033 0.0709 -0.46
mndum5 0.016 0.0670 0.23
mndum6 -0.013 0.0592 -0.22
mndum7 0.188** 0.0390 4.81
mndum8 -0.102 0.0593 -1.73
mndum9 -0.216** 0.0819 -2.63
mndum10 -0.012 0.0427 -0.27
mndum11 -0.124* 0.0609 -2.04
mndum12 -0.067 0.0601 -1.11
mndum13 0.109 0.0782 1.39
mndum14 -0.142 0.0816 -1.74
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTES: The dependent variable is the ratio of the best price to the average price to pharmacies.  The R squared is 0.32 and the adjusted R squared
is 0.22.  The results are for the fourth quarter of 1994; there were 327 observations.
OLS = ordinary least squares; * = significant at the 5 percent level; ** = significant at the 1 percent level.
a. The Goldfeld-Quandt test showed that heteroscedasticity is present.  The standard errors were corrected using a consistent covariance
matrix.            
b. The t statistic was calculated using the corrected standard errors.  The statistical significance of the five leading coefficients was confirmed using
a chi-square test.
c. Clsdum10 was omitted.  That class represents respiratory drugs.
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Table B-3.
The Effects of Generic and Brand-Name 
Competition on Price Dispersion
Number of 
Manufacturers
Change in Ratio of Best
Price to Average
Pharmacy Price (BP/AP)
Competition from Generic Drugs
1 -0.02
2 -0.10
3 -0.12
4 -0.13
5 -0.14
6 to 8 -0.15
9 to 21 -0.16
22 to 24 -0.17
Competition from Other Brand-Name Drugs
1 0.15
2 0.07
3 0.05
4 0.04
5 0.03
6 to 9 0.02
10 to 13 0.01
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
and the average price, which implies that discounts are
larger.
The coefficient on Medicaid market share indi-
cates that at the mean market share of 13 percent, the
BP/AP ratio is 4.6 percentage points higher because of
Medicaid's best-price provision.  If Medicaid has just
5 percent of the market, then the BP/AP ratio is just 2
percentage points higher, and if Medicaid has 30 per-
cent of the market, that ratio is 11 percentage points
higher.  As expected, a larger Medicaid market share
is associated with less price dispersion.7
7. The same regression was run using the BP/AP ratio for the fourth
quarter of 1993.  The variables GENDUM, INVNMG, INVNMBR,
and MDSHARE were constructed based on 1993 annual sales.  The
coefficients on those variables and the intercept obtained from the 1993
regression did not differ with statistical significance from the values of
those coefficients shown in Table B-2 (based on a chi-square test).  Nor
does the difference in the values of the coefficients obtained from the
1993 regression change the economic interpretation of those
coefficients.  The coefficient that changed the most between the two
regressions was INVNMG.  According to the 1993 regression, if two or
more generic manufacturers enter the market, the BP/AP ratio declines
by 7 to 20 percentage points.
Appendix C
Assumptions Behind the Calculation
of Returns from Marketing a New Drug
Despite the patent extensions included in theHatch-Waxman Act, the present discountedvalue of the average returns from marketing a
new drug have fallen by an estimated $27 million, or
approximately 12 percent, because of the increase in
generic market share since 1984.  That calculation,
presented in Chapter 4, employs a methodology used
by economists Henry Grabowski and John Vernon in
various analyses and by the Congressional Budget Of-
fice (CBO) in a 1994 study of returns from research
and development in the pharmaceutical industry.1  The
calculation is based on estimates obtained from this
study's analysis of generic entry after patent expira-
tion.  Assumptions similar to the ones in CBO's 1994
study were used to convert the change in the stream of
sales revenues to the change in profits.
The key assumptions in the calculation—the rate
at which sales revenues eroded before and after the
Hatch-Waxman Act and the change in the length of
patent protection—are based on analysis of CBO's
retail pharmacy data set, data on patent extensions
from the Patent and Trademark Office, and a study by
the Federal Trade Commission.2  The change in re-
turns is calculated by projecting the value of total U.S.
sales revenues in the 12th to 20th year after market
introduction for the average drug in CBO's sample of
67 drugs under two scenarios.  First, what would sales
revenues in those years have been if generic market
share (for nonantibiotic drugs) were at its pre-1984
average?  And second, what would sales revenues in
those years be with a 2.8-year patent extension and
increased generic market share at the end of year 14,
as is the case today?
From those two revenue streams, the change in
profits in years 12 to 20 is calculated assuming a mar-
ginal cost of production equal to 25 percent of the
brand-name wholesale price.  That assumption is well
grounded in the literature on the pharmaceutical indus-
try.3  Since the appropriate measure of returns is after-
tax profits, a marginal tax rate of 35 percent is also
applied.  Thus, an increase in sales revenues of $1
would add 49 cents to after-tax profits in a given
year.4  The change in profits is then discounted to the
date of market introduction using a real interest rate of
1. Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, "Returns to R&D on New Drug
Introductions in the 1980s," Journal of Health Economics (1994);
Grabowksi and Vernon, "Longer Patents for Lower Imitation Barriers:
The 1984 Drug Act," American Economic Review (May 1986); and
Congressional Budget Office, How Health Care Reform Affects
Pharmaceutical Research and Development (June 1994).
2. Alison Masson and Robert Steiner, Generic Substitution and
Prescription Drug Prices: Economic Effects of State Drug Product
Selection Laws (Federal Trade Commission, 1985).
3. See, for example, Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical
R&D: Costs, Risks and Rewards (February 1993), p. 79.  Also see
CBO, How Health Care Reform Affects Pharmaceutical Research
and Development, pp. 51-53.
4. Because (1 - 0.25)(1 - 0.35) = 0.49.
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10 percent (consistent with previous studies that have
measured the average returns from marketing new
drugs).
Formulas
Because of the patent-term extensions available after
1984 and the delay between patent expiration and ge-
neric entry that existed before 1984, the sales streams
in the two scenarios do not begin to diverge until year
14.  The formula used for converting the difference
between the pre- and post-1984 sales streams into
profits (discounted to the date of market introduction)
is:
where 
i = the year on the market 
r = a discount rate of 10 percent
0.25 = unit cost as a proportion of price
0.35 = the marginal tax rate
To obtain the pre- and post-1984 streams of
sales revenues, an assumption is needed about the rate
at which those revenues would erode without generic
entry.   For both streams, sales revenues were assumed
to decline gradually starting in year 14 because of
competition from other, improved innovator drugs.
That erosion rate was assumed to be 6 percent in year
14 and to increase by 2 percentage points each year
thereafter.  The formula for sales revenue erosion
caused by competition from other innovator drugs
starting in year 14 is:
That revenue stream is then further reduced de-
pending on the size of the generic market.  The bigger
the generic market share, the smaller will be the sales
revenues for the average innovator drug. The formula
used to project the revenue stream, accounting for ge-
neric entry, is:
Generic Market Share 
Before 1984
Before the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic market share
was very small for most multiple-source drugs, with
the exception of antibiotics.  Generic market share
averaged just 12.7 percent for 29 multiple-source
drugs that were among the top 100, rated by total U.S.
sales revenues, in 1980.5  Those were drugs for which
generic entry had occurred, however.  Actual generic
market share for the average brand-name drug before
1984 was smaller than that after accounting for cases
in which generic entry did not occur.
Besides generic market share being small, the
probability of generic entry was low for an off-patent
brand-name drug before 1984.  After excluding antibi-
otics and drugs approved before 1962, only 35 percent
of the remaining top 200 drugs had generic versions
available in 1983.6  A few of those drugs had had their
patent expire in 1980 or later; hence, the overall prob-
ability of generic entry at the average time it occurred
(three years after patent expiration) was assumed to be
slightly higher, 40 percent (see Table C-1).  As a re-
sult, average generic market share for all multiple-
source drugs was assumed to be 5.1 percent (40 per-
cent of 12.7 percent), although that figure would be a
bit smaller in the first year after generic entry.
5. The 12.7 percent average was calculated based on Table A5-1 in
Masson and Steiner, Generic Substitution and Prescription Drug
Prices.  The sample in that report contained 45 multiple-source drugs.
Ten were antibiotics, and six others were eliminated because they were
still under patent, had minimal generic sales, or were only available
under a generic name.
6. Grabowski and Vernon, "Longer Patents for Lower Imitation Barriers,"
pp. 195-198.
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Table C-1.
Assumptions Used to Calculate the 
Change in Returns from Marketing a Drug
Assumption (For an 
average brand-
name drug)
Before Hatch-
Waxman Act
After Hatch-
Waxman Act
Length of Patent 
Protection 11 years 13.8 years
Time Between Patent 
Expiration and 
Generic Entry 3 years 1.2 monthsa
Probability of 
Generic Entry 40 percent 91.5 percent
Generic Market Share
1 year after generic
    entry 2.4 percent 40 percent
2 years after generic
    entry 5.1 percent 50 percent
3 or more years after
    generic entry 5.1 percent 60 percent
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
a. This average does not account for cases in which generic entry
was delayed.  Such cases are taken into account in the esti-
mated probability of generic entry.
Generic Market Share 
After 1984
CBO assumed that in the post-Hatch-Waxman period,
generic entry normally occurs within 1.2 months of
patent expiration.  That figure resulted from examin-
ing 17 top-selling nonantibiotic drugs whose patents
expired between 1990 and 1993.  For 14 of those
drugs, the average delay between patent expiration and
generic entry was just over one month.  (The date of
generic entry for those drugs was included in a paper
by Grabowski and Vernon; CBO obtained the date of
patent expiration from the Food and Drug Administra-
tion’s so-called Orange Book for 1990).7  For the
other three drugs, generic entry took 17 to 21 months
after patent expiration; but according to an official of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), that delay
occurred largely because the agency was unable to
evaluate those applications quickly since it was recov-
ering from a scandal in the generic drug industry.8
CBO’s assumption about the size of the generic
market shortly after patent expiration and generic en-
try is based on an analysis of 21 innovator drugs in the
retail pharmacy data set that first faced generic com-
petition between 1991 and 1993.  Generic sales consti-
tuted an average of 44.2 percent of total prescription
sales for those drugs during the first full calendar year
after generic entry.9  Since that figure is based only on
cases in which generic entry occurred, CBO adjusted
it by the estimated probability of such entry—calcu-
lated to be 91.5 percent (see Box C-1).  As a result,
the average generic market share in the year following
patent expiration, accounting for cases in which ge-
neric entry does not occur, is estimated to be about 40
percent.
By the time three years have elapsed since generic
entry, the average generic market share for a drug is
assumed to have reached 60 percent.  CBO estimated
that figure as follows.  Overall generic market share
—calculated as the volume of generic countable units
sold to all purchasers in the United States divided by
the volume of all drugs sold, including single-source
drugs—was 40.4 percent in 1994, according to IMS
America.  (Note that this figure for 1994 generic mar-
ket share is lower than the 50.5 percent figure in Box
C-1 because it is taken as a percentage of all drug
sales rather than just sales of multiple-source drugs.)
Based on the retail pharmacy data set, CBO estimated
that including all dosage forms in that average, rather
than just those that are easily countable, such as tab-
7. See Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, “Longer Patents for Increased
Generic Competition in the U.S.” PharmacoEconomics (1996), Table
1, p. 112; and Department of Health and Human Services, Food and
Drug Administration, Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations (1990).  The patent expiration dates are also
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/da/ patex17.htm.
8. Personal communication with an FDA official on March 26, 1998.
9. The unweighted average generic market share for the 21 drugs was 43
percent.  Weighting that average (a volume measure) by the value of
the drugs' retail pharmacy sales revenues in 1991 (thus giving higher-
selling drugs a greater emphasis) yields an average generic market
share of 44.2 percent.
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Box C-1.
Calculating the Probability of Generic Entry
Not every brand-name prescription drug with an expired
patent faces competition from generic copies.  In some
cases, generic entry is delayed or even prevented because
generic manufacturers have particular difficulty proving
bioequivalence.  Premarin, a drug to help prevent osteopo-
rosis, is one such case.  Since not all of the key ingredients
in Premarin have been clearly identified, bioequivalence is
hard to demonstrate.1  Although the patent for Premarin has
expired, no generic versions are currently available.
Premarin was the 11th-best-selling drug in the United
States in 1997, with sales of $800 million.2  A few manu-
facturers obtained approval from the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) for generic copies of Premarin, but that
approval was later withdrawn.
Generic entry can also be delayed when a drug con-
tains a very potent active ingredient that is dangerous if the
body absorbs too much too quickly.  Generic manufacturers
have more difficulty obtaining FDA approval for such
drugs, so fewer generic manufacturers may apply for ap-
proval.  The immunosuppressive drug Imuran (whose chem-
ical name is azathioprine) is an example.  Although Imuran
lost patent protection in 1979, a generic version was not
approved by the FDA until 1996.3  Generic entry can also
be delayed because of lawsuits between innovator and ge-
neric firms over which patents actually protect a drug.
To fully account for cases in which generic entry is
prevented or delayed, the Congressional Budget Office ex-
amined the patent and exclusivity status of all single-source
drugs in its retail pharmacy data set in 1994 (277 drugs) to
determine what was preventing generic entry.  Patent pro-
tection or an exclusivity provision prevented generic entry
for all but 77 drugs.  Of those 77, only eight had significant
sales through retail pharmacies (of $40 million a year or
more).4  Two other important cases, Premarin and
Coumadin (an anticoagulant), had modest generic retail
1. "Wyeth-Ayerst Commits to Characterization of Premarin, FDA
Says; Generic Conjugated Estrogens May Not Be Approved Until
Premarin Is Characterized," The Pink Sheet, F-D-C Reports, May
12, 1997, p. 3.
2. "Post-1990 Launches Represent 43% of Rx Market, IMS Says,"
The Pink Sheet,
 F-D-C Reports, March 9, 1998, p. 9. 
3. Personal communication with an FDA official, March 31, 1996.
(The patent expiration date was obtained from a data set provided
by David Dranove of Northwestern University.)
4. In 11 cases, drugs with annual retail sales through pharmacies
that totaled $11 million to $33 million did not have generic cop-
ies.  The remaining cases had sales of less than $10 million; many
had sales of less than $1 million.  Of the eight significant drugs
with no generic competition in 1994, six now have generic com-
petitors.  One drug that still has no generic competitors is the birth
control pill Lo/Ovral.  The patent status of two other birth control
pills in the data set that had sales of more than $50 million a year
and no generic competition could not be determined, so they were
not included in calculating the probability of generic entry.
sales in 1991, but those sales tapered off to an insignificant
amount by 1994.5
Accounting for the 77 cases without generic competi-
tion, plus the cases in which such competition was severely
limited, lowers the average generic market share in 1994
from 55.2 percent to 50.5 percent.6  Thus, the implied prob-
ability of generic entry—adjusting generic market share
(calculated as a percentage of the volume of sales of all
multiple-source drugs) to account for cases in which generic
entry does not occur soon after a drug's patent has ex-
pired—is 91.5 percent.7  The higher percentage, 55.2 per-
cent, was calculated by dividing the number of generic pre-
scriptions dispensed by the total number of prescriptions
dispensed for all multiple-source drugs with generic sales
of $100,000 a year or more.  To obtain the lower percent-
age, 50.5 percent, the calculation included in the denomina-
tor the number of prescriptions dispensed for off-patent
brand-name drugs with no generic entry as well as for
multiple-source drugs with any generic competition (includ-
ing those with generic sales of less than $100,000).8 
The estimate of 91.5 percent may not accurately reflect
the probability of generic entry in the first year after patent
expiration.  That estimated probability is based on the over-
all market average and does not focus on drugs that lost
their patent protection recently.  Still, the cases in which
generic entry does not occur are extremely limited for top-
selling drugs and will not be accurately picked up if only a
small number of drugs that recently lost patent protection
are analyzed.  The best approximation available was to take
an overall market average. Applying that probability re-
duces generic market share in the first year after patent ex-
piration from 44.2 percent to 40 percent.  The sensitivity
analysis discussed later in this appendix shows that CBO’s
estimate of the decline in returns is only slightly sensitive
to reasonable variations in the assumed level of post-1984
generic market share.
5. Generic competition for Coumadin has been hampered.  See "Barr
Is Barring Warfarin Competitors with Bulk Agreement, Invamed
Sues," The Pink Sheet, F-D-C Reports, March 2, 1998, p. 11; and
"Dupont Merck Payments to PBMs Blocked Barr Warfarin Dis-
pensing," The Pink Sheet, F-D-C Reports, March 16, 1998, p. 26.
Generic sales for Coumadin dropped between 1991 and 1994
because the two previously approved generic drugs' manufacturers
were forced to leave the market during a scandal involving certain
generic drug manufacturers and FDA officials in the late 1980s.
6. That generic market share is calculated for all dosage forms.
Confining the dosage forms only to tablets and capsules increases
generic market share by 2.2 percentage points.
7. Because 50.5 divided by 55.2 equals 0.915.
8. The only brand-name drugs with retail pharmacy sales of over
$20 million that had competing generic retail pharmacy sales of
less than $100,000 were Premarin and Coumadin. Both of those
were top-selling brand-name drugs.
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Table C-2.
Formulas for Calculating Generic Market Share
Year of Drug's 
Product Life
Before Hatch-Waxman Act After Hatch-Waxman Act
Formulaa Value Formulab Value
14 None 0 (0.44)(0.915)(0.1) 0.04
15 (0.06)(0.4) 0.024 (0.44)(0.915)(0.9) + 
(0.5)(0.1)
0.41
16 (0.127)(0.4) 0.051 (0.5)(0.9) + (0.6)(0.1) 0.51
17 to 20 (0.127)(0.4) 0.051 (0.6) 0.60
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
a. Equal to average generic market share when generics are available times the probability of generic entry.
b. Equal to average generic market share times the fraction of the year to which the average applies.  For example, in year 15, the formula is a
weighted average of the average generic market share in the first and second years after patent expiration.
lets and capsules, reduces generic market share to 38.2
percent.10  To calculate average generic market share
for drugs that have been off patent for three or more
years, the 38.2 percent figure was divided by 66.7 per-
cent, the share that off-patent drugs constituted of the
retail pharmacy data set in 1994.  As a result, CBO
estimated that generic sales represented 57.3 percent
of all sales of multiple-source and off-patent single-
source drugs in 1994.11  Since generic market share
has continued to increase slightly since 1994, and
since older drugs would have a slightly higher generic
share than the market average (which includes drugs
that recently went off patent), CBO adjusted that esti-
mate of average generic market share upward to 60
percent.12
The figure for generic market share in the second
year after patent expiration, 50 percent, is simply an
average of the figures for the first and third years.
In CBO's calculations of generic market share,
the estimated probability of generic entry (91.5 per-
cent) helps to account for the cases in which generic
entry is delayed by a year or more.  In the first year
following patent expiration, generic market share
equals 44.2 percent multiplied by 91.5 percent, or 40
percent. In the third year after patent expiration and
later, the cases in which generic entry did not occur
were incorporated into the calculation of a generic
market share of 60 percent.  How sensitive CBO's cal-
culation of the change in returns from marketing is to
those estimated generic market shares is analyzed be-
low.
The formulas used to project generic market
share based on this analysis are shown in Table C-2.
The first year of patent expiration is split between
years 14 and 15 of a drug’s product life.  Since ge-
neric entry is assumed to occur at the very end of year
14, in that year generic market share is equal to only
10 percent of 44.2 percent multiplied by 91.5 percent,
which is 4 percent.  In year 15, generic market share is
a weighted average of generic market share in the first
year after patent expiration (90 percent) and the sec-
10. Limiting the calculation only to tablets and capsules raises the average
generic market share calculated from the retail pharmacy data set by
2.2 percentage points.
11. That figure has already been adjusted to account for cases in which
generic entry was prevented, since the sales of single-source, off-patent
brand-name drugs were accounted for in the 66.7 percent.
12. IMS America estimated that overall generic market share in 1996 was
42.6 percent.  Adjusting that figure from mainly tablets and capsules to
all dosage forms would imply a market share of 40.4 percent.  Then,
assuming the same split between brand-name and generic drugs in 1996
as in 1994 would yield a generic market share of 60.5 percent for drugs
off patent.
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ond year after patent expiration (10 percent).  The av-
erage generic market share for year 15 is therefore 41
percent.
Sensitivity Analysis
CBO examined the sensitivity of its estimate of the
decline in the present discounted value of the average
returns from marketing a new drug ($27 million) to the
assumptions used to construct the pre- and post-1984
streams of sales revenues.  The results indicate that
the estimate is little affected by modest changes in the
key assumptions (see Table C-3).
If, in constructing the pre-1984 sales stream,
CBO assumed that generic drugs took four years in-
stead of three to enter the market after patent expira-
tion, the estimated decline in returns would be $28
million, just $1 million different.  That change is small
because the size of the pre-1984 generic market was
small, so postponing generic entry by another year in
that period does not have much effect on the basic re-
sult.
 The effect would be greater if generic entry was
further postponed in the post-1984 period (since ge-
neric market share is higher then), but the data that
underlie CBO's estimate of a 2.8-year average post-
ponement under the Hatch-Waxman Act are solid.  If
the average length of a patent extension was six
months shorter, returns would fall by an additional $5
million.  If the average length was six months longer,
the decline in returns would be $4 million less.  How-
ever, the data on patent-term extensions obtained for
all drugs approved between 1992 and 1995 make it
unlikely that the estimated average length of an exten-
sion would be off by as much as six months.
CBO's basic result is not very sensitive to a small
increase in the size of the generic market.  For exam-
ple, if the post-1984 generic market share was 45 per-
cent in the first year after generic entry, rising to 65
percent in the third year and beyond, the decline in
returns would be $30 million—only $3 million more
than the base case.   Those alternative assumptions are
based on what might be a reasonable upper bound for
current levels of generic market share.
CBO assumed that the marginal cost of produc-
ing another unit of a prescription drug was 25 percent
of its brand-name price.  Varying the marginal cost
from 20 percent to 30 percent of the brand-name price
causes the total decline in returns to vary between $25
million and $29 million.  Thus, CBO's estimate is not
particularly sensitive to reasonable variations in incre-
mental unit costs.
As a drug becomes obsolete and its efficacy is
surpassed by that of newer innovator drugs, its sales
revenues gradually erode.  That erosion rate was as-
sumed to be 6 percent in year 14 and 8 percent in year
15, increasing by 2 percentage points each year there-
after.  If CBO had used a slightly slower rate of reve-
nue erosion caused by product obsolescence—starting
at 5 percent in year 14 and increasing by 1 percentage
point each subsequent year—the total decline in re-
turns would be an estimated $30 million.  By contrast,
with a faster erosion rate—6 percent in year 14, in-
creasing by 3 percentage points each year thereafter
—returns would decline by $25 million.  Hence, the
estimate is fairly robust to that assumption as well.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the extent to which
brand-name prices respond to generic entry is unclear
from previous studies.  CBO's base case assumes that
those prices do not respond to generic entry.  If brand-
name prices did change because of generic competi-
tion, they would primarily affect the profit stream in
the post-1984 scenario, since generic market share
was so small before 1984.  If, because of increased
discounting, the average brand-name price was 5 per-
cent lower in each year after generic entry in the post-
1984 scenario, the returns from marketing a new drug
would fall by $29 million, a difference of $2 million.
If, conversely, the average brand-name price was 5
percent higher in that period after generic entry, esti-
mated returns would fall by $25 million.  Thus, CBO's
calculation is not highly sensitive to any effect that
generic entry might have on brand-name prices.
An important number on which the calculation
depends is sales revenues in year 13 (the average
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Table C-3.
How Sensitive Is the Calculation of Returns to Changes in the Base-Case Assumptions?
Decline in Returns
(Millions of 1990 dollars)
Base-Case Assumption Alternative Assumptions
Total 
Decline
Variation from
Base Casea
Pre-1984 Delay Between Patent Expiration and Generic Entry
3 years 4 years 28 1
2 years 26 -1
Length of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term Extension
2.8 years 6 months longer 23 -4
6 months shorter 32 5
Post-1984 Generic Market Share After Generic Entry
40 percent one year later, 
50 percent two years later, 
60 percent three or more years later
Higher:  45 percent one year later, 
    55 percent two years later, 
    65 percent three or more years later
30 3
Lower:  35 percent one year later, 
    45 percent two years later, 
    55 percent three or more years later
24 -3
Marginal Cost
25 percent of unit price 20 percent of unit price 29 2
30 percent of unit price 25 -2
Sales Erosion Rate from Brand-Name Competition
6 percent in year 14, 
increasing by 2 percentage 
points each year thereafter
Higher:  6 percent in year 14, increasing by
    3 percentage points each year thereafter
Lower:  5 percent in year 14, increasing by
    1 percentage point each year thereafter
25
30
-2
3
Post-1984 Change in Brand-Name Prices Because of Generic Entry
No price change Brand-name price is 5 percent higher 
    in years 14 to 20
25 -2
Brand-name price is 5 percent lower 
    in years 14 to 20
29 2
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
a. The base case is a $27 million decline in the present discounted value of returns.
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drug's peak year, before product obsolescence and ge-
neric entry occur).  According to CBO's data set, those
revenues averaged $139.2 million in 1990 dollars.13
CBO's estimate of the change in returns is not very
sensitive to modest changes in those revenues.  For
example, if sales revenues in year 13 were 10 percent
lower, the estimated decline in returns would be $24
million.  If sales revenues in year 13 were 10 percent
higher, the estimated decline in returns would be $30
million.  Of course, if revenues were 10 percent lower
or higher in all years leading up to year 13, then total
returns would also be lower or higher than the as-
sumed $210 million to $230 million.  But even ac-
counting for the corresponding change in total returns,
the result (taken as a percentage of the total expected
returns from marketing a new drug) would remain a
decline of about 12 percent, on average.13. Average U.S. sales for the 67 drugs in CBO’s sample were $139.2
million in year 11 and were assumed to continue at that level through
year 13.
Appendix D
The Replacement Effect
Besides its primary effect of reducing the returnsfrom marketing innovator drugs, generic entrycan also have a small positive effect on the in-
centive to innovate.  Economists have shown that a
monopolist can have a tendency to "rest on his lau-
rels."1  Monopolists may have little incentive to re-
search and develop new products that will compete
directly with their currently marketed products—a
phenomenon referred to as the replacement effect.
When a cash flow model of the expected returns from
marketing an innovative product incorporates that ef-
fect, it shows that in a few cases, the net impact of
generic entry on a monopolist's incentives to innovate
could be close to zero (although in general one would
expect returns to decline).  In those cases, generic en-
try may reduce the size of the replacement effect al-
most as much as it reduces the present discounted
value of the returns from marketing an innovation.
Whether the reduced replacement effect signifi-
cantly offsets the direct decline in returns caused by
generic competition will depend on how much of the
current product's market is being replaced and the tim-
ing of that replacement.  The reduction in the replace-
ment effect is more likely to be an important factor
when the product being replaced is within a few years
of patent expiration.  That implies that when pharma-
ceutical companies invest in developing new drugs in
therapeutic classes in which they are already market
leaders, the rise in generic competition may not lower
their incentive to innovate as much as the Congres-
sional Budget Office's (CBO's) calculation of the re-
turns from marketing a drug (presented in Chapter 4)
would appear to indicate.
Still, only a limited number of cases exist in
which the reduced replacement effect could be strong
enough to nearly offset the direct decline in returns
because of generic competition.  Although companies
do continue to develop drugs in therapeutic areas
where they are market leaders, they also invest in ther-
apeutic areas where few treatments exist.  And it is in
precisely those areas—where patients may benefit the
most from a new drug—that the offsetting replacement
effect is not present at all.
As Box D-1 shows, the profit stream from inno-
vating is equal to the present discounted value of the
returns from marketing the innovation, offset by any
decline in the present discounted value of the profit
stream from the currently marketed product (that de-
cline, shown in brackets in the box, represents the re-
placement effect).  Generic entry reduces the present
discounted value of the returns from marketing the
innovation (by an average of $27 million in 1990 dol-
lars, according to CBO's analysis) but is offset some-
what by a decrease in the replacement effect.
That relationship can be expressed mathemati-
cally, as follows.   Assuming that:
t  = number of years a product has been
on the market
tg = year of generic entry
1. Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1988), p. 392, quoting Kenneth J. Arrow.  Although manu-
facturers of brand-name drugs usually do not have a pure monopoly, the
analysis still applies to innovation in this industry.
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Box D-1.
Calculating the Impact of the Replacement Effect and Generic
Competition on the Returns from Innovation
Calculation of Returns from Innovation When New Products Replace Old Ones
Present Discounted
Value (PDV) of
Profits from 
Innovation
= PDV of Returns from
New Product
–   PDV of Returns
8 from Currently
, Marketed Product
x Share of Current
Market Replaced >
by New Product 2
Calculation of How the Rise in Generic Entry Since 1984 Has Affected Returns
Change in PDV of
Profits from Inno-
vation Caused by
Increased Generic
Entry
= Change in PDV of
Returns from New
Product
–   Change in PDV of
8 Returns from Cur-
  rently Marketed
, Product
x Share of Current
Market Replaced >
by New Product
2
T = number of years of product life
h = year in the life of the currently mar-
keted product when a new, compet-
ing product is introduced by the mo-
nopolist
 = share of the current product's market
that is absorbed by the new product
$
M(t) = monopolist's profits in year t with no
generic entry
$
G(t,tg) =  monopolist's profits in year t with
generic entry
$
C(t,tg) = $M(t) if t < tg
$
G(t) if t > tg
VM = profit stream generated from intro-
ducing a new product after the cur-
rent product has been on the market
for h years, in the absence of generic
competition following patent expira-
tion
VG = profit stream generated from intro-
ducing a new product after the cur-
rent product has been on the market
for h years, with generic entry in
year tg
It is assumed that the functions $M(t) and $G(t,tg) are
the same for the product that is currently on the mar-
ket as for the new one.  Those functions could be
thought of as the average profits generated from mar-
keting a new drug t years after market introduction.  In
the absence of generic entry, the change in the profit
stream from introducing a new product after the cur-
rent one has had h years on the market is equal to:  
The first term equals the present discounted value of
the profits from the innovation.  The second term
equals the decline in the present discounted value of
the profit stream of the currently marketed product
after the innovation is introduced (the replacement ef-
fect). After accounting for generic entry, the profit
stream from innovation becomes:
The first two terms are equal to the present discounted
value of the profits from the innovation.  The second
term accounts for lower postpatent revenues when ge-
neric entry occurs.  Together, those equations imply
that the effect of generic entry on the returns from
marketing an innovation can be expressed as:
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The first term in that combined equation equals the fall
in the present discounted value of the profit stream
from the innovation because of generic entry starting
in year tg.  The second term equals the loss in the fu-
ture profit stream from the currently marketed product
because its sales volume declines after the more inno-
vative product is introduced.  The amount by which
VM exceeds VG is diminished by the change in the re-
placement effect.  
Note that using present discounted values dimin-
ishes the first term more than the second term.  The
effect of generic entry on the current profit stream is
diminished because it occurs at the end of a drug's
product life.  But the change in the replacement effect
under generic entry occurs sooner, as reflected by dis-
counting by t - h years rather than by t years.  Sup-
pose that h = 10, so that a new product is introduced
after the monopolist's current product has been on the
market for 10 years.  The model used in this study
estimates that the effect of generic entry on the present
discounted value of profits, when discounted back only
to year 10, is more than twice the value when dis-
counted back to year 0.  If more than half of the cur-
rent product's market is absorbed by the new product
( > 0.5), the change in the replacement effect would
completely offset the first term.  The change in the
replacement effect is largest when the currently mar-
keted product approaches patent expiration.
